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ABSTRACT 
MILITARY MASCULINITIES IN THE MAKING: 
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY 
 
 
Elif İrem Az 
Cultural Studies, MA Thesis, 2014 
Supervisor: Ayşe Gül Altınay 
 
 
Keywords: military, education, masculinity, neoliberalism, Turkey. 
 
Military schools have historically been the black boxes of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
The subjects who make up the military and their education in military schools have 
largely remained outside of academic inquiry. Since the establishment of the Republic, 
the military has been consolidating its power over political processes, the legal system 
and everyday life through various coups and interventions. Yet, we witness a historical 
shift in political, social and cultural positionality of the military since the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz [Sledgehammer] trials, beginning in 2007 and 2010 respectively. Based 
upon participant observation, modest historical research, and in-depth interviews with 
former cadets of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy who were 
students between the years 2003 and 2013, this study aims to trace the links between my 
research participants’ narratives and the military’s falling from grace. This thesis argues 
that this shift ranges from internal restructuring of power in professional military 
education to changes in ideological, ethnic, and class composition of the military. It is 
argued that this allegedly homogeneous entity is made up of diverse bodies, subjects 
and ideologies that are dynamically being restructured in this process. Trying to 
transcend the artificial distinction between the institutional representation of the military 
and the agents who compose it, this thesis, draws attention to the importance of 
academic research on the professional military, not only through the decision-making 
processes of a high ranking minority of military officers but also through the 
heterogeneous subjectivities and layers of complication within the institution. 
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ÖZET 
ASKERİ ERKEKLİKLER OLUŞURKEN: 
BUGÜNÜN TÜRKİYESİ’NDE PROFESYONEL ASKERİ EĞİTİM 
 
Elif İrem Az 
Kültürel Çalışmalar, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014 
Tez Danışmanı: Ayşe Gül Altınay 
 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: Ordu, eğitim, erkeklik, neoliberalizm, Türkiye. 
 
 
Askerî okullar tarihsel olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin kara kutusu olmuştur. Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetleri’ni oluşturan özneler ve bu öznelerin nasıl yetiştirildiği üzerine 
akademik çalışmalar yok denecek kadar azdır. Türkiye tarihindeki askerî darbe ve 
müdahaleler, ordunun siyasi karar alma süreçlerindeki, hukuki alandaki ve gündelik 
yaşam pratiklerindeki gücünü ve etkisini yeniden üretmiştir. Ne var ki, sırasıyla 2007 ve 
2010 yıllarında başlayan Ergenekon ve Balyoz davalarından bu yana, ordunun ülke 
içindeki siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel konumunda tarihsel bir değişime tanık olunmaktadır. 
Bu araştırma için, 2003 ve 2013 yılları arasında Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi ve Deniz Harp 
Okulu öğrencisi olmuş, eski askerî öğrencilerle derinlemesine görüşmeler ve katılımcı-
gözlem yapılmıştır. Aynı zamanda mütevazı bir tarihsel araştırma yürütülmüştür. Bu 
çalışma, görüşmecilerimin anlatılarıyla ordunun değişmekte olan gücü ve konumu 
arasındaki bağlantıları araştırmaktadır. Burada bahsedilen değişim sürecinin; 
profesyonel askerî eğitimin yeniden yapılandırılmasından ordunun ideolojik, etnik, 
sınıfsal, yapısal ve güç ilişkileri bakımından dönüşümüne kadar uzandığı iddia 
edilmektedir. Homojen bir yapı olarak algılanan ve sivil-asker ilişkileri literatüründe 
homojen bir yapı olarak ele alınınan ordunun farklı bedenler, erkeklikler, öznellikler ve 
ideolojilerden oluşan karmaşık bir yapı olduğu ve bu yapının da söz konusu değişim 
sürecinin etkisiyle dönüşmeye devam ettiği ortaya konmaktadır. Ordunun kurumsal ve 
homojen temsili ile orduyu oluşturan gerçek özneler arasındaki suni ikiliği aşmaya 
çalışan bu çalışma, profesyonel orduya dair akademik çalışmaların önemine işaret 
etmektedir. Zira ordu, yalnızca karar alma pozisyonlarında bulunan yüksek rütbeli bir 
subaylar azınlığından oluşmamakta ve çok katmanlı bir kurum olarak içerisinde 
heterojen öznelikler barındırmaktadır. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Entering the field before the fieldwork 
My grandfather brought my father to Istanbul for military high school entrance 
examinations in 1970. He took both Land and Air Force exams. He answered only some 
of the questions so that his father would think he could not succeed, although the 
children of military officers were positively discriminated and given extra points
1
. 
When asked why he did not want to enter a military high school, my father responded 
with a rhetorical question: “What happens when you set gunpowder on fire?” He did not 
want to speak further on this memory, and he said he leaves the rest to my 
interpretation. Metaphorically, I think he is the gunpowder, and military school is the 
fire. He expected to “explode” if he had gone to military high school.   
In 2003, one of my elementary school friends, Ali decided to enroll in Turkish 
Naval High School [Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi] in Heybeliada. I was surprised by his 
willingness. His parents were wealthy people who did not have a positive look on 
boarding schools. Moreover, I was probably affected by my father’s negative perception 
of military officers and policemen. During one of our meetings while we were both in 
high school, Ali came with a friend from school, Selim. In our conversations that day, 
his unhappiness and criticisms about professional military education struck me, an 
                                                 
1
This regulation was lifted only in 2005. See “‘Babam subay’a ek puan yok”. Yeni 
Şafak, November 5, 2005, accessed May 15, 2014.  
http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/kasim/05/g06.html. 
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unhappiness which a couple of years later drove me to ask him for an interview for the 
term paper of one of my courses.  
Where and when did my field begin? Although the largest part of my ‘fieldwork’ 
was actualized between December 2013 and April 2014, I think several memories from 
my past life became a part of ‘the field’ of this research. In retrospect, I understand that 
not only my interest in Selim’s emotions about the experience of professional military 
education but also my memories or post-memories of my grandfather whom I knew as a 
retired Captain of Land Forces, and his impact on my father is reflected in the subject 
and textual outcome of this study.  
Sandra Harding suggests, “The beliefs and behaviors of the researcher are part of 
the empirical evidence for (or against) the claims advanced in the results of research. 
This evidence too must be open to critical scrutiny no less than what is traditionally 
defined as relevant evidence.” (Harding 1987). In a similar vein, Ruth Behar writes a 
quest for a genre recognized also by Clifford Geertz as missing: “the language to 
articulate what takes place when we are in fact at work.” (Geertz 1995, 44; cited in 
Behar 1996, 8-9) Since these discussions took place in anthropology in the 1980s and 
90s, the involvement of the researcher’s beliefs, behaviors, and emotions during the 
ethnographic practice have become acceptable, if not expected, aspects of ethnographic 
analyses. Navigating back and forth between ‘the field’ and my personal life, which 
relates in different ways to the subject under study, the question of where the field 
begins has been interwoven with my aspiration to embed my related ‘personal’ stories 
within the accounts of the lives of my research participants.  Thus, I aim at locating my 
subjectivity as well as my pre-fieldwork expectations and prejudices in this thesis. It has 
been far from easy for me to think up interesting ways to draw deeper connections 
between my own life as a young woman student in Turkey and the experiences of 
former cadets. Thus, I try my best to use “(self-) reflexivity as an important tool to 
access and develop” knowledge (Breuer, Mruck and Roth 2002), to incorporate, at least, 
my presence within the field in this thesis.  
Based upon participant observation, modest historical research, and extensive 
interviews withseventeen former cadets of Turkish Naval High School and/ or Turkish 
Naval Academy who were students between the years 2003 and 2013, this study aims to 
trace the links between my research participants’ narratives and macro process of the 
military’s changing power and position from 2007 onwards. I track down a recent 
historical shift in the military that ranges from internal restructuring of power in 
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professional military education to changes in ideological, ethnic,and class composition, 
to the military’s changing reputation in the public sphere.First, I aspire to locate this 
unprecedented shift in the history of civil-military relations and professional military 
education in Turkey. Secondly, I seek for the ways in which children and adolescents 
are composed as both productive and subjected bodies and masculinities through 
internal discipline. While professional military education continues to have a routinized, 
standardized and disciplinary training, I argue that this allegedly homogeneous entity is 
made up of diverse bodies, subjects and ideologies. This heterogeneity produces a 
plurality and dynamism of military masculinities, which has its corollary in the 
historical shift the military is undergoing. While the power is restructured in military 
schools in parallel to the military’s falling from grace, my research participants state 
experiencing and witnessing changes in desired military masculinities of TAF. Thus, 
trying to transcend the artificial distinction between the institutional representation of 
the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the agents who compose it,this study aspires to 
propose a different “way of knowing” the military, as our perceptions are characterized 
“not only by rules and values but also by ways of knowing” (Escobar 1995, 13). This 
thesis, hopefully, draws attention to the importance of critical approaches to the 
professional military, not only through the decision-making processes of a high ranking 
minority of military officers but also through the heteronegeous subjectivities and layers 
of complication within the institution. 
 In this introduction, after discussing my methodological considerations, I 
individually introduce my research participants. Afterwards, the terminology and 
internal organization of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy are 
presented. I later discuss the impacts of the military’s shifting position in macro politics 
on Turkish Naval High School, and especially on Turkish Naval Academy. Finally, I 
move on to the possible contributions and the outline of the thesis. 
1.2. Methodological considerations 
To accomplish this research, I conducted semi-structured, open-ended, and in-
depth interviews with fifteen individuals and a group of two who were students of 
Turkish Naval High School located in Heybeliada, and Turkish Naval Academy located 
in Tuzla, Istanbul, between the years 2003 and 2013. Due to the scope and limits of this 
study, and the concerns about access to the former cadets of other military schools, I 
chose to narrow down this research with the two schools of Turkish Naval Forces. 
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Except one interview with two research participants at the same time, I conducted 
individual interviews in three different cities/ towns of Turkey. Some of my research 
participants kindly called me when they visited Istanbul, and made the process much 
more easier for me. Therefore, this study can be described as a multi-sited ethnography 
(Marcus 1995). 
While entering the field in December 2013, I was assuming that my ability to 
reach former cadets will be determined by Selim’s willingness to introduce me to his 
friends. However, Selim happened to be my first gatekeeper before I got in contact with 
Rıdvan, and Hakan. While Selim and the research participants with whom I contacted 
through him are from the cohorts who are born between 1987 and 1990, Hakan and 
Rıdvan come from other cohorts that are significant for this thesis in different ways.  
Hakan was from one of the cohorts born between 1990 and 1992, among whom 
there are cadets who went through investigations as a result of the anonymous advice 
letters received by Turkish Naval Academy administration in 2008-2009. After our 
interview, he helped me contact with three other friends of his. Yet one of them did not 
want to meet me not because he is “afraid of anything” but because he does not “want 
to remember,” as stated by himself. Rıdvan on the other hand, was a contact who found 
me rather than vice versa. While we were discussing my thesis topic with friends in a 
public place, he overheard us, and said he would like to speak with me and help me 
with finding other contacts. Rıdvan and the two research participants whom I reached 
thanks to his willingness to help are from the cohorts born between 1992-1994. While I 
introduce my research participants in detail below, I shall mention here that I do not 
share from which cohort they originate or any personal information that would make it 
easy to identify them for the sake of their anonymity.  
Though I had three gatekeepers, Selim, Rıdvan, and Hakan respectively, I 
benefited from participant-observation by courtesy of Selim. He took me to social 
meetings with his friends from Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval 
Academy, where I had the chance to observe their interactions, meet former cadets, and 
arrange interviews. During the writing process, he was always available to answer my 
questions.  
Important reflections of my subjectivity in this study stem from the 
positionalities I take in the eyes of my research participants. Some spoke with me as a 
close friend of their dear high school and academy friends Ali and Selim. Some others 
who are younger than me showed me the respect one would show to an abla [elder 
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sister] who is a graduate of Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi 
University, and a teaching assistant at Sabancı University. Combined with this, another 
challenge was my gender. A young woman who is trying to understand the 
transformations in professional military education and asking questions about men’s 
masculinities, friendships and sexualities, was, a source of anxiety, at least for the 
younger research participants who shared a great deal of anxiety about making an 
interview with me. Since they stated facing mobbing and discrimination in school or 
getting through hard times of administrative investigations or court cases, I was very 
much empathetic to their concerns. 
An additional challenge was dealing with the knowledge of my feminist and 
anti-militarist positionality, which was familiar to the research participants who were 
friends with Ali and Selim. While some of my younger interviewees spoke about the 
value of being patriotic for a cadet and a military officer, I tried my best to be an 
empathetic listener. When they asked my opinions, I answered without hiding or 
trivializing my own political positionality, but also stating my respect for their stance. 
As my first anthropological research, this process and the research participants taught 
me how to stay respectful and empathetic in disagreement, which was one of my major 
ethical considerations before the fieldwork.  
My interactions with Ali, Selim and my other formerly cadet friends ‘before’ 
entering the field shaped my tentative guesses to a great extent about the outcomes of 
this research. Yet I tried my best to utilize the afore-acknowledgement of these guesses 
in order not to let them shadow my perceptions on their narratives and my observations 
in the field.  
1.3. Research participants 
My first gatekkeper Selim accompanied me throughout the fieldwork process 
and I benefited from his insights on professional military education, particularly in my 
analysis in chapter four. The interviewees who were willing to participate because they 
trusted Selim, who prepared the social environment for me to tell his friends about my 
research several times, are from the cohorts born between 1987 and 1989, with one 
elder exception, Kerem. I will categorize these ten interviewees as the first group, when 
it is relevant to do so. Hakan and the two interviewees I reached through him are from 
the cohorts born between the years 1990 and 1992, and will be called the second group. 
The last group of participants was born between 1992 and 1994, and they will be 
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referred to as the youngest or third group throughout the thesis. These categories are 
shaped according to the outcomes of the interviews, despite the fact that they appear to 
be based on age difference. Starting from the first interviewee, I introduce my research 
participants in the order of the above-listed three groups. Unless indicated otherwise, 
the cadets went both to naval high school and the academy. 
First group, born between 1987 and 1989, cadets between 2001 and 2011 
Kaan 
 Kaan is a military officer who currently does not have an assigned position 
because of his health problems. As the other members from the first group, he 
mentioned the randomness of his enrollment in naval high school. His father is a civil 
servant in the field of education, and his mother is a civil servant in health care service. 
He said there are not any military officers or non-commissioned officers (NCO) in his 
family, and explained his decision to enter the examinations of Naval Forces as follows: 
Kaan: […] was a naval officer. He is a family friend. He is closer to me than 
an uncle or an aunt, think that way. He told me that they would make me a 
military officer in a school on Heybeliada. And I was aspired, of course. 
There is no soldier in our family. My father is against it. He is so against 
that… You know they make us wear costumes at kindergarten; one becomes 
soldier, one doctor, one nurse. I was going to be a soldier. Or was it a cop? 
It was either a soldier or a cop. Yeah, it was a soldier I think, since my mom 
worked at military, a costume could have been arranged, you know… 
Something amateurish. However, my father is, in fact, a rightist, nationalist 
man. He somehow feels antipathy against uniforms. Or rather, he didn’t 
want us, me, to be inside one from the beginning.
2
 
3
 
 
His parents, especially his father who is a Turkish nationalist according to Kaan, did not 
desire a military career for Kaan, although they did not disapprove, either. It was 
striking for me to notice that he does not count his mother as working in the military, 
                                                 
2
All the interviews were conducted in Turkish. Unless indicated otherwise, the 
translations of both the interviews and the originally Turkish resources from which I 
make quotations belong to me, of course with the generous help of Müjde Yılmaz.  
3Kaan: […] deniz astsubayıydı. Aile dostumuz. Bana amcadan teyzeden yakın, öyle 
düşün. O bana dedi ki seni, Heybeliada’da okul var, seni subay yapacağız. Ben de tabii 
özendim. Benim ailemde hiç asker yok. Benim babam da karşı. Babam o kadar karşı ki 
hani kreşte herkese kıyafetler giydirilir ya biri asker olur, biri doktor olur, hemşire olur. 
Ben asker olacaktım. Polis mi olacaktım? Ya asker ya polis ikisinden biri. Ha asker 
galiba, annem askeriyede çalıştığı için oradan kıyafet ayarlanabilir falan gibisinden, 
anladın mı? Amatör bir şey yani. Halbuki babam benim aslında milliyetçi, sağ görüşlü 
bir adamdır. Ama üniformaya antipatisi var adamın. Daha doğrusu, bizim, benim 
içeride olmamı istemiyordu en başta. 
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although she does in a well-known military institution with a civil status, nor did he 
mention her influence on his decision.  
 
 
Oğuz 
 Oğuz left the naval academy of his own volition. He recently graduated from the 
university he was transferred to after the academy. There is a military professional in 
his family who did not want Oğuz to enroll in a military high school. Remaining a 
student after his classmates in the academy became military officers, with good salaries, 
disturbed him. However, he expressed his self-complacency outside the military. Like 
Kaan and Onur he emphasized the subjectivity of his unhappiness in military schools: 
Oğuz: These are, of course relative troubles. I mean, I might find it difficult 
while another one does not. Something that bothers another one may not 
bother me at all. I mean, in conclusion, it depends on how you look at it or 
what kind of a person you are. I didn’t find these difficult. I might have but I 
thought like this… I could do this job better than most people, I mean, 
perhaps better than most people who work at this profession right now, 
because I had this thing in me… I might have stronger sense of patriotism 
than others. But I… To be honest, under these circumstances I see some 
kind of people. I said “I can’t do this job” in the end. Frankly speaking, I 
had trouble.
4
 
 
Burak 
 Burak quit military education when he graduated from naval high school. Not 
because he has a military officer in the family but because he was successful enough to 
be ranked among the first hundred in the high school entrance examination, he entered 
the naval high school with an exceptional degree. His parents did not want to send him 
to one of the top high schools of the country, according to Burak, because they thought 
they did not possess the necessary cultural capital: 
Burak: I took it as a trial, to have some testing experience. I came out with a 
good degree. […] And after high school placement test, I took enough 
points to go to one of the best Anatolian high schools in Istanbul. They 
might have thought if I had gone to that school, it would have put them in 
                                                 
4Oğuz: Bunlar tabii kişiden kşiye değişen zorluklar. Yani bu bana göre zor gelir, 
başkasına zor gelmeyebilir. Yani başkasını zorlayan şey bana zor gelmeyebilir. Yani 
sonuç olarak nereden baktığın, nasıl bir karakter olduğuna bağlı. Bana bunlar zor 
gelmedi. Gelecekti açıkçası, şöyle düşündüm ben. Ben açıkçası çoğu insandan belki 
şuanda mesleği yapan çoğu insandan daha iyi bu işi yapabilirdim çünkü benim içimdeki 
hani şey... Vatan sevgisi belki diğerlerinden daha güçlü olabilir. Ama benim... Ben 
açıkçası bu şartlar altında bir takım gördüğüm insanlar oluyor. “Bu işi yapamam” dedim 
ben yani. Sıkıntı yaşadım açıkçası yani. 
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cultural and financial trouble. My father said “Will you study here? Look at 
those long haired boys with earrings, will you be like them?” in a despotic 
way. Yes, the teachers are appointed by the government. The woman asked 
if I had a foreign language, I said no. She assumed that I had English but not 
French. I thought that I would really be crushed there. I was a chubby boy. 
Dad also said that “I want to see you strong as a nail, in front of me.” This 
was another blow to me, do you understand? Though I hadn’t even thought 
about it once till that time, all of a sudden I found myself obliged to go to 
the military high school.
5
 
 
He recently started to work in a private company in Istanbul. He expressed no regret 
about leaving the military, although he was quite unhappy because he had to take the 
university entrance examination with a serious disadvantage
6
. 
Efe 
Efe works as a military officer in a Mediterranean city. He graduated from both 
naval high school and naval academy. There is a non-commissioned officer in his 
family. Among my interviewees from his groups he had the most positive approach to 
the military as an institution. I interpret his distinguishing motivation to arrange our 
interview in line with his stated presupposition that my other interviewees most 
probably would have negative perceptions of professional military education and the 
military. I did not ask about how they identify themselves to my research participants, 
class or ethnicity wise. Efe implied not yet needing a guaranteed salary, and thus 
working as a military officer not out of obligation but desire. He narrates his first night 
                                                 
5
Burak: Deneme olsun, sınav tecrübesi olsun diye girdim. Dereceyle girdim, […] Lise 
giriş sınavına girince de İstanbul’daki en iyi anadolu liselerinden birini kazandım. 
Kültürel açıdan o lisede okumamın kültürel ve maddi olarak onları zorlayacağını 
düşünmüş olabilirler. Babam “burada mı okuyacaksın, bak şu küpeli uzun saçlı 
çocuklara, böyle mi olacaksın?” demişti despot bir şekilde. Öğretmenleri devlet mi 
atıyor, evet. Kadın yabancı dilin var mı diye sordu, hayır dedim, kadın İngilizce bilip 
Fransızca bilmediğimi düşündü. Ben burada hakikaten ezilirim diye düşündüm. Biraz 
tombik bir çocuktum. Babam bir de “Serhat ben senin çakı gibi karşımda olmanı 
istiyorum” demişti, buradan da vurdu beni, anladın mı? O ana kadar aklımdan 
geçmezken, ben bir anda kendimi askeri liseye gitmek zorunda buldum. 
6At the time, one’s weighted high school grade point average was determined by the 
overall success of the students of a high school in that particular year. Since the 
graduates of military high schools do not take the university entrance exam but pass on 
to the Academy automatically, Burak had a very low weighted high school gpa, which 
narrowed his possibilies down albeit his considerable success in the exam. For the 
details of the updated regulations see “YGS Puan Hesaplama.” meb.gov.tr, January 23, 
2013, accessed May 15, 2014. Last updated on October 11, 2013. 
http://mebk12.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/42/02/216195/icerikler/ygs-puan-
hesaplama_290103.html.  
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in Heybeliada as an expression of the resoluteness he showed not to quit professional 
military education: 
Efe: At my first night there, people were like that, crying, complaining or 
so. Then, I went to sit at a place with a very beautiful view. I just sat there. 
[…] I was on my own. I said that I would stay. So far, I have never thought 
about leaving. I mean, I am alright. I would stand behind that. Perhaps that 
is why I like navigation. If I hadn’t made that decision back then, I would 
have probably had nothing to do with marine but I like standing behind the 
things I do very much. I mean, if I won’t be able to do something, I don’t 
even mention it. After that, I have never gone through that again.
7
 
Tarık 
Tarık lives in an Aegean city working as a military officer. He likes his job as he 
works in a quite specific unit of Naval Forces. There is a military officer in his family. 
He is content with his ongoing life except the limited socialization opportunities he can 
access because of his job, and the gated military zone he works in. Like Efe, he did not 
leave the school although his parents are able to afford the compensation penalty for 
quitting. First, he said he never wanted to become a burden to his parents, and then 
asked “Most young people outside don’t worry about their future until they graduate 
from the university, right? I have no idea why we were like that.” 
Ümit 
 Ümit was one of the comfortable interviewees expressing the ‘normality’ of 
hierarchy, violence, and suffering as indispensible parts of military education. There is 
not a military member in his family, and he stated learning about military high school 
from a teacher in his elementary school. He left the military after the academy 
graduation, and found a good job almost immediately. He defined his experience of 
military school as simultaneously the best and worst thing that has ever happened to 
him. His emphasis on the positive impacts, I think, is a reflection of his contentment 
about his current life: 
Why did you say “both the best and the worst”? 
Ümit: ‘cause it is so, it had many contributions on us. Everyone at school 
saw themselves as the standard people. Why? Military says that people 
under some standards cannot come in, they eliminate them from the 
beginning. Then again, they cannot hold themselves over some standards. I 
                                                 
7Efe: İlk gün gittiğimin akşamı millet şey yapıyor, ağlayanlar zırlayanlar falan. Sonra 
oturdum böyle, çok güzel yer vardı böyle manzaralı. Oturdum böyle. […] Kendi 
kendimeydim. Kalacağım dedim. Bir daha da hiçbir zaman gitmek aklıma gelmedi. 
Memnunum yani. Onun arkasında da dururum yani. Belki de onun için seviyorum 
denizciliği. O gün o kararı vermesem denizle alakam olmayacak belki ama ben yaptığım 
şeylerin arkasında durmayı çok severim. Bir şeyi yapamayacaksam söylemem yani. O 
günden sonra hiç bir daha o konuyu açmadım kendime. 
10 
 
mean a boy was a very good sportsman, a national oarsman and he quitted, a 
national chess player quitted. These kind of extremes have got themselves 
out. So, people at school look at those in lower degree and say: man, he is 
an inch lower, I am the standard. And from time to time some urban legends 
like “the questions of whatever course outside was such but ours were 
such…” You always compare yourself to the life here. […] We were 
educated well compared to the outside. The school taught how to learn, how 
to use our brain in a better way.
8
 
 
Berk 
 Berk found himself in a military high school as a fait accompli presented by his 
parents. Although he won a very prestigious high school in Istanbul, his father enrolled 
him in the Turkish Naval High School because he went bankrupt. After he left the 
academy, he was transferred to a good university. During his undergraduate studies, he 
worked in several companies doing things related to advertisement, and now he works 
for a very famous advertising agency. He expressed respect for military officers several 
times throughout our interview, as he was describing himself as fitting perfectly in the 
capitalist market economy. He was very enthusiastic while telling me about his job and 
his future plans. His emphasis on his ‘distinguishing abilities’, on which he trusted 
while taking the risk of leaving the military, served to legitimize his detachment from 
the academy albeit having a great deal of respect for military professionalism. There is 
no military officer, NCO or  civil servant working for the military in his family. 
Mahmut 
 Mahmut was a kabak in the Turkish Naval Academy, yet a loved one for the 
“originals” 9 . He works as a military officer. His socio-economic background is 
significantly different from the rest of first group. His father works in an underpaid 
freelance job, and his mother is a stay-at-home housewife. He did not made any 
mention of his ethnic background. He was born and grown up in the eastern Turkey 
unlike the rest of my research participants. While expressing his dissatisfaction with his 
                                                 
8Niye “hem en iyi şey hem kötü” dedin? 
Ümit: E öyle, birçok şey kattı bence. Okulda herkes kendini standart kişi olarak 
görüyordu. Niye? Askeriye diyor ki, bu seviyenin altındaki giremez, diyor; onu baştan 
eliyor. Ondan sonra belli bir seviyenin üzerinde kendini tutamıyor. Yani adam çok iyi 
sporcu milli kürekçiydi ayrıldı, milli satranççıydı ayrıldı. Böyle çok uç kişiler de attı 
kendini. Okulda millet o yüzden alttakine bakıyor: ulan bir tık aşağıda, ben standartım. 
Arada bir şehir efsanesi: “ulan dışarıdaki bilmem ne soruları olsa şöyleymiş de, bize bu 
sorular”... Kendini hep burayla kıyaslıyorsun. […] Dışarıya göre iyi yetiştirmişiz 
kendimizi. Nasıl öğrenebileceğin, kafayı çalıştırma konusunda iyi yetiştirmiş okul. 
9
The adjective, or name, original is used for the cadets who are have also been the 
students of Turkish Naval High School. 
11 
 
occupation, he was the only one from the first group who stated seeking for a 
guaranteed job, and the privileges of a military career: 
Mahmut: The real purpose to it was not a special one like “I was born to be 
a soldier” or so, not like this. It was the worries about the future, the 
attraction of officialism, a guaranteed job, etc. Yes.
10
 
Kerem 
Kerem is a military officer in the Black Sea region. He was born between 1981 
and 1983, and was a cadet approximately between 1996 and 2005. Yet his narrative is 
not distinct from the memories and perceptions of the first group in terms of the various 
sites of transformation I trace. Our interview with him was quite uncomfortable as we 
were in a room without a door. Furthermore, we were having the interview right after 
we met, which was the case only for Ali and Mert except for Kerem, and I think this 
had a distancing effect as well. Consequently, he did not share as much as did the other 
interviewees on how he remembers professional military education and perceives being 
a military officer. However, he mentioned being raised by a single parent, at least for a 
while before he enrolled in naval high school. I thought after this and his other 
statements that he comes from a relatively disadvantaged family like Mahmut when 
compared to the others. 
Onur 
 Onur was expelled from the academy, by intentionally committing several 
offenses, so as to exhaust his disciplinary points
11
 in order to be transferred to a 
university
12
. He stated his regret over his decision because of the financial burden he 
put on the shoulders of his parents, and because he felt lost in the civilian world. While 
                                                 
10Mahmut: İşin aslı çok öyle özel bir maksat değildi yani, “ben asker olmak için 
doğdum” vs., bu değil. Gelecek kaygısı, memuriyet peşinde koşma, garanti iş vs… 
Evet. 
11
Each cadet enters the Turkish Naval High School and the Turkish Naval Academy 
with a full disciplinary point of 120. As they get punished due to their disrespectful 
behaviors to their seniors, or because of their other misdemeanors such as dirty shoes or 
hats, they consume these points. Even in the academy, when a cadet falls under a certain 
amount of points, the family of the cadet is invited to the school, even if they have legal 
capacity and do not need a guardian. First, the cadets are not seen as capable 
individuals. Second, his or her parents are those who will pay the compensation penalty 
for their military education if one gets expelled from the school. Exhausting the entire 
120 points results in being expelled from the school no matter how successful one is in 
his or her courses. 
12
The related law of the time was allowing only the former cadets who are expelled 
from a military school to be transferred to a university decided by the Higher Education 
Council, in accordance with the cadet’s general point average.  
12 
 
stating his appreciation of the military as an institution and nationalism as an ideology, 
he said his detachment was a result of increasing pressure on the cadets after the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz operations: 
Onur: After passing to the military academy you start asking yourself “What 
am I doing? I am following a path and I will step into that profession” and 
after you finish 4
th
 class in the academy, you have a time till 30
th
 of July. 
Until that time, you have to decide whether you will quit or not. Because if 
you don’t, there will be a compulsory service of 15 years. And, since after 
3
rd
 year I would start having difficulties, I didn’t want to do that compulsory 
service for 15 years and I didn’t want to choose military as my profession, I 
quitted military academy. But the time I quitted was such, as an excuse of 
the operations Ergenekon and Balyoz, many people were arrested. […] Till 
that time, I had been in military school for 5 years and I hadn’t seen such 
pressure… When those incidents emerged, I was at military academy and I 
was being punished for nonsense, silly reasons and things began to get 
really bothersome.
13
 
 
As Onur put, the increasing pressure on the cadets from 2009 onwards was observed by 
the first group to a certain extent. However, it was the cohorts succeeding them who 
faced mobbing and discrimination, or observed their friends being harassed by the 
commanders, as claimed by my younger research participants. 
Second group, born between 1990 and 1992, cadets between 2004 and 2013 
Hakan 
 Our acquaintance with Hakan dates back to 2007, when he was still a cadet. 
When I called him in April 2014, he was very helpful with arranging the interview. 
Enrolled in a prestigious university by taking the student selection examination after 
leaving the naval academy, he is very happy with his life. He comes from a lower 
middle class family, living in small town of Anatolia. There is not a military 
professional in the family. His sibling has a bright career, which set a precedent for 
Hakan while he was considering leaving the military. Our interview was a turning point 
                                                 
13Onur: Harp okuluna geçtikten sonra da artık diyorsun “Ben ne yapıyorum, bir yola 
doğru gidiyorum, artık ben mesleğe adım atacağım ve Harp 4’ü bitirdikten sonra 30 
Temmuz’a kadar bir zaman var. O zamana kadar karar vermen lazım okuldan ayrılacak 
mısın, ayrılmayacak mısın. Çünkü eğer ayrılmazsan on beş sene kadar zorunlu hizmet 
var. Ben de işte üçüncü sınıfta şey olacağı için, bundan sonra artık zorlanacağım için, 
15 sene zorunlu hizmet yapmak istemediğim için ve askerliğin mesleğim olmasını 
istemediğim için askeri okuldan ayrıldım. Ama benim ayrıldığım dönem şöyle bir 
dönemdi, bu işte Ergenekon ve Balyoz soruşturmalarını bahane edip birçok insanı 
tutukladılar. […] Ben o zamana kadar beş senedir askeriyedeydim ve ben o zamana 
kadar görmediğim baskıyı... Biz işte harp okulundayken böyle bir olay olunca ben de 
artık antin kuntin şeylerden ceza almaya başladım ve canım çok sıkıldı artık böyle 
durumlara. 
13 
 
in the fieldwork: First, he narrated the story of how he decided to take the military high 
school examinations. Second, he personally knows the two cadets who were 
apprehended while having a sexual affair, and the following investigations began with 
the anonymous accusation letters received by the academy administration.  
I was astonished to hear that Hakan became a part of the Hizmet Movement
14
 
while he was attenting one of their training centers [dershane] for student selection 
examination for high schools [Temel Öğretimden Orta Öğretime Geçiş, TEOG], and he 
enrolled in Turkish Naval High School with the encouragement of the community. His 
brothers
15
 were saying that Naval Forces is morally the most corrupted body among all 
military forces; thus, religious people like Hakan shall contribute to its transformation: 
Hakan: At secondary school I wanted to have more science courses. So I 
attended one of private institutions of Cemaat [Gülen community]. I met 
some of those famous “brothers”. After some invitations to their home and 
such things, I started to visit them regularly. It was usually a group of two or 
three people. […] You regularly meet with three people at a house and so 
on. After that they made military school such… They made me want to 
attend it. […] Naval Forces was being considered as the worst part of this 
thing. The most Kemalist one… I mean, they saw it as a crap and the most 
Kemalist part, the most opposing part was naval office. Cemaat wanted to 
change Naval Forces the most. The ones referring me to the naval high 
school were them. I also wanted it but it was mostly their doing. A few 
times, I had second thoughts like “should I choose the air?” but they had 
mostly canalized me towards naval high school.
16
 
                                                 
14“The Gülen community that mainly identifies itself as Hizmet Hareketi 14 or Nur 
Cemaati is one of the widely recognized Islamic groups in Turkey and internationally. 
[…] Whether it is a successor of a Nurculuk movement led by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
or an extension of this movement is debatable. However, it can be argued that Nursi 
was one of the influential figures who shaped Gülen’s thoughts on the Islamic 
revivalism. Still accentuating on the revitalization of faith, the current leader of the 
movement, Fethullah Gülen who resides in the USA since 1999, appropriates modernist 
discourse. Differently from other Islamic movements and other Nur groups, the Hizmet 
movement constantly negotiates and engages with secularist processes and expands its 
activities internationally […] The decentralized organization, informal membership and 
lack of transparency of the community makes it impossible to provide the exact number 
of the followers and sympathizers of the movement.” (Saparova 2014, 8)  
15
The Hizmet Movement has a system of “brothers” and “sisters.” According to one’s 
gender, particular brothers or sisters mentor him or her. They also help with one’s 
courses if necessary. 
16Hakan: Yedinci sınıftayken falan daha çok fen lisesi istiyordum. Sonra cemaatin 
dershanelerinden birine gittim. Orada meşhur abilerle falan tanıştım. Onlar evlerine 
çağırma olayları falan derken, yavaş yavaş gidip gelmeye başladım. İki üç kişilik 
gruplar halinde oluyordu. […] Üç kişi sürekli bir eve gidiyorsun falan filan. Ondan 
sonra askeri liseyi iyice şey yaptılar. Ister duruma getirdiler beni. […] Deniz Kuvvetleri 
en pislik yeri olarak görülüyordu bu şeyin. En Atatürkçü… Yani onlar en pislik 
14 
 
 
His contact with the movement continued until the first years of the academy. Because 
he started to feel bad about answering the questions of brothers about his friends and 
commanders from the school, he stopped answering their calls, and after several 
months, told them he do not want to see them anymore. Hakan provided me with three 
other contacts from his group among which only one did not want to make an interview 
with me. 
Eren 
 Like the other interviewees introduced thus far, Eren won a good high school in 
his city. There is not a military officer or a NCO in his family but he decided to enroll in 
the naval high school after taking the advice of his relatives and family acquaintances. 
“It was a quickly made decision, I can even say a coincidence”, he said. In 2009, the 
academy administration received anonymous letters about some eight to ten cadets 
including Eren. Although he left the academy because of his exhaustion of the 
accusations and administrative investigations he went through, he stated that he finds 
military professionalism very hard in this specific historical context. He also stated 
thinking that the military approximates to the police force, which has negative 
connotations in his perception: 
Eren: I think it is a very difficult profession in today’s world, being directed 
by others and living in the pattern you are supposed to live in and all. I don’t 
believe that people live there has much saying on their own lives. Because 
even their vacation days are predetermined, not personal. You should know, 
too. While you have, at least the chance, right, to say that “I won’t go to 
work today, enough” if you are a civilian, you don’t have that right here. 
Very simple, in my head being military officer is restrictive in regard to 
one’s freedom and it does not give you chance to develop yourself or so. 
Even after retirement, you have a limited list of occupations to follow, I 
don’t know much about the financial part. Probably it is in middle level 
taking Turkey’s conditions into consideration. I mean, perhaps it is lower 
than the salary of a person working after graduating from a fine university. 
[…] Before, it wasn’t like this in Turkey. Everybody is aware of that. In the 
past, the military could play an active role in international relations in the 
direction it wished. This is my opinion. But now, I don’t think that it is 
possible. Both the condition of the world and the transformation Turkey 
                                                                                                                                               
görüyordu ama en Atatürkçü, en şey olan, her şeye karşı çıkan Deniz Kuvvetleri’ydi. En 
çok Deniz Kuvvetleri’ni değiştirmek istiyordu cemaat. Beni Deniz Kuvvetleri’ne 
özellikle onlar sevk etti. Ya ben de deniz istiyordum ama onlar da şey yapmıştı. Birkaç 
kere fikrim değişir gibi oldu havaya mı gitsem falan diye, ama Deniz’e daha çok 
yönlendirmişlerdi. 
15 
 
faced for the last 10 years brought this about. I mean, I do not think of it as 
very different from being a cop.
17
 
 
Arda 
 There is no one from the military in Arda’s family. He entered only the naval 
high school entrance examination,as he wanted to be a seaman rather than a soldier. He 
mentioned the common perception in the society and within the military that marines 
are regarded as lesser soldiers than those in the army and air force. He said his parents’ 
guidance also impacted his decision although they did not pressurehim. Arda was very 
successful in his courses like Hakan and Eren. He shared the same faith with Erenand 
went through investigations because of the accusations about him received by the 
administration. While neither Eren nor Arda shared the details of their particular cases, 
the changes in perceptions on a military career as a result of these processes were 
perceptible throughout our interviews. Arda comes from a middle class family like 
Eren, and his parents were willing to afford the compensation penalty after his 
detachment from the academy since they were informed about the mobbing and 
investigations faced by their son.  
Third group, born between 1992 and 1994, cadets between 2006 and 2013 
Rıdvan 
 Rıdvan left the naval academy very recently, a couple of years after the start. He 
was transferred to a university, and is still a student. He has a military officer in family 
with whom he is angry, because this person did not take any action while Rıdvan was 
discriminated by his company commanders, facing mobbing and extra psychological 
and physical training. He said he did not want to leave the military but he was forced to 
by the harassments of his commanders. He mentioned his non-need for a guaranteed 
                                                 
17Eren: Şu gün çok zor bir meslek olduğunu düşünüyorum. Sürekli birileri tarafından 
yönlendirilip kalıplar çerçevesinde yaşamak yani. Hayatının çok da fazla kendi elinde 
olduğunu düşünmüyorum orada yaşayanların. Çünkü izin günleri bile sonuçta belirli 
yani, şey değil. Sen de biliyorsundur. Sivilde en azından bir gün ben bugün işe 
gitmeyeceğim ya yeter dediğin bir hakkın şansın varken, öyle bir şansın yok. En basit, 
kafamda subaylık çok fazla özgürlük kısıtlayıcı ve çok fazla kendini geliştirme de 
olanak çok fazla tanımayan bir meslek olarak görüyorum. Meslek değiştirmeye de izin 
vermiyor. Emekli olduktan sonra da yine olabileceğin meslekler sınırlı yani. Maddi 
durumu da çok fazla bilmiyorum. Herhalde Türkiye şartlarında ortalama bir seviye yani. 
İşte iyi bir üniversiteden mezun olup çalışandan belki daha da düşük olabilir. […] 
Eskiden Türkiye’de o şekilde değildi. Herkes de farkındadır. Eskiden ordu kendi karar 
verdiği doğrultuda uluslararası ilişkilerde bir aktif rol oynayabiliyordu. Bu benim 
görüşüm. Ama şu an öyle bir şey olmasına imkan yok olarak görüyorum. Hem dünya 
şartları buna getirdi hem Türkiye’nin bir on senelik dönüşümüyle de bu duruma girdi. 
Benim gözümde bir polisten çok da farklı bir konumda değil yani. 
16 
 
salary and job provided by a military career through the economic well-being of his 
parents. He also highlighted his Turkish identity several times by expressing the strange 
presence of Kurdish cadets coming from civilian high schools in naval academy. Unlike 
the other groups, he emphasized his passion to enroll in military high school, 
distinguishing himself and his friends from the rest: 
Rıdvan: There were students thinking like me too: cadets who are in 
military school for having professional pleasure in the future but not for job 
warranty.
18
 
Ali and Mert 
 Ali and Mert are two former cadets who recently left the academy, sharing the 
same faith with Rıdvan. They agreed to meet me on the condition of being interviewed 
together. Only when we met could I understand their anxiety. Then I felt worried and 
uneasy about having the interview. I realized, they decided not to calleach other by 
namewhile I was recording. Yet in retrospect, I do not regret my decision to continue 
anyway since at the end, they were content with sharing what they have been through, 
and I thought this was the reason why they agreed to meet me in the first place. They 
both had military professionals in their families. Mert’s father did not want him to 
‘waste himself’ in military schools, with his words. They emphasized that they did not 
‘leave’ the academy but they were ‘pushed out’ as a consequence of the commanders’ 
harassments and mobbing. Thus, they stated they were very proud to be cadets while 
still in naval high school and the academy. Like Rıdvan, they mentioned being 
passionate about becoming a military officer, not because they need a guaranteed salary 
but with nationalist feelings. 
Furkan 
 Furkan left the military when he finished the naval high school. Thus he was not 
subjected to mobbing or extra disciplinary training like Rıdvan, Ali and Mert. However, 
the military’s declining ‘prestige’ in domestic arena affected his decision to quit, he 
said. There are many military officers and NCOs in his family. Whilst they supported 
his entrance to the naval high school, they supported his detachment as well, because of 
the military’s ‘loss of prestige’, according to Furkan. Like the others from the third 
group, he highlighted the economic and social prosperity of his parents, implying he left 
                                                 
18Rıdvan: Ama benim gibi öğrenciler de vardı. Sadece meslek sahibi olmak için değil de 
mesleki haz almak için giden öğrenciler de vardı. 
17 
 
the military not because he is a betrayer running from a sinking ship but because of 
increasingly irrational discipline within the schools.  
1.4. The terminology and organization of professional military education 
“Hem mahpus hem lise hem asker arkadaşı:)”19 wrote a former cadet while sharing 
a photo from their class reunion in Summer 2014. ‘Class’ refers to a particular cohort in 
Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy. ‘Class unity’ requires 
solidarity among classmate cadets, and secrecy of the internal debates of the cohort. It is 
a value that shapes the perceptions of my research participants on professional military 
education to a great extent. Meanings that are attributed to it usually change from cohort 
to cohort but sometimes even from individual to individual.   
Classmates are first of all “prison friends.” The hierarchy between cohorts 
reinforces the class unity as well as the isolation of a cohort from the others. Secondly 
and most importantly, the physical isolation of the military schools from civilian life 
make cadets ‘prisoners’ in their memories. The expressions ‘closed inside’ and 
‘imprisoned’ were widely used by all of my interviewees, even by those who 
championed the disciplinary techniques of professional military education for the sake 
of a stronger military.  
Thirdly, not only the physical isolation but also financial concerns imprison many 
cadets, as they have to pay a large amount of compensation penalty if they quit or get 
expelled from the school. While the children or adolescents enroll in a military high 
school or a military academy, a contract is signed between TAF and the parents, and the 
latter become the guarantor of the expenses that will be made for their children. Selim 
stated that the penalty was approximately one hundred thousand Turkish liras but it was 
decreased gradually since the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power. 
Most recently in 2013, the pocket money, stationary costs, medical and service 
expenses have been removed from the list. Additionally, the guarantor will compensate 
only fifty percent of the food cost.
20
 The cadets automatically become a party of the 
contract when they turn eighteen. Because one’s parents sign the binding contract when 
                                                 
19“Prison, high school, and military friends at the same time:)” 
20“Askeri okuldan ayrılana tazminat müjdesi!”. Sabah, November 9, 2013, accessed 15 
May 2014. http://www.sabah.com.tr/Egitim/2013/11/09/askeri-okullardan-ayrilanlarin-
odedigi-tazminat-miktari-dusuruldu. For more, please see Av. İlknur Sezgin Temel. 
“Askeri Öğrencilik Dönemine İlişkin Yönetmelik Değişikliği”. 
http://ilknurtemel.av.tr/bilgi/makalelerim-2/askeri-okullar/. 
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s/he is thirteen or fourteen, s/he can refuse the deal once became a legally capable 
citizen. In that case, parents as the guarantor of the contract have to pay the 
compensation penalty.  However, the children do not have the capacity to understand 
the content of the contract at the time of initial deal. If this is not a violation of the 
child’s rights21, it certainly creates a great deal of pressure on cadets, especially if their 
parents are not wealthy enough to pay the penalty. Secondly, there is another binding 
contract signed between the new graduates of the academies and TAF.After they take 
the military officer’s oath on August 30 Victory Day, right after their graduation, and 
sign this contract, they do not have the right to quit until they finish obligatory service 
time, which was reduced to ten years in 2012
22
. Though not all the working conditions 
of military officers are within the scope of this research, these two binding regulations 
have a great deal of impact on the perceptions of my interviewees on professional 
military education. 
Classmates are high school friends since they spend three years of their adolescence 
eating, studying, sleeping and suffering from disciplinary power together. Among my 
research participants, there were some who had left military school. In our 
conversations, they highlighted the difference between their friendships from the 
military, and from civilian life by expressing overwhelmingly positive feelings about 
the former. Yet when it comes to the educational experience, their narratives on the 
daily routine in high school and in the academy, which are analyzed in chapter three, 
show that the experience of schooling has hardly left any traces in their memories. 
Making it all the way from the beginning of high school till the end of military academy 
has great importance for many former cadets. Those who come from civilian high 
schools are labeled as kabaks
23
. Even cadets who promote to junior class as a result of 
                                                 
21 “Convention on the Rights of the Child”. 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx. 
22“Subay ve Astsubayların Mecburi Hizmet Süresi Kısalıyor”. TRT Haber, March 14, 
2012, accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/subay-ve-
astsubaylarin-mecburi-hizmet-suresi-kisaliyor-32422.html. 
23
Kabak means both courgette and bald in Turkish, yet the word is used by former 
cadets of military high schools for those who directly come to naval academy from a 
civilian high school: as some of them put “those who are not ready, tough enough for 
military education; those who are unripe”. Some of my interviewees stated that in the 
past, the cadets coming from civilian high schools mostly did not know how to swim. 
Thus they were having special trainings with swimming floats called kabak, and this is 
the origin of their title. Though many cadets from civilian schools enter the naval 
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their already advanced English are deemed to be ‘less soldiers’ than those who went 
through the preparation class: 
Efe: What I mean is, that man says “I’ve suffered from this for a year during the 
first year of the high school”, that is his mentality. He says, “This man came 
without going through the first year and now he is looking down upon us”. Do you 
know what I mean? You are at first class, you finished a year at high school, you 
brag about being a soldier, and this man comes directly. Why? Because his English 
is good. Then you teach him how to walk, you make fun of him bla bla, a million 
things.
24
 
 
Thus, the significance of missing a year in high school because one’s English is good 
comes from the hierarchy of suffering/ soldiering rather than of education. 
 Based on our interviews with former cadets, I argue that they have a very 
powerful sense of military friendship based on common suffering, which forms an 
integral part of military masculinity. As they believe they have had to become 
individuals far earlier than their peers in civilian schools, professional military 
education is regarded as a military experience rather than a high school or university 
experience.  
 The military is compartmentalized as companies, battalions, and regiments, from 
smaller to the bigger respectively. The Chief of the school is a Staff Colonel.  This 
means that Turkish Naval High School is conceptualized as a battalion. The design of a 
military school is organized according to the rank of its Chief. Thus, the Chief of 
Turkish Naval Academy is an admiral
25
, and the academy is his regiment. Selim stated 
the assignment of a vice-admiral, for the first time, as the military’s Chief of Education 
of Turkish Naval Forces, responsible of all the schools of the force
26
, was a surprise for 
                                                                                                                                               
academy by knowing how to swim, Mahmut said there are still special/ extra swimming 
trainings for those who did not, including him. 
24
Efe: Öyledir yani adam “ben lise birde bir sene bu acıyı çektim” diyor, o mantalitede. 
Bu adam bir sene okumadan geldi de bizi eksik görüyor diyor, tamam mı? Sen lise 
birsin, bir sene okumuşsun, askerlik yaptım diyorsun, gaza geliyorsun, adam direk 
geliyor. Niye? İngilizce’si iyi diye. Sonra ona yürümeyi öğretiyorsun, dalga geçiyorsun 
falan filan, milyon tane şey. 
25
The level of admiral is composed of four sub-ranks: Rare admiral, Vice admiral, 
Admiral, and Admiral of the Fleet. The rank of the Chief shall be the highest ranking 
officer serving in a military school by rule. Therefore, if a Colonel is from the same 
cohort with the new Chief of the school who is high ranking because s/he is a staff 
officer, the Colonel is reassigned. 
26
These are Turkish Naval High School, Turkish Naval Academy, Naval Non-
commissioned Officers College [Deniz Astsubay Meslek Yüksekokulu, DAMYO], and 
Karamürsel Bey Training Center –where the military officers get trained for three to six 
20 
 
the cadets. Due to the arrests of high-ranking military officers following the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz trials, the force could not appoint an admiral to the academy
27
. 
 Cadets face mostly what I will call “company commanders” [bölük komutanları] 
throughout the thesis. As a class is composed of four companies, which make a 
battalion, four company commanders are responsible for a class, or cohort. In high 
school, which is a battalion, class officers [sınıf subayı] are in charge of four classes in 
the school: namely, orientation class [intibak sınıfı], juniors, second class, and seniors. 
Therefore, military schools are organized as a set of military units rather than high 
schools and universities.  
 The use of the term “cadet” is rather problematic for the students of military 
high schools since they legally are not cadets but cadet candidates [askeri öğrenci 
adayı]. However, for the purposes of simplicity, I will call the students of both Turkish 
Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy as cadets. 
 A final note is on the English names of the two schools. “Turkish” is not an 
adjective before their names in Turkish as they are called Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi 
[Heybeliada Naval High School] and Deniz Harp Okulu [Naval Academy]. However, 
Naval Forces obviously prefer their schools to be known with the adjective of ‘Turkish’ 
by the international audience
28
, thus I stick to the official naming throughout the thesis. 
1.5. Landmark impacts of the military’s falling from grace on Turkish Naval 
Academy 
 Since 2012, there have been news regarding the mobbing and discrimination 
against particular groups of cadets in Turkish Military Academy [Kara Harp Okulu, 
Harbiye], Air Force Academy [Hava Harp Okulu], and Turkish Naval Academy
29
. 
                                                                                                                                               
months after graduation, and contracted military officer candidates get Officer Basic 
Training [Subay Temel Eğitimi] –before their first assigned position. 
27
See Regulations on Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Assignments [Subay ve 
Astsubay Atama Yönetmeliği]. Published in the Official Gazette on December 8, 2005. 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.9704&sourceXmlSearch=&
MevzuatIliski=0.  
28
 For Turkish Naval Academy see: http://www.dho.edu.tr/indexen.html. The same 
difference between Turkish and English namings of the schools is valid for the schools 
of Land Forces: For Turkish Military Academy see: 
http://www.kho.edu.tr/eng_mainpage.html. 
29
 “Harbiyeli olmak istemiyorlar.” Sözcü, April 14, 2013, accessed May 15, 2014. 
http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gundem/harbiyeli-olmak-istemiyorlar-268945/, and 
“Harbiye’de neler olmuş neler!”. Sabah, August 13, 2012, accessed May 15, 2014. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/08/13/harbiyede-neler-olmus-neler. 
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Because I had friends from the naval academy by that time, the parallelism between the 
military’s falling from grace from 2007 onwards, and the changing perceptions of my 
friends on professional military education was perceivable for me. Yet, I realized the 
differences between the perceptions and experiences of my interviewees from different 
cohorts during the fieldwork. The above listed three categories reflect significant 
differences between each group’s perceptions and experiences of professional military 
education. After my last interview with Furkan, I thought the perception of unfamiliar 
changes taking place, especially in the naval academy, becomes widespread among 
former cadets, increasingly from from the eldest group to the youngest one.  
 The first group of former cadets felt a transformation mostly in the disciplinary 
regime, unwritten rules and values of the academy: 
 
Mahmut: For instance, there was a transformation process. Before this 
process the higher classes was dominant at the school. What I mean is the 
school was ruled according the pressures coming from the higher classes. 
But afterwards, the authority of higher classes was diminished and the 
company commanders started to make the deal. Of course this created both 
advantages and disadvantages. The worst of those disadvantages was that, 
an offence which could have been handled very differently, was being 
handled by apologia, giving everybody an apologia. The more apologia was 
given, the lesser the points got. When the points were decreased, 
separations, disposals began. While it had been very difficult to quit school 
or get expelled before, we started to see many friends grabbing their bags 
and going as the days passed.
30
 
 
The new and more oppressing rules of the academy were obviously very heavy even on 
original cadets who survived the disciplines of the naval high school. Many former 
cadets connected their experience with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials: 
 
Onur: They did it also to three or four boys at military academy. They put 
sex doll and porn CDs to their houses and found them at raid. All of the 
people caught during Ergenekon or Balyoz operations are like this. The 
evidence is put by the police and then the prosecutors of the same rank find 
                                                 
30Mahmut: Mesela bir dönüşüm süreci vardı. Bu dönüşüm sürecinden önce okulda 
hakim olan üst sınıftı. Üst sınıf baskısıyla okul idare edilirdi diyeyim sana. Ama sonraki 
süreçte üst sınıfın etkisi azaltılarak bölük komutanları vasıtasıyla bu iş yapılmaya 
başlandı. Tabii bunun getirileri, götürüleri oldu. Götürülerinden en beteri çok daha 
farklı şekillerde halledilebile 30  kabahatler diyeyim sana, artık savunmayla, herkese 
savunma verilmesiyle halledilmeye başlandı. Savunmalar verildikçe puanlar düştü. 
Puanlar düştükçe ayrılmalar, atılmalar başladı. Öncesinde okuldan ayrılmak, atılmak 
çok zor şeyken sonraki süreçte, her geçen gün bir arkadaşımızı daha çantasını almış 
giderken görüyorduk yani. 
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those evidences. During that time there was a kind of pressure in the 
military academy; but we weren’t subjected to that kind of pressure 
personally… The officers at the academy started to do that, thought that as a 
precaution: the more they kept us in, the less we went out, the lesser would 
be the possibility for us to be related to those kinds of crimes, as I 
understood. They put an unbelievable pressure on us regarding 
punishments.
31
 
 
Onur and many others from the first group said that their cohorts did not go through the 
most efficacious period of this transformation except a few exceptions. Yet they 
experienced the increasing pressure on their shoulders in varying degrees.  
Hakan, Eren and Arda are from the same cohort with two male cadets whose 
relationship was apprehended by their classmates. Afterwards these two cadets were 
forced to leave the school instead of being expelled, with a ‘disgraceful offense’ on their 
records. Hakan, Eren and Arda were friends with them. Hakan stated feeling very lucky 
because he left the naval academy after this incident, and just before the academy 
administration started to receive anonymous letters about eight to ten cadets who were 
somehow connected to these two former cadets. Eren and Arda were among those who 
were blamed for several ‘offenses’. Without sharing the details of his investigation, 
Eren listed the accusations written in the letters as follows: 
Eren: I will talk generally; I won’t give specific, private information on that 
subject. […] Especially the things related to male-female student relations. 
The things about homosexuality. Then some extreme cases like someone 
having intercourse with his girlfriend from outside and her getting 
pregnant… Some information claiming that some students had relations to 
leftist organizations. A great number of denounces in which, in our class 
only almost the half of the students were included. As a result of this there 
were cases of constantly going through and through investigations.
32
 
                                                 
31Onur: Şu an işte bizim Harp Okulu’ndan üç dört tane çocuğa da yaptılar. Evlerine işte 
şişme kadın koydular, porno CD’ler falan koydular, onları yakaladılar. Bütün 
Ergenekon, Balyoz davalarında yakalanan insanlar böyle yani. Delilleri polis koyuyor, 
sonra yine aynı zümrenin savcıları yakalıyor bu delilleri. O dönemde harp okulunda 
şöyle bir baskı oldu: Biz birebir böyle bir baskıya maruz bırakılmadık ama... Harp 
okulundaki subaylar şunu yapmaya başladı, önlem olarak şöyle düşündüler: Bizi ne 
kadar içeri tıkarlarsa, ne kadar az dışarıya çıkarsak o kadar az bu tarz suçla 
ilişkilendirme yüzdemizi düşürürler, diye düşündüler anladığım kadarıyla. İnanılmaz bir 
baskı yaptılar bize ceza konusunda. 
32 Eren: Şöyle, genel konuşayım, birebir özel bilgi vermeyeceğim o konuda. […] 
Özellikle bayan-erkek öğrenci ilişkileriyle ilgili şeyler. Eşcinsellikle ilgili şeyler. Daha 
sonra çok uç örnekler, dışarıdan birisinin kendi kız arkadaşıyla girdiği ilişki sonucunda 
hamilelik boyutuna gelmesi ile ilgili şeyler. Ondan sonra bazılarının, bazı [sol] 
örgütlerle bağlantısı olduğuna dair bilgiler. Ciddi boyutta ihbar edilen insanlar 
topluluğu ki bunun sayısı bizim sınıf için neredeyse yarı yarıya vuran bir şeydi. Sürekli 
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This group of eight to ten cadets went through an exhausting process of administrative 
interrogations during which they were asked many questions relevant or irrelevant to 
the blames laid on them, such as their consumption of alcohol. The parents of all the 
cadets of their cohorts received letters about them with an additional list of 
approximately forty cadets. The letters were ‘warning’ the families to be aware of the 
‘corrupted’ educational environment of their children. Eren and Arda expressed their 
disappointment with most of the military officers in administrative positions. These 
officers took the accusations in the anonymous letters as serious allegations if not as 
facts. They did not even launch a comprehensive investigation about who send them to 
the school. Eren and Arda stated feeling humiliated not because of the investigations per 
se but because most of their commanders did not stand behind them. As Eren put it, 
they decided to leave the academy because this situation, and the attitudes of their 
commanders led them to worry about their futures in TAF: 
Eren: Since these kinds of incidents increased and I was included in some of 
them, since I thought I would find myself in a bad situation if I continued 
there, I would get dismissed or worse, get through some investigations 
including prosecutors, etc, and my future… Already going through all the 
stuff I mentioned, when also those happened I decided not to be in this 
anymore. It was a decision made in 3-5 months.
33
 
 
 Hakan’s relation with the Hizmet Movement has several implications in regard 
to the anonymous letters, and the succeeding interrogations within the academy. To 
claim that it was the cadets who are members of the movement who leaked information 
about their classmates or commanders to the people who wrote and sent these letters 
would be presumptuous. However, I think his perception on the accusations about his 
friends is shaped majorly by his experience with the brothers from the movement while 
he was in naval high school. He said he thinks there were over eighty cadets in naval 
high school, only in his cohort. When asked how he knows, he told me about how he 
was making practice interviews for the military high school entrance process, he was 
                                                                                                                                               
bunlar sonucunda soruşturmaya girip çıkma, soruşturmaya girip çıkma şeklinde gelişen 
olaylar oluyordu yani. 
33Eren: Bu tarz olayların sayısının artması ve benim de bazılarının içinde yer almam 
sebebiyle daha fazla ilerlersem kötü duruma düşebileceğimi ya da atılma ya da ne 
bileyim daha ileriki boyutlarda savcılık boyutunda, ciddi bir soruşturma çerçevesine 
girebileceğimi düşündüğüm için, geleceğimi bu kadar… Zaten bahsettiğim şeylere 
katlanıyorken bir de ekstra üstüne bunlar eklenince, daha fazla kendimi bu işin içinde 
tutmamaya karar verip, öyle belki üç beş ay içerisinde aldığım bir karardır yani. 
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taught to perform five time namaz[salaat] in a day just by using his eyes, and his 
brothers were not telling him the names his classmates from the movement on purpose:  
Hakan: They prepared lots of people but nobody knew each other. Because 
they don’t have just one thing in their system. They have lots of houses. For 
instance, I was in one of […] ‘s municipality. There, for instance there were 
20-30 houses. They each have three students. I just knew those 2 other 
students but later I found out there was a lot more. I guess in our term, how 
many people went to navigation school? Around 200 and at least 80-90 of 
them were so. 
How can you guess? 
Because you catch it, they have some things. They teach performing namaz 
prayers at school without being noticed; you do it with your eyes. […] I 
mean, anticipating from their personality or style, I suppose there were 80-
90 people. It must be more after our term. That was the hard period. After 
AKP-Cemaat relations, they were more relieved. I guess the number 
increased after that. And back then, the interviews of military schools were 
very… there were legendary questions mentioned like “You are on a boat, 
Mohammed and Ataturk are fallen, who would you save?” don’t you know 
that? (Laughing) […] Yes, they told us in Cemaat that we might come 
across such things and they made… We were going through rehearsal 
interviews to be prepared.
34
 
 
He said he wanted to end his relationship with the brothers because, as he grew older, 
he became conscious about the possible outcomes of the answers he was giving to their 
questions. When asked how often he was seeing these brothers, he replied as follows: 
Hakan: They arranged meetings at the weekends. In some houses mentioned 
before. We met at … and at …, irrelevant places like these (he names 
various districts of Istanbul). If we went out with uniforms on us, we 
stopped by somewhere to change. We went and read books, read Koran, 
things like that. That continued for a while. But I was so bored, you know. 
                                                 
34Hakan: Bir sürü kişiyi hazırlıyorlardı; ama hiç kimse birbirini bilmiyordu. Çünkü bir 
tane şey yok onların sisteminde. Bir sürü evleri var. Mesela ben […]’in bir 
ilçesindeydim. Orada mesela yirmi otuz tane ev var. Hepsinde böyle üçer tane öğrenci 
var. Ben sadece diğer iki kişiyi biliyorum ama daha sonradan öğrendiğim bir sürü kişi 
de var. Ki benim tahmin ettiğim, bizim dönemde, Deniz Lisesi’ne kaç kişi girdi?.. 200 
civarı kişi girdi, en az 80-90 kişinin öyle olduğunu tahmin ediyorum.  
Nasıl tahmin ediyorsun? 
Anlıyorsun çünkü onların bazı şeyleri var. Okulda şey olarak, kimseye belli etmeden 
namaz kılmayı öğretiyorlar, gözünle falan namaz kılıyorsun. […] Yani kişiliğinden, 
tarzından bir şekilde tahmin ettiğim 80-90 kişi var. Bizden sonra daha da fazladır kesin. 
O dönemler tam sıkıntılı dönemlerdi. AK Parti-cemaat şeyleriyle falan daha rahat 
oldular. Ondan sonra daha fazla olduğunu tahmin ediyorum. Ki o zamanlar asker 
okulların mülakatlarında çok şeyler vardı, işte “Kayıktasın, Hz. Muhammed düşmüş, 
Atatürk düşmüş hangisini alırsın? ” Öyle efsane mülakat soruları falan dolaşır, biliyor 
musun onları? (Gülüyor) […] Evet, cemaat kanalında böyle şeylerle karşılaşabilirsiniz 
diyorlar ki o zaman şey yapıyorduk biz… Prova mülakat falan yapıyorlardı bize, 
hazırlıklı oluyorduk. 
25 
 
Military school has a different mentality; they have a very different one. 
And it is during puberty, I was overwhelmed. I didn’t know what to think, 
who to believe, do you understand? And I started to think that the Cemaat 
had malicious intentions. Because they were constantly asking questions 
about people. 
Were they about your friends, or about the commanders? 
Both about my friends and the commanders. All kinds. For instance, They 
were asking about each of my classmates. What does he do, does that take 
alcohol, does this have a girlfriend, what kind of a person is that and so on. I 
started to suffocate. Then I never see… I did this, for 5-6 months, I didn’t 
take or return their calls. Then I met them and said I didn’t want to see them 
anymore.
35
 
 
While he was narrating the anonymous letters, he also raised rhetorical questions about 
how the senders of these letters acquire the true information that decorates the false 
accusations about his friends. Claiming that there are many whistle-blower cadets and 
officers within the school, in contact with the movement, he questioned the unknows of 
this process such as how they found the addresses of the parents of all cadets to send the 
aforementioned ‘warning’ letters. While Eren’s statements on whistle-blowers were in 
line with Hakan’s claims, Erensaid he cannot know who planned this process in the first 
place, and it is too easy to blame it on the Hizmet Movement: 
Eren: I think, well, these are exterior things, in the end. A letter or 
something else... Because these written things are fictional as I said. If there 
is a truth rate of 10%, the rest 90% is made up. But, well, how can I say, 
they are not totally imaginary, do you understand? They were written 
according to some information, it seems. I link it to insiders, whatever kind 
of an evil-minded group they are… Let me mention the parallel structure… 
(Laughing) I don’t know, the insiders may be a student group, or maybe 
they are officers. I guess they are students. If this kind of incidents 
happened more in our term during registrations… In short, if there were ten 
                                                 
35Hakan: Haftasonları görüşme ayarlanıyordu. Daha önceden konuşulmuş bir yerde, bir 
evde. …’de buluştum, …’da, böyle alakasız alakasız yerlerde. [İstanbul’un çeşitli 
semtlerini sayıyor] Üniformalı çıkarsak falan gidip bir yerde kıyafetlerimizi değiştirip 
öyle gidiyorduk. Gidiyorduk, kitap okumaktır, şeylerdir, Kur’an okumalardır falan. 
Öyle devam etti bir süre. Artık ben çok sıkıldım ama yani… Askeri okulda çok farklı 
bir düşünce yapısı var, orada çok farklı bir düşünce yapısı var. Bir de ergenlik 
dönemindesin, ben iyice bunalmıştım yani. Ne düşüneceğimi bilmiyordum, neye 
inanacağımı bilmiyordum yani, anladın mı? Ve cemaatin de niyetinin kötü olduğunu 
düşünmeye başlamıştım. Çünkü insanlarla alakalı sürekli sorular soruyorlardı. 
Arkadaşlarınla ilgili mi komutanlarla ilgili mi? 
Arkadaşlarımızla ilgili de komutanlarla ilgili de. Her türlü. Mesela benim sınıfımdaki 
insanları tek tek soruyorlardı. Şu ne yapıyor, şu içki içer mi, kız arkadşaı var mı, şu 
nasıldır falan filan diye. Artık iyice bunalmıştım. Bir daha görüş… Böyle şey yaptım 5-
6 ay cevap vermedim telefonlarına. En son gittim ben görüşmek istemiyorum sizinle 
artık dedim. 
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or fifteen rotten people in those two hundred students which was called a 
class, it might have been easier for them to do that things inside, to carry 
information to the things they provide service. Maybe they weren’t able to 
reach that much specific information about the upper classes. 
[…] While I was thinking of it more like a bogeyman at first, now a little 
more… Looking from outside, I don’t think that I was in a degree to 
recognize. Well, I think saying that is taking the easy way out, I mean AKP, 
Cemaat… Then they were close but now AKP and Cemaat are separated. 
AKP is shooing Cemaat. This is what being shown to Turkey, after all. Now 
everyone can say that, make that comment. Therefore, I don’t want to talk 
so straight on that subject. I think they are more complicated structures, with 
those relations, interests… (Laughing)36 
 
Rıdvan, Ali, Mert, and Furkan did not witness this process of interrogations 
within the academy, unlike the majority of my interviewees. However, while Furkan 
left the military right after the high school, Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert stated being subjected 
to discrimination and mobbing in the academy. They said there was a group thirteen or 
fifteen cadets from their cohort, which was targeted by the company commanders. 
Getting punishing for offenses that are normally overlooked, or being subjected to extra 
discipline, or military, training after the bedtime gradually became a part of their life in 
the academy. They explained that the commanders gathered this group and told them 
they are short in discipline compared to their classmates, and thus, they need extra 
training. However, the content of these ‘trainings’ was nothing but scolding and yelling 
at them. Rıdvan said they came together with this group at school and discussed their 
common traits: 
                                                 
36Eren: Bence şey sonuçta bunların dışarıda, dış kaynaklı şeyler. Bu mektup bilmem ne. 
çünkü bu yazılan şeyler dedim ya kurgusal. İçinde yüzde 10 doğruluk payı varsa yüzde 
90 sıkma. Ama şey, nasıl denir, tamamen de hayal ürünü değil, anladın mı? Bilgiler 
dahilinde anlaşılan yazılmış bir şey. Şeye bağlıyorum bunu yapanlar da içeride bulunan 
nasıl bir art niyetli gurupsa… Paralel yapıdan bahsedeyim… (Gülüyor) İçeride bulunan 
herhalde bir öğrenci grubu mu artık, belki subay grubudur bilmiyorum. Öğrencidir diye 
tahmin ediyorum. Bizim senemizde giriş kısmında daha fazla sayıda bu tarz bir şey 
olduysa… Kısaca o sınıf denilen iki yüz kişilik şeyin içerisinde on, on beş tane böyle 
çürük insan varsa onların servis ettiği ve içeride yaptığı şeyler, bilgi uçurmaları 
falanlarla herhalde daha kolay yapabilmişlerdir. Bir üst sınıflarla ilgili bu kadar çok, net 
bilgiye ulaşamıyor olabilirler yani.  
[…] İlk başlarda böyle öcü şeklinde düşünürken şimdi biraz daha böyle... Fark 
edebilecek seviyede de olduğumu düşünmüyorum dışarıdan bakarak. Ya şey demek işin 
kolayına kaçmak bence işte, AKP, cemaat… O zaman yakındı, şimdi AKP ile cemaat 
ayrıldı. AKP cemaati kışlıyor. Türkiye’ye gösterilen bu zaten. Şu an bunu herkes 
diyebilir, bu yorumu yapabilir. Öyle o yüzden direk böyle net konuşmak istemiyorum 
bu konuda. Daha karmaşık yapılar olduğunu düşünüyorum ben, ilişkiler, çıkar 
ilişkileri… (Gülüyor) 
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Rıdvan: I also started to feel that I was being treated differently and I 
decided to investigate this situation. We were group of 10 or 15 students. 
We were getting a different treatment and we were going to investigate its 
roots, why such a thing happened? What did we do? We tried to think about 
our common traits. What were those common traits? We all had a military 
officer in the family. And those officers, those in the family, were raised 
starting from high schools. Apart from that we were all Kemalists. We all 
had the ability of analytical thinking, we weren’t robots. We were kind of 
people who did not just do things but questioned some things. In the end, as 
much as I wanted to continue… We all wanted this job; it is not something 
you can do reluctantly. When we look at the student type, usually poorer 
families, not the wealthy ones, choose the profession because it has a job 
warranty. My term was such. But there also were students like me. There 
were students who did not come just to have a job but to have professional 
pleasure. And one of the common traits of this group was that, after all.
37
 
 
Supporting Rıdvan’s narrative, Eren from the second group, stated that: 
Eren: When I think about it now, look at the friends outside, they are always 
flashy types, free thinkers… I don’t know, what can be their common traits? 
Their being Kemalist can be counted. Their taking alcohol… Because in 
that investigation, even this was a subject to be mentioned.
38
 
 
 The second and the last groups of my interviewees agreed on the commonalities 
of the cadets who have been investigated, or exposed to mobbing, discrimination, and 
extracurricular discipline training, or say violence. However, the reactions of the two 
groups differ to a great extent. While Eren and Arda went through intense processes of 
interrogations, giving testimony, and striving to be absolved, their current reaction is 
rather apathetic towards the ongoing tranformations in both micro and macro levels of 
                                                 
37 Rıdvan: Ben de kendi üzerimde farklı bir muamele gördüğümü hissetmeye 
başlamıştım ve bu konuyu araştırmaya karar verdim. Biz on, on beş kişilik bir gruptuk. 
Bize farklı bir muamele söz konusuydu ve biz bunun kökenini araştıracaktık, acaba niye 
böyle bir şey var? Ne yaptık? Ortak özelliklerimizi birazcık şey yapmaya çalıştık. Ortak 
özelliğimiz neydi? Hepimizin ailesinde subay vardı. Ve bu subaylar, ailedeki subaylar, 
liseden yetişme subaylar. Onun dışında hepimiz Atatürkçüyüz. Hepimiz analitik 
düşünme yeteneğine sahibiz, robot değiliz. Sadece emirleri uygulayan değil, aynı 
zamanda bazı şeyleri sorgulayan tipleriz. Sonunda ben ne kadar devam etmek istesem 
de… Hepimiz bu işi istiyorduk, bu iş istemeden yapılacak bir iş değil. Öğrenci şeyine 
baktığımız zaman, genelde varlıklı aileler değil de ihtiyaç sahibi aileler, meslek 
garantisi olduğu için seçiyor. Benim dönemim de öyleydi. Ama benim gibi öğrenciler 
de vardı. Sadece meslek sahibi olmak için değil de mesleki haz almak için giden 
öğrenciler de vardı. Bu grubun da ortak özelliklerinden biri de buydu zaten. 
38Eren: Şimdi de düşününce dışarıdaki arkadaşlara falan bakınca hep şeyler daha böyle 
parlak tipte, özgür düşünceli… Ne bileyim ortak özellikleri ne olabilir? Atatürkçü 
olmaları denebilir. Alkol almaları denebilir. Çünkü o soruşturmalarda bunun bile 
konusu geçiyordu yani. 
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the military. With a retrospective look taken as civilians, they were making sense of 
what they have experienced in the naval academy with apathy rather than anger.  
On the contrary, Rıdvan, Ali and Mert expressed feeling anger with a strong 
sense of being treated unfairly. They assertively emphasized the socio-economic 
prosperity of their parents, their distinguishing educational achievements in the Turkish 
Naval High School, their attachment to Kemalism and nationalism, and their passion to 
become a marine while they were cadets. All of these stresses, I argue, served to prove 
‘the unfair treatment’ they received, and their ‘rightful anger’ towards those who were 
responsible from their detachment from the military. These differences between the 
three groups of research participants will be further analyzed throughout the thesis. 
1.6. Possible contributions and the outline of the thesis  
 Professional military education has not been critically explored by social 
scientists and independent researchers not because of a lack of intellectual or 
journalistic curiosity but mainly because of the military’s closeness about its ‘own’ 
affairs to outside scrutiny. As Catherine Lutz suggests, in relation to the silence on the 
Vietnam War in the US: “Silence is also a strategy of confinement” (Lutz 2001, 132). 
While there is a large civil-military relations literature in Turkish and English on 
Turkey, which will be reviewed in chapter one, there is still a gap about the subjects 
who make up the professional military (officers and NCOs) and their education, in the 
burgeoning critical studies on the military and militarism in Turkey.   
 Beyond the literature on civil-military relations, which takes TAF as a 
homogeneous entity, and as a macro-level actor, first of all, the narratives of former 
conscripted soldiers are brought into view, although very recently. Nadire Mater’s 
much-debated collection of the narratives of former conscripts who ‘served’ in the 
southeast Turkey during the most painful process of the war between PKK (Partiya 
Karkarên Kurdistan/ Kurdistan Workers Party) and TAF is the first outstanding 
example of this literature (Mater 1998). In Pınar Selek’s Sürüne Sürüne Erkek Olmak 
[Crawling to Become a Man], the oral histories of former conscripts who did or did not 
involve in armed conflict are conducted. Thus, Selek delivers to the reader, the stories 
of becoming a man, overwhelmed by the myth of ‘masculinity’ (Selek 2008, 13) 
through the memories of ‘regular’ military service, which include various duties from 
serving tea to the officers and their wives to peeling potatoes to armed conflagration. 
Ayşe Gül Altınay’s work is one of the rare historically engaged studies on militarism in 
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Turkey from a gender perspective, historicizing the myth of the ‘military-nation’ in 
various militarized fields (Altınay 2004). Most recently, Pınar Öğünç’s Asker 
Doğmayanlar [Not Born A Soldier] rendered the voices of those who refuse to kill, and 
to complete their passage to “being a real man” through military service visible: 
Conscientious objectors (Öğünç 2013). 
Navigating between macro analyses on civil-military relations and participant-
observation among military individuals and groups, I think Levent Ünsaldı’s research is 
a very comprehensive one. His study is based not only on a broad literature and studies 
of international institutions that monitor military spending, arms industry and military 
strategies but also on his participant-observation while he was a cadet in Artillery and 
Missile School in 2000-2001, for almost a year (Ünsaldı 2008, 17). His text provides 
important data and interpretation on the internal organization of the military with 
regards to the institutional differences between Land, Naval and Air Forces as well as 
social, political and economic differences between officers, non-commissioned officers 
and military men and women holding other positions (Ünsaldı 2008, 194-229). He also 
floats challenging opinions on overrated significance of Kemalism in shaping civil-
military-society relations in Turkey (Ünsaldı 2008, 190-193). 
 Fortunately, beside those who collected the narratives of conscripts or 
conscientious objectors, there are many other researchers who have moved beyond 
“methodological militarism” to develop critical analyses of the military, soldiering and 
militarism in everyday life. As reviewed by Altınay, the first comprehensive research 
along these lines is done by independent researchers but not in the academia of Turkey 
as a result of the tabooized status of the military in the public space and academia. 
Starting from the 1996 book Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Modernizm [Armed Forces and 
Modernism], Serdar Şen’s insistence on interpreting the military’s role as an ideological 
apparatus in militarizing and nationalizing the lives and perceptions of the people of the 
newly established Turkish Republic is, in many respects, a first in the literature, (Şen 
1996; 2000; 2011). İsmet Akça on the other hand, writes on the economic presence of 
the armed forces. According to Akça, TAF is not a supporting actor but a power in 
macroeconomic balances of the country, mainly through the Turkish Armed Forces 
Assistance and Pension Fund [Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu, OYAK] since 1960s. 
 Following Cynthia Enloe’s call to explore the acknowledgement of hegemonic 
norms of femininity and masculinity in the processes of militarization (Enloe 2000b, 
220), many researchers increasingly dwell upon the intersections of ordinary 
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experiences and perceptions, military, militarism, motherhood, femininities, and 
masculinities. While Özlem Aslan and Senem Kaptan interpret, respectively, the 
experiences of mothers of PKK guerillas, Mothers of Peace [Barış Anneleri] and 
mothers of the conscripts, Sertaç Kaya Şen’s thesis on the lives of children raised in 
military families and within the military complex draw the historical lines between 
family, militarism, military, and the state (Şen 2014, 7). Concerning the purposes of my 
research, Şen’s and Ömer Turan’s reflexive texts are especially outstanding since they 
are based also on the personal experiences of the researchers, respectively, as the son of 
a military judge father and as a former conscript
39
. 
The only study that is based upon the narratives of the cadets, commanders, and 
officer-teachers of military schools is Mehmet Ali Birand’s Emret Komutanım [Your 
Order, Sir]. Written in 1986, right after the introduction of an ideological synthesis of 
Turkish nationalism and Islam, and neoliberalism by the 1980 military coup, Birand’s 
journalistic research was meant to respond to a rightful curiosity of the public about 
military officers. On the other hand, his research was confined mostly to praises of the 
military and its “devoted and honorable” members, without voicing critique. Since he 
normalizes and legitimizes the existence of the military, soldiering and militarism by 
picturing them as indispensable parts of life and politics in Turkey, his book stays 
within the borders of “methodological militarism” (Altınay 2009, 1248). Leaving aside 
the absence of critical studies, the silence of the professional members of the military 
still continues to a great extent, as Ali Bayramoğlu and Ahmet İnsel argues:  
Turkish Armed Forces is an institution that speaks out loud more than the 
armies of other countries but an institution that is also more disturbed than 
them about being spoken about. In democracies, the military is usually 
expected to be mute about political and societal issues. However, when it 
comes to the autoritarian democracy of Turkey, the society is expected to be 
mute about the military or to praise it. (Bayramoğlu and İnsel 2009, 9) 
 
This study does not only attempt to partially fill a gap in the literature but also 
seeks answers to questions of importance for our specific historical context. In chapter 
one, after providing a review of the large literature on civil-military relations in Turkey, 
I historicize professional military education from the late 18
th
 century of the Ottoman 
Empire onwards, focusing particularly on the Turkish Naval High School and the 
                                                 
39
 For another study on masculinities and the military in Turkey see Sinclair-Webb 
2000. For more on militarism, military, motherhood and gender see Sancar 2001, 
Biricik 2006, Gedik 2008, Şentürk 2009 and Akgül 2011. 
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Turkish Naval Academy. Then I direct my attention to the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, 
and the military’s falling from grace from 2007 onwards (i.e. since the commencement 
of the Ergenekon case). Finally, based on quantitative data, I aim at interpretating the 
repercussions of the changes in power and positionality of TAF in relation to the JDP 
government, on military schools. Focusing on military high schools and academies, I 
review the changes in the number of applications and graduations since 2007, and 
comment on the applications to contracted positions created by TAF only recently. 
In chapter two, I explore the disciplines of professional military education that 
deform and reformthe subjectivities and masculinities children and adolescents as both 
productive and subjected bodies. I argue that the often-neglected diversity of military 
masculinities produced through these disciplines, challenge the respresentation of TAF 
in civil-military relations as a homogeneous entity. I suggest that the historical shift in 
the military and in civil-military relations echoes as the restructuring of power and 
disciplines in professional military education. I argue that there is a parallelism between 
the power struggles within military schools, and the declining reputation the changing 
position of TAF in our political and social context: the authority centralizes at the top of 
the hierarchy, and oppression and violence of the disciplines increase within the 
education institutions of the military. 
In the final chapter, I focus on the connections between the rising neoliberalism 
since the 1980 military coup, and the perceptions of former cadets and military officers 
on professional military education and military professionalism. First, I review the 
military’s historical relations to the market economy in Turkey. As military officers 
have historically been from middle or upper-middle class families, I argue that there is a 
social and economic discrepancy between the future expectations of my research 
participants, created during military education, and the life style they attain after 
graduation. The military’s declining ‘prestige’ and global trends of flexibility and 
uncertainty in professional arena contribute to increasing social and economic future 
expectations of my interviewees. They mostly come from middle or upper-middle class 
families, and were considered successful according the criteria of educational system in 
Turkey. I was unable to acknowledge the privileges of a military career, partially 
because of my memories about my colonel grandfather, and his impacts on my father, 
and partially because of my friendships with most of the research participants from the 
first group who were, or still are, discontent with the military. However, the privileges 
of a military career are visible in the accounts of former cadets who need a guaranteed 
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job and social security. Finally, based on the narratives of the youngest group, I argue 
that new distinctions along the axes of Kemalism, class, and ethnicity emerge, 
especially within the Turkish Naval Academy. Whilst the military reorganizes itself by 
downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing, these new distinctions remake military 
masculinities in accordance with this specific historical context. All of my research 
participants expect a decrease in the socio-economic backgrounds of future military 
officers. Their predictions are questionable with regard to the limits of this research and 
the partiality of their perspectives. However, TAF has historically recruited relatively 
privileged and Kemalist Turkish men in decision-making positions. If this prototypical 
military masculinity is changing, this study is also a quest for further research on the 
present and future of the agents who compose the professional military of Turkey.  
 This thesis aims to contribute to critical military studies and the “civil-military 
relations” literature, with a focus on men who have been permanent or temporary 
insiders of the military. An interpretation of the changing techniques of making the 
prospective military officers in relation to the macro transformation processes suggests 
another “way of knowing” the military institution – not as a homogeneous entity 
research on which remains a taboo, but as an institution among other institutions that 
has its own layers of complication, history, and responsibility for accountability. 
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CHAPTER 2:  HISTORICIZING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
IN TURKEY: WHAT ABOUT THE CADETS? 
 
 
Absolutely stay out of politics during this period. If we find ourselves in it today, it is 
because we think it is our duty to save our country from a disaster… Each time the 
army gets involved in politics, it starts to lose its discipline… In close history, we can 
see the sample of this situation in Balkan War. Therefore; I ask you again not to take 
our present intervention as an example, don’t ever get involved in politics… I want to 
draw your attention to that point: We maintain this task as a commanding group 
composed of five people (i.e. National Security Council). We make every possible effort 
to prevent our subordinates from getting involved.
40
 
Gen. Kenan Evren
41
 
 
 Military schools have historically been the black boxes of the armed forces. 
Indeed, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is a sum of black boxes for the ‘outsiders’. 
Professional military education has not been critically explored by social scientists and 
independent researchers not because of a lack of intellectual or journalistic curiosity but 
mainly because of the military’s closeness about its ‘own’ affairs to outside scrutiny. 
Beside the official statements and notorious coups and interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, 
                                                 
40
 Gen. Kenan Evren: Bu devirde katiyen siyasete bulaşmayın. Biz bugün siyasete 
karıştıksa, ülkemizi bir felaketten kurtarmanın görevimiz olduğunu düşündüğümüz 
içindir… Ordu siyasete girdiği her seferinde disiplinini kaybetmeye başlamıştır… 
Yakın tarihimizde, Balkan Savaşı’nda bunun en büyük örneğini görebiliriz. Bu nedenle, 
tekrar şu andaki müdahalemizi kendinize örnek almamanızı sizden tekrar istiyorum, asla 
siyasete bulaşmayın… Dikkatinizi bir noktaya çekmek istiyorum: Beş kişiden oluşan bir 
komuta kuruluyla [yani, MGK] bu işi yürütüyoruz. Bizim altımızdakilerin bu işe 
bulaşmasını önlemek için her çabayı harcıyoruz. 
41
 National Security Council. 1982. 12 September in Turkey: Before and After, 301-304. 
Ankara: National Security Council Office of Secretary General. 
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and 1997), the subjects who make up the military have been a mystery. Ahmet İnsel 
argues that power and privileges that comes with the membership of TAF are not 
personal but denominational or exclusive to the coterie [zümresel] (İnsel 2009, 45). The 
military has been producing itself as a distinguished and privileged ‘coterie’ in Turkey, 
since the establishment of the new Republic. This mystery, thus, is a strategy rather than 
a necessity for ‘national security’. As Catherine Lutz suggests, in relation to the silence 
on the Vietnam War in the US: “Silence is also a strategy of confinement” (Lutz 2001, 
132). 
 In this chapter, firstly, I aim to make a humble review of the large civil-military 
relations literature in Turkish and English on Turkey. I continue with a brief history of 
professional military education, focusing particularly on the Turkish Naval High School 
and the Turkish Naval Academy. Afterwards, I proceed to the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
(also known as the Sledgehammer) trials, and the military’s falling from grace from 
2007 onwards (i.e. since the commencement of the Ergenekon case). Finally, based on 
quantitative data, I seek for an interpretation of the repercussions of the changes in 
power and positionality of TAF in relation to the Justice and Development Party (JDP) 
government, on military schools. Focusing on the Turkish Naval High School and the 
Turkish Naval Academy, I review the changes in ‘the number of applications and 
graduations since 2007. In other words, this chapter aims to historicize the narratives of 
my research participants in the present-day of the country with a "relational mode of 
thinking" (Bourdieu 1989, 15).  
The educational institutions of TAF have historically been a relationally 
constructed and ever transforming "field of power" (Bourdieu 1989, 16), which have 
played a major but often neglected role in civil-military relations, and in politics. 
However, the existing literature on civil-military relations often takes the structures that 
produce the military as the military itself, thus as a stable and homogenous entity. 
Despite acknowledging its changing relations to the civilians and politicians, this 
literature does not scrutinize the agents who make up the military and their education, 
except a minority of high ranking military officers who are dominant in decision 
making processes. Fortunately, recent research has begun to fill this significant gap
42
.  
Based on my research with military cadets, I argue that the transfigurations 
                                                 
42
This growing literature has been reviewed in the introduction of this thesis. 
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within military schools have historically and politically been parallel, and sometimes 
coming prior, to macro-level changes in civil-military relations. Trying to transcend the 
artificial opposition between structures, and ordinary experience and perceptions of 
individuals and groups (Bourdieu 1989, 15), I argue that this synchronicity is 
historically and presently valid, albeit in significantly diverse ways in different periods. 
Before passing on to interpret how the macro processes are presently reflected in the 
transformations of military masculinities, disciplinary power, and the relations between 
neoliberal economy and professional military education in the following chapters, I note 
that this thesis presents a partial account on civil-military relations by trying to 
construct a history of the present. 
2.1. A brief review: civil-military relations in Turkey 
 Modern Turkey is often deemed to be a product of the efforts of several military 
officers, and a plan in their minds starting from the Military Academy [Harbiye] years 
of the radical group, led by Enver Pasha, within Committee of Union and Progress 
[İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti] (Akmeşe 2005, 188-190). Since the establishment of the 
Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatütk, İsmet İnönü and their friends are considered 
to be the producers and protectors of new secular values of the country. Thus, the 
commencement of modernization in the country is also attributed to the military 
officers. Altınay and Bora, nevertheless, assert the contrary. Referring to a lecture by 
Halil Berktay delivered at Sabancı University in 2001, they state that the 19th century 
was the most ‘civilian’ century in the history of the Ottoman Empire in terms of the 
developments in education, culture, literature, law and politics, culminating in the 
Tanzimat reforms in 1839 (Altınay and Bora 2002, 141). Hence, they suggest that the 
modernization attempts of the Committee of Union and Progress should be read within 
the larger militarization of the Empire and its political regime in the late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century and that the preceding process of “civilian” modernization be also taken 
into account in the histories of modernization. In line with Altınay and Bora, Gül Tokay 
claims that modernizations in the military and security policies was already started 
during the 19
th
 century, under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II (Tokay 2010, 35-46). 
  With the “War of Independence” led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the 
establishment of the new Republic, the military was established as an institution that not 
only protects the national unity from external and internal threats but also produce 
opinions on domestic and foreign politics. This is the first component of what 
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Bayramoğlu calls the ‘wartime regime’ of the War of Independence [Kurtuluş Savaşı] 
(Bayramoğlu 2009, 60). Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye43 was placed under the authority 
of İcra Vekilleri Heyeti44 in 1920, which meant the establishment of what is today 
called the General Staff. When some members of the new parliament criticized this 
suggestion, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk responded as follows: 
Military organization is as closely (as military affairs) related to internal and 
external politics as it is to the necessary defense of our county in various 
fronts. And it has been proposed to work together with them to be 
concerned by The Chief of General Staff and to be acquainted with the 
views of other responsible people, as well as to have the vote of The Chief 
of General Staff and other concerned people like Executive Deputies on a 
subject.
45
 
46
 
 
This perspective later subjected the Ministry of National Defense to the General Staff, 
and made the military gain priority over other bodies responsible for the national 
defense, which, according to Bayramoğlu, was the second character of the ‘wartime 
regime’. The third one is the highly centralized organization of internal structure and 
decision-making processes (Bayramoğlu 2009, 60-62). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself 
became Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye in 1921 as the proxy holder47. When his proxy was 
annulled in 1924, Turkish General Staff became an almost completely independent 
body, which was not inspected by the government. Until 1944, Commander Fevzi 
Çakmak was the chief of Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye. He worked as the prototype of 
the National Security Council [Milli Güvenlik Kurulu] of post-1960 all by his own, 
intervening to the decision-making processes of ministries about issues from state 
investments in iron and steel industry to educational, public and industrial investments 
in eastern and southeastern Turkey. The General Staff was legally bound to the Prime 
Ministry only when Fevzi Çakmak retired because İsmet İnönü was discontent with 
Çakmak’s independent actions during World War II. At the time İnönü was enjoying 
                                                 
43
 The legal body that served as the “ministry of war” in the Ottoman Empire. 
44
 The board embodying legislative, executive, and judiciary powers during the war of 
independence. 
45
 Teşkilatı askeriye vatanımızı esbabı müdafaası ve muhtelif cephelerde icra edilecek 
(askeri işler kadar), siyaseti dahiliye ve hariciye ile (de) yakınen alakadar bulunuyor. Ve 
mesailde Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi’nin mütealası bulunmak ve diğer haizi 
mesuliyet olan zevatın noktai nazarlarına yakınen vakıf olmak için onlarla birarada 
çalışmak ve bir mesele hakkında Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi’nin rey ve mütealası 
olan zevat gibi İcra Vekilleri meyanında olması teklif edilmiştir. 
46TBMM Gizli Zabıt Ceridesi 1, 163-164. 
47
His title was Başkumandan, Commander-in-Chief. 
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the title of Milli Şef [National Chief]. In 1949, General Staff was placed under the 
authority of Ministry of National Defense to comply with the standards of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Bayramoğlu 2009, 70).  
 The 1960 military junta, composed of relatively young, lower ranking military 
officers, established the National Security Council. The organization of the NSC was set 
to fulfill the requirements of NATO while enabling the committee to act as swiftly as 
possible. Therefore, its members were an aggregation of politicians and officers: Chief 
of Turkish General Staff; representatives of three main forces of the military; and the 
ministries of National Defense, Internal Affairs, Transportation, and Labor along with 
the President, the PM, and his deputies. The 1960 military coup carried distinguishing 
features from the subsequent interventions of 1971, which was signed by the NSC, and 
of 1980. The presence of the military in political decision-making processes became 
‘institutional’ with the 1960 military coup, legitimized by the support of social groups 
that previously formed the bases of opposition against the authoritarian rule of the DP 
(the intellgensia and civilian/ military bureaucracy) (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1992, 717). This 
period marked also a conceptual shift from the perspective of ‘national defense’ to 
‘national security’ (Şarlak 2009)48. 
 Eleven years later after the 1960 coup, the military intervened in parliamentary 
politics once again on March 12, 1971. This intervention is still not called a ‘coup’ but a 
muhtıra [memorandum], because, on the surface, the military did not take over the 
government this time. However, even the naming of the intervention as a 
‘memorandum’ reflects the increasing degree of militarization in the society since the 
1960 military coup. The ‘memorandum’ itself, which was announced on the radio at 1 
pm on March 12, 1971, was as follows: 
1.With their ongoing attitude, view and actions, the assembly and the 
government have put our country in anarchy, civil war, social and financial 
troubles; in public view, lost the hope to reach the civilization degree 
Ataturk aimed for us and put the future of the Republic of Turkey into a 
great danger by not realizing the reforms envisaged by the constitution. 
2.It seems necessary for Turkish nation and Military Forces embodied by it 
to constitute a strong, reliable new government, within democratic rules, 
which will restore reforms envisaged by the constitution with a Kemalist 
point of view and implement revolutionary laws with a nonpartisan 
approach, by being evaluated in our assemblies, to end this sad and 
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hopeless, desperate environment and to finish the present anarchical 
situation. 
3.If this matter is not realized immediately, Turkish Military Forces is 
determined to do its task provided by law, which is preserving and 
protecting the Republic of Turkey, by taking on the administration directly. 
For your information…49 50 
According to Hale, who writes extensively about the legitimacy of the underlying 
reasons behind the 1960 and 1980 interventions, the exact grounds of this one are still 
benighted (Hale 1996, 161). There are indeed several issues explaining the chaotic 
socio-political atmosphere in the country, if not the military intervention, before March 
12, 1971. The growing strength and influence of the student and labor movements, 
factionalism in the Justice Party and in left
51, the conflict between İsmet İnönü’s and 
Bülent Ecevit’s supporters, and the succeeding factionalism within the PRP are among 
the internal issues that lie in the background of the 1971 “memorandum.” On the other 
side, the government of PM Süleyman Demirel was in a conflictual position with regard 
to the US demands from Turkey to stop the implantation of opium. Moreover, the 
government had sided with the Palestinians in the occupation of Palestine by Israel, and 
the flights of the US U-2 planes from Adana Incirlik Air Base to the USSR were not 
permittedsince Demirel considered this as a threat to the country’s international 
independence. (Sunay 2010, 161)  
 
                                                 
49
1.Meclis ve hükümet, süregelen tutum, görüş ve icraatlarıyla yurdumuzu anarşi, 
kardeş kavgası, sosyal ve ekonomik huzursuzluklar içine sokmuş, Atatürk ün bize hedef 
verdiği uygarlık seviyesine ulaşmak ümidini kamuoyunda yitirmiş ve anayasanın 
öngördüğü reformları tahakkuk ettirememiş olup, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti nin geleceği ağır 
bir tehlike içine düşürülmüştür. 
2.Türk milletinin ve sinesinden çıkan Silahlı Kuvvetleri nin bu vahim ortam hakkında 
duyduğu üzüntü ve ümitsizliğini giderecek çarelerin, partiler üstü bir anlayışla 
meclislerimizce değerlendirilerek mevcut anarşik durumu giderecek anayasanın 
öngördüğü reformları Atatürkçü bir görüşle ele alacak ve inkıl p kanunlarını 
uygulayacak kuvvetli ve inandırıcı bir hükümetin demokratik kurallar içinde teşkili 
zaruri görülmektedir. 
3.Bu husus süratle tahakkuk ettirilemediği takdirde, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri kanunların 
kendisine vermiş olduğu Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ni korumak ve kollamak görevini yerine 
getirerek, idareyi doğrudan doğruya üzerine almaya kararlıdır. Bilgilerinize... 
50“12 Mart 1971 Muhtırası Araştırma Raporu.” Hürriyet, November 21, 2012, accessed 
May 15, 2014. http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/haber_resim_3/12_mart_raporu.pdf. 
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After the Worker’s Party of Turkey [Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP] gained seat(s) in the 
Parliament for the first time in 1965, and for the second time in 1969 general elections. 
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There have been fewer studies that analyze the ways in which the military 
structure and organization affected and was itself affected by the 1970 “memorandum.” 
Gen. Muhsin Batur writes in his memoirs that, before the intervention, a group of high 
ranking officers, including himself, were planning to take over the government. Indeed, 
offices such as the presidency, prime ministry, vice prime ministry, and the presidency 
of General Staff were already distributed among the group for the post-intervention 
interim government (Batur 1985, 233). However, Cengiz Sunay argues that there were 
two concerns behind this group not overtaking the government but forming a ‘civilian’ 
one under their control instead: First, the restlessness of young officers was a great 
source of anxiety for the high ranking officers, which constituted a major motivation for 
intervention. They were concerned that they would not be able to keep a tight rein on 
the younger officers if the existing government and political chaos continued. The 
experience of 1960 had obviously had a significant impact on the internal paradigms of 
the military, and the lower ranking officers were deemed to be a boiling threat against 
the command echelon. Secondly, the high ranking officers were worried that the 
relatively low ranking officers such as Celil Gürkan and Vedii Bilget who were popular 
figures at the time, would stage another coup if the command echelon overtookthe 
government. (Sunay 2010, 164-165) Thus, Sunay agrees with Nazlı Ilıcak about the 
complexity of the 1971 intervention, not only with regards to its effects on civil-military 
relations but also considering the internal dynamics of the military: 
In Republic period, we faced three military interventions in Turkey. There is 
no doubt that 12th March was the most complicated and intractable one, 
because in 12th March, various juntas sometimes worked intimately and 
sometimes worked as detached separate groups.
52
 
53
 
 
 With the 1971 military intervention, though it remained a limited one, the 
political realm was further militarized. The 1980 military coup was one more step 
backwards for the hardly surviving democratic components of the regime. The coup and 
the 1982 Constitution made the military an absolute legislative, executive and judicial 
power for three years until a civilian government was formed. The constitution was “to 
protect the State from the actions of its citizens rather than to protect the fundamental 
                                                 
52Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet döneminde üç askeri müdahale gördük. Bunlardan 12 Mart 
muhakkak ki en karışık ve içinden çıkılması en güç olanıydı. Çünkü, 12 Mart’ta çeşitli 
cuntalar, içiçe bazen de birbirinden ayrı müstakil gruplar olarak çalışmıştı. 
53Nazlı Ilıcak (Undated), “Elyazısı İtiraflarla 12 Mart Cuntaları”, 5; as cited in Sunay 
2010, 164. 
40 
 
rights and liberties of the citizen from the State’s encroachment” (Özbudun 2007, 179). 
The duty of the NSC was redefined as ‘protecting the peace and security of the society’, 
which led the institution to become more militarized and powerful in its organization 
and involvement in the political processes. William Hale recapitulates how political 
institutions were restructured after the 1980 coup (Hale 1996, 218-221), although 
without transcending the intellectual borders of “methodological militarism” (Altınay 
2009, 1248). With its new structure, the NSC started to operate in guidance, 
surveillance, and policymaking of broader fields from economy to non-governmental 
organizations. The 1980 military junta added a notorious story to the ‘military tutelage’ 
[askeri vesayet], which was rebuilt by the 1960 coup after the Democrat Party (DP), by 
ignoring the 1961 Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. Some 
of the legal ways in which a great power was given to the executive branch and security 
forces over civilian bodies, and the supervision of military spending was lifted were as 
follows: State Auditing Board of the Presidency, Council of Higher Education, High 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors, Council of State, Regional Administrative Courts, 
Martial Law, the laws that rearrange the auditing and appointment powers of the 
President (Bayramoğlu 2009, 83). Among these, the law no. 3162, which was amended 
in 1985, is especially striking as it lifted all the surveillance over military spending. 
Herewith the 1982 Constitution, the military became more centralized as to first prevent 
any coup attempts against the already staged coup. The high ranking military officers 
were already legally well equipped to enjoy political decision-making by the 
constitution, and the junta did everything to pull the plug on another possible 
intervention of younger officers. The processes of centralization and specialization of 
the internal affairs and structure of the military (Bayramoğlu 2009, 98) has not been 
quite available to researchers. Yet the speech of the leader of the coup, Gen. Kenan 
Evren, delivered in Turkish Military Academy in 1982, shed light on the perspective 
behind the changes
54
. 
Yet the military could not keep its distance from politics since it was already 
institutionally involved through the means of the NSC. The February 28 ‘post-modern 
intervention’ was announced as a result of a meeting of the NSC in 1997. The council 
interpreted certain acts of the PM Necmettin Erbakan and his fellows as ‘provocative’ 
and threatening against secularism. Erbakan’s visits to Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria; his 
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dinner with the leaders of religious orders and sheikhs; and the anti-Alevi and pro-Sunni 
speeches of the Minister of Justice and a mayor from the Welfare Party were among 
these perceived threats. All in all, this process made TAF an exhorter actor during 
‘peace’ times, or say, non-coup times. TAF moved on to a more active style in terms of 
its psychological operations to reinforce the already rife perceptions of Kurdish identity 
and Islamic extremism as the internal enemies (Cizre 2004, 214), and the military’s 
contacts with business, media and judicial authorities to influence  politics. 
The independent, journalistic or scholarly research has historically  approached 
civil-military relations in Turkey as mostly centered upon military coups and 
interventions. As the review above is conducted from such a literature,  it lacks a 
significant part of the history, including the tortures, arbitrary imprisonments, losses, 
and other types of military violence as well as the militarization of everyday lives and 
the civilian institutions in the country. Moreover, sexual and gender-based violence is 
almost always silenced in the written memories of those who faced torture after these 
two interventions with a few exceptions, which adds yet another level of silence.
55
 Here 
I shall note that scholars such as Taha Parla, Murat Belge, Ümit Cizre, and Serdar Şen 
who write on civil-military relations from a critical perspective were exceptions in this 
literature until early 2000s (Parla 1991a, 1991b, and 1992; Belge 1992; Cizre 1992 and 
1997; Şen 1996 and 2000). As Altınay argues, “methodological militarism” (Altınay 
2009, 1248) has long been dominating the literature on civil-military relations through 
subtle or open statements. First, the military coups are legitimized to a great extent in 
this literature. The 1960 military coup is considered a ‘revolution’ that contributed to 
democracy rather than a ‘coup’ against it. The 1980 military coup is deemed to be 
‘successful’ in ending political violence and recovering the crawling economy. 
Secondly, military violence and torture experienced by many segments of the society 
are either ignored or trivialized by authors such as William Hale and Metin Heper
56
. 
Before the JDP came to power, the 2001 law no. 118 of the 1982 Constitution 
that organizes the structure and functions of the NSC had been partially modified. 
Though the number of civilians in the council was increased to outnumber the military 
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officers, and the expression “the Ministerial Cabinet will primarily consider” was 
changed to “the Ministerial Cabinet will evaluate the decisions of the National Security 
Council”, the balances in civil-military relations was not affected in practice 
(Bayramoğlu 2009, 107). The Seventh Harmonization Package, aimed at adapting 
Turkey to EU acquis, introduced more fundamental changes that shifted the balance in 
the relations between the military high command and the executive branch of the 
government: 
 The position of the General Secretary of the MGKGS [General 
Secretary of the National Security Council] was radically modified. The 
majority of his executive powers were removed and only mostly 
administrative duties stayed in his hands. 
 After the reform, the General Secretary could also be recruited from 
non-military persons and not only from full generals or admirals. 
 The MGKGS was deprived of the possibility to request non-classified or 
classified documents from ministries, public institutions, organizations 
and private persons. 
 The frequency of the MGK meetings was decreased –the National 
Security Council would meet once every two months instead of once 
every month. 
 The secrecy surrounding the MGK was removed, and transparency of its 
functioning was enhanced. the package stipulated that the regulation on 
the functions of the Secretariat of the Council should be published in the 
Official Gazette. 
 The seventh harmonization package also made it possible for the Court 
of Accounts to exercise financial oversight in the state properties in the 
hands of the TSK. 
 The jurisdiction of the military courts was narrowed. (Crimes regulated 
by Article 58 of the Military Criminal Code committed by non-military 
persons in times of peace would not be tried by military courts.) (Danek 
2011, 33-34)
57
 
 
The latest significant institutional-legal change in civil-military relations 
regarding governance at the state level was the annulment of the Security and Order 
Cooperation Protocol [Emniyet Asayiş Yardımlaşma Protokolü, EMASYA] on February 
4, 2010
58
, which had been signed in 1997 between Turkish General Staff and Ministry 
of Internal Affairs bestowing the autonomy of the Gendarmerie to intervene in riots. 
Although the new regulations place the Gendarmerie under the control of local civilian 
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administrations, to what extent this is implemented at the local level in rural areas 
remains a question.
59
 
Since the European Union declared Turkey candidate country for membership 
after the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, the first decade of the twenty-
first century has been a process of transformation in civil-military relations. This 
transformation is related to three interlinked factors according to Akça and Balta-Paker: 
“the presence of international conditionality, a decrease in the level of internal threats, 
and the emergence of a domestic political actor with the capacity and will to challenge 
the military establishment.” (Akça and Balta-Paker 2013) As argued by many 
commentators, the level of internal and external threat faced by a society affects the 
strength of civilian control over the military dramatically. They suggest that the capture 
of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, became a turning point for the high 
levels of militarization experienced due to the conflict in the predominantly Kurdish 
southeast part of Turkey, in the 1990s. Moreover, they explain the significance of the 
successive electoral victories and consolidating will of the JDP to challenge the military 
establishment, along with the international conditionality, as follows: 
Finally, and most importantly, it was the emergence of a political actor with 
the capacity and will to challenge the military establishment that enabled the 
transformation of civil–military relations. Since 2002, the AKP has won 
three successive elections with increasing electoral and popular support. 
This electoral support is exceptional, given that the post-1980 period was 
marked by a protracted crisis of political hegemony, where no single party 
was able to govern alone.[…] The AKP’s project has revitalized the 
neoliberal hegemony by absorbing Islamism into the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank-oriented secular neoliberalism. In doing this, the 
AKP has reinvented the populist strategies of Turkey’s center-right and 
promoted a restricted political reformism within the limits of its 
authoritarian populism. (Akça and Balta-Paker 2013, 78) 
According to the authors, the most recent period of this transformation was marked by 
the Ergenekon trials. After winning 46.6% of the vote and gaining 62% of the 
parliamentary seats, the JDP intensified its efforts to further change the balance of 
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power between the civilian government
60
.  
When it comes to the militarization of the society and of politics, military coups 
and interventions constitute only part of the history. As Altınay argues, the widespread 
perception that Turkish nation is a ‘military-nation’ has been constructed since the 
establishment of the Republic in 1923, and survives through the militarization of 
everyday life, education, and gender regimes (Altınay 2004). Yet, until recently, the 
militarization of society has not been studied rigorously, and has been almost absent in 
the literature on civil-military relations in Turkey. One can argue that the neglect of 
close analysis of the agents composing TAF (officers, conscripted soldiers, and other 
constitutents) for the sake of institutional explanations is an important component of 
this gap in the literature, keeping “the human” and the many levels of complexity that 
constitute the military and its relations with the rest of the society uninterrogated
61
. 
2.2. Professional military education from the late 18th century onwards 
 In June 28, 2014, President Abdullah Gül celebrated Turkish Land Forces’ 
2223
rd
 foundation anniversary
62
. This date means that Land Forces was established in 
209 B.C.: 
The Hun Emperor Mete Khan had acceded to the throne in 209 B.C. and 
this date was taken as the foundation of the army. 
In the Turkish regular army which was established in 209 BC. by Mete 
Khan, the largest unit comprising of 10.000 horsemen was named 
“division”. Divisions were broken down into units of thousands, thousands 
to hundreds, hundreds to tens. Each were assigned a Division Commander, 
Major, Captain or Corporal as a commander and interconnected within the 
chain of command.
63
 
 
This history continues with the Seljuk Empire, the Anatolian Seljuks, the Egyptian 
Turkish Mamelukes, and the Ottoman Empire, ‘proving’ the skills of Turkish peoples in 
creating great armies. This “mythical” history of the Turkish military, adopted only 
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recently, constitutes a part of the prominent myth of ‘military-nation’ which has 
constituted the official ideology since the 1930s (Altınay 2004).  However, when the 
subject is military schools, official historiography takes a different form.  
 The histories of military high schools and academies go back “only” to the late 
Ottoman period. Turkish Military Academy is known to be established in 1834, and 
military high schools in 1845: 
In recognition of intense demands of science and technology on modern 
warfare, the Ottoman State abolished the Janissaries and founded Military 
Academy in Istanbul in 1834 as an institution devoted to the arts and 
science of warfare by the order of Sultan Mahmut II. The Academy 
produced its first graduates in 1841. After the foundation of military high 
schools in 1845, the Academy continued to give education with a four-year 
curriculum. The Academy had primarily trained artillery and cavalry 
officers until 1908. The Military Academies that were founded in five army 
centers in Edirne, Manastir, Erzincan, Damascus and Bagdad were closed 
after a short while. Later, only the Military Academy in Istanbul continued 
education and training.
64
 
The establishment of Turkish Naval Academy and Turkish Naval High School goes 
back to 1773. Though Air Force Academy was established only in 1951, the first 
aviation school [Hava Okulu] was founded in 1912 to train the cadets of Turkish 
Military Academy. While there is an effort to claim the history of our “military-nation” 
as being more than 2000 years old, the history of military schools parallels the history 
of modernization and dates back to the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, constituting a part of 
the larger history of “modernization”. What is of particular significance is that both 
histories predate the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.  
 According to Gül Tokay, the reforms concerning the military forces of the 
Ottoman Empire had two façades: reforms of the emperorship driven by the internal 
dynamics and observed improvements in the militaries of European countries; and 
reforms imposed by the European states (Tokay 2010, 35-36). Many commentators and 
scholars mark the beginning of modernization in the Ottoman Empire’s land based and 
naval forces with the late 18
th
 century, and the ruling period of Selim III between 1879 
and 1808 (Tokay 2010, 36; Zorlu 2011). During the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries, 
Selim III carried a series of reforms “to catch up” militarily with the European 
countries, which were called the Nizam-ı Cedid [New Order] (Zorlu 2011, 160-166). 
Selim’s reformation attempts were ceased by his dethronement by the Janissaries. 
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Mahmud II executed Mustafa IV who came to power after Selim III, and became the 
emperor, in 1808. Mahmud’s successful disbandment of the Janissaries for good, which 
was called the Auspicious Event, marked his emperorship as a successful one. In June 
1826, after the Auspicious Event, a new army was established based on the system 
offered by Selim’s Nizam-ı Cedid: the army was sectioned as companies, battalions and 
regiments, which still constitutes the way each military force is organized.  
Tokay argues that modernization of the military had been the priority of the rule 
of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and the Second Constitutionalist Period. Despite the 
difference between the managerial understandings of these two periods, two factors 
played important roles in these modernization attempts. The first is the impact of 
German Military Mission [Alman Askeri Misyonu] on the military. Secondly, newly 
applied formal education begot a new class of military officers [mektepli subay sınıfı] 
along with the existing, direct-entry soldiers. What directed Abdulhamid II to prioritize 
radical reforms in the military was another defeat in the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-
78 [known as 93 Harbi, the 93 War, according to the hijri calender]. Since Prussia had 
an internationally prominent military force and was not posing a threat to the Empire, 
Abdülhamid II requested military assistance from Prussia. Tokay argues that this 
Prussian-German hand in the reformations in the Ottoman military later ended up 
having impact on the Committee of Union and Progress, which believed in a radical 
change in the regime to save the country, especially after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). 
(Tokay 2010, 38-45) 
After the declaration of the Second Constitution [İkinci Meşrutiyet] in 1908, the 
curriculum of the school was reshaped in accordance with the program of Naval 
Academy of the United Kingdom.
65
 The dominance of the impacts of Prussian-German 
military system on the Ottoman army, and of the British naval model on the navy and 
naval education lasted until World War I
66
 (Rooney 1998). 
According to Gencer Özcan, the significant impact of the Prussian-German 
model on the military is an understudied issue in Republican military historiography. 
Because the Committee of Union and Progress is held responsible for the alliance with 
Germany, and thus for the defeat in World War I, the reforms put into practice by 
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German officers who came to the Ottoman Empire for assistance is intentionally 
ignored, suggests Özcan. (Özcan 2010, 176) As the military went through radical 
changes between Balkan Wars and World War I, the official historiography has noted 
the Union’s “inefficacy” in executing German instructions properly, thus downplaying 
their influence in shaping military organization and education institutions: "Ordunun 
kalkınmasını Almancadan Türkçeye çevrilen üç beş talimname ve talimatla 
çözümleneceğini sananlar, bütün iyi niyetlerine ve fedakar çalışmalarına ragmen tam 
olumlu bir sonuç elde edememişlerdir."67 
Özcan states that General Freiherr Colman von der Goltz had a special impact 
on Ottoman military officers, among all Prussian officers who served in the Ottoman 
Empire for military assistance starting from 1909. Goltz and his students who later 
became professors in military academies helped the creation of a military coterie, 
composed of officers who perceive themselves as members of an elite class of high 
characters (Özcan 2010, 186-189; Ünder 2001, 45-53). Thus, the education of the 
prospective military officers was also organized according to the Prussian-German 
system. For instance, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was educated by the officer-teachers who 
were trained by Goltz Pasha. As Özcan also quotes, General Mittelberger, who also 
helped the necessary information for the plan of Turkey’s occupation by Germany 
written in September 1940, writes that the Military Academy was totally operating 
according to the German system (Koçak 1996, 512). 
 The dominating effects of the Prussian-German system on professional military 
education in Turkey lasted until 1948. The military started to send some teachers to the 
US in order to prepare them to serve in Turkish Military Academy in 1947, with the 
Truman Doctrine declared on 12 March 1947.  In May 1947, a US military committee 
came to Turkey and stated that the infrastructures of transportation and communications 
shall be ameliorated first. This first committee also announced that the US proposes 
reforms that will be geared towards forming a defensive military in Turkey.
68
 The main 
problem of the military was the same as it was under the rule of Abdulhamid II, in the 
Ottoman Empire: the number of soldiers was more than enough but the military guns 
and equipment necessary for war were absent. According to the US Military Aid 
Committee, the two major problems regarding the development and modernization of 
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the military were rates of literacy among conscripts who were supposed to use the 
military guns and technology, and the underdevelopment of the transportation 
infrastructure. The former was meant to be resolved by special education centers for the 
conscripts but the US officers were worried that the military lacked officers and non-
commissioned officers who could work at these centers. As a result, three divisions 
were formed just for the education of the conscripts in 1954. (Güvenç 2010, 267) The 
financial aid of the US to the military was considered to be a very small amount -100 
million dollars- and it was argued that it was nothing compared to the amount necessary 
for an overall transformation of the military, in the US media
69
. The first military aid 
was composed of surplus guns and equipment, leftovers of World War II. However, the 
impacts of the US Military Aid Committee operating in Turkey on military schools, and 
thus, on the future internal organization and ideologies of the military were massive. 
Among them, the impacts on professional military education have resonated until today.  
Low ranking officers who were trained in the US started to provide technical 
education to their commanders, which was a first in the history of the military forces of 
the Republic. The increasing level of sophistication was observed by the high ranking 
officers as well as by the US committee. The committee suggested insertion of political 
science, Turkish politics, and international relations in the curriculum, which are fields 
gaining increasing importance for the future military officers especially in terms of 
issues concerning NATO. (Güvenç 2010, 269-270) The most significant challenges, 
according to the US Military Aid Committee, had to do with the military mentality of 
TAF, which created differences between elder and younger officers. Some of these were 
as follows: 
1. In 1953, the high levels of centralization of authority in Turkish military was 
severely criticized by the US committee of officers: In some divisions, even the 
work permits of vehicles were required to be signed by the head of division 
(Güvenç 2010, 180). While I was asking Selim about this issue, he said this is 
still the case.  
2. The low numbers of NCOs in the military also struck the attention of the US 
officers. The committee’s insistence resulted in the recruitment of 30.700 NCOs 
between 1950 and 1953.  
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The previous resistance to recruit more NCOs, and the extreme centralization of 
authority were impacts of the Prussian-German tradition.  
3. As such, there has been a transformation from the Prussian-German military 
system to the US military model, as low ranking officers were educated 
according to the latter (Güvenç 2010, 280). 
Güvenç argues that there were major differences between the Prussian-German and 
the US military systems and understandings. The former was based on absolute 
obedience and a strict discipline, which required high levels of centralization of 
authority; the conceptualization of ‘military-nation’; the priority of warfare over civilian 
politics; the priority of land based military power; operative maneuvers in order to 
move to succeed in the short run with low risk of defeat; the fundamentality of tactic, 
operative and strategic levels in military doctrine; initiative of the commander in 
warfare; and the education of military officers in intellectual fields and sciences along 
with the military ones. The US military paradigm, however, was based on collective 
warfare of all forces rather than on the priority of land, naval or air force; the 
fundamentality of tactic and strategic levels of military doctrine; instrumentalization of 
warfare/ the military as a tool or a part of politics; detailed planning of the combat 
missions rather than trust on the initiatives of commanders in making good decisions 
during conflicts; and the priority of applied military practice over academic 
development in professional military education. (Güvenç 2010, 256-257) In the end, 
Güvenç argues that there has not been a total transformation from the Prussian-German 
military system to the US model albeit the significant impacts of the latter on military 
technologies and technical education of the military personnel. The Prussian-German 
model survived in TAF in terms of military thinking and conceptualization of war until 
the 1980s, Güvenç states. (Güvenç 2010, 283-284)  
 While the educational sophistication of low ranking officers is deemed to have 
resulted in the takeover of the military by Enver Pasha, the leader of the Committee of 
Union and Progress in 1908, the transformation initiated through US Military Aid after 
1947 seems to have found its expression in the 1960 military coup. Not only the low 
ranks of the officers who staged the coup but also the ways in which the concept of 
‘national security’ was applied to the historical context of Turkey were markers of this 
transformation. The concept was drawn from the US attempts to reformulate and 
reconceptualize civil-military relations after World War II (Özcan 2010, 348), and when 
applied to Turkey, it had hybrid reflections in the actions of the 1960 military junta. For 
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instance, while the introduction of the concept of ‘national security’ was in line with the 
US military understanding in terms of conceptualization of the military as a security and 
defense force, the often neglected political powers given to the military through the 
establishment of the National Security Council after the 1960 military coup was not 
depicting the military as outside of politics but as an integral part of it – not unlike the 
Prussian-German system.   
To take a glance at military schools before the 1960s, let us stress here the 
impact of this hybridity of the Prussian-German and the US models on professional 
military education. The cadets of the most famous military school, Turkish Military 
Academy [Kara Harp Okulu, also known as Harbiye] of the land forces made a 
historically significant march to the parliament before the 1960 military coup. To raise 
artillery and engineering officers, Turkish Military Academy was first established in 
1795, with the name of Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun [Imperial School of Land 
Engineering], and later in 1834 with the name of Mekteb-i Harbiye [Military College] 
by Sultan Mahmud II.
70
 The school has raised some of the best known commanders 
including the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The fame of the school 
in near history of Turkey however, stems from the march of the cadets of Harbiye to the 
parliament on May 21, 1960, right before the coup, which was organized by very young 
military officers of ranks such as colonels, lieutenant colonels, squadron leaders 
[binbaşı] and even lieutenant commanders [yüzbaşı].  
As the cadets of Harbiye expressed their discontent with the DP government of 
the time, this initiated heated debate among members of the government and of the 
General Staff. Their silent march on Atatürk Boulevard in Ankara was first planned to 
end with the kidnapping of PM Adnan Menderes while  in the car with the PM of India, 
Jawaharial Nehru. Then the cadets decided not to pursue this plan lest it creates a bad 
impression about the TAF on the international scene. The succeeding debates were 
quite more interesting, and show the significance of this action of cadets for the 
politicians. The President of the Republic Celal Bayar, PM Menderes, and the 
Commander of TAF, Rüştü Erdelhun had a meeting after the march, and the news 
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immediately spread afterwards that the cadets would be executed.
71
 According to the 
notes of Erdelhun, these rumours about the content of the meeting became a part of the 
psychological operations of the military officers who later staged a coup.  
 Later after the coup, President Bayar, PM Menderes, the Speaker of the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) Refik Koraltan, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Undersecretary of the PM Ahmet Salih Korur, and other members of 
the government were taken to the military academy on the first day of the coup. They 
were battered and interned by the cadets according to the memories of then Colonel 
Alparslan Türkeş, who were later discharged and exiled among the ‘fourteen’ hardliners 
of the junta. (Turgut 1995, 140) Cemalettin Taşkıran, a former officer-teacher who is 
not a graduate of military schools but was a professor and researcher of TAF, states that 
the military officers of the junta wanted Harbiye to become a part of the unrest before 
they staged the coup. However, he puts, “the wrongful acts and attitude of the 
politicians” were also effective in the involvement of the cadets in  politics. (Taşkıran 
2009, 112-113)  
 Güvenç argues that because of the Prussian-German military system and 
understandings that survived by mixing with the US model in TAF up until the 1980s, it 
is hard to mark a sharp change in military high schools and academies as well as in 
different military forces with the 1980 military coup either. The attempts to shift from 
the Prussian-German model’s approach to the US model about the academic education 
of the cadets continued during the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, whilst Turkish 
Military Academy offered bachelor’s degrees in Mechanical Engineering, Civil 
Engineering, Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Management between the years 
1974-1991, the Academy made a gradual transition to Systems Engineering program, in 
which each and every cadet was graduating with the same degree. In the meantime, in 
1991, the Air Force Academy started to give engineering formation to its cadets. The 
period of study was raised from two to three years in 1969, and from three to four years 
only in 1974.
72
 After the 1980 military coup, the International Relations program was 
shut down in the Naval Academy while engineering degrees remained, which I interpret 
as an attempt towards depolitization of future military officers by the military junta to 
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avoid another military coup against the values and the Constitution imposed by the 
already staged one.  A detailed review of this process for Turkish Naval High School 
and Turkish Naval Academy will be conducted in the next section.  
 At the moment, there are nine military colleges and five high schools, highly 
structured by the central authority within TAF. For an overall view of the educational 
institutions of the military the list below (from the Human Resources website of the 
General Chief of Staff), shall be useful
73
: 
1. Military Academies 
 Turkish Military Academy 
 Turkish Naval Academy 
 Turkish Air Force Academy 
2. Gülhane Military Medical Academy 
 Medical Faculty 
 Gülhane Military Medical Academy of Nursing 
3. Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) Colleges 
 Land Forces NCO Vocational School 
 Naval Forces NCO Vocational School 
 Air Forces NCO Vocational School 
 Gendarmerie NCO Vocational School 
 Gülhane Military Medical Academy NCO Vocational School of Health 
4. Military High Schools 
 Kuleli Military High School (on behalf of Turkish Land Forces) 
 Maltepe Military High School (on behalf of Turkish Land Forces) 
 Turkish Naval High School (on behalf of Naval Forces) 
 Işıklar Military Air High School (on behalf of Air Forces) 
5. Non-commissioned Officer Band Training High School 
 
There are quite different military understandings in different military academies, 
which are not within the scope of this study. Levent Ünsaldı writes one of the rare 
comments available on the diverse distinctions within the military. He suggests that the 
categories of ‘the military’, ‘military officers’ or ‘soldiers’ are illusionary with regard to 
the distinctions based on age, generation, rank, political ideologies, and membership of 
different forces (Ünsaldı 2008, 202). As I argue in the next chapter through the 
narratives of my research participants who have been the cadets of same military 
schools, this diversity holds even for the prospective members of the same force, from 
the same cohort.  
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 The military officers of Naval Forces have historically been considered 
‘ballroom officers’ [salon subayı] within the military. Unlike the officers of Land 
Forces who serve in each and every city and town of the country, and face armed 
conflict more often than others, ‘marines’ [denizciler] have better conditions. They 
work in their ships and bases, away from the socio-economic and political conflicts in 
the society. Especially since the late 1940s, they have been sent abroad, especially to 
the US for education or purchase of ships, unlike the army and aviation officers. They 
are paid better as well, according to the table created by Ünsaldı based on the data 
collected from the Ministry of Finance and Supreme Court of Public Accounts, on 19 
March 2002 (Ünsaldı 2008, 203). Ünsaldı also points out the fact that Naval Forces and 
Air Forces have been participating in administrative duties of TAF much less than the 
Land Forces: All the presidents of General Staff have been the members of Land 
Forces, mostly from the Artillery Unit [Topçu Sınıfı]. Because they are considered to be 
‘ballroom officers’, military officers of Naval Forces are deemed less ‘soldierly’, 
especially in comparison to army officers. One of my research participants confirmed 
this perception when he talked about his reluctance to use the term ‘soldiering’ to define 
his experience of professional military education: 
Efe: Since I am not a person who commands others, I cannot call myself “a 
soldier” anyway. 
How so? 
I have navigation abilities. My knowledge on law is pretty good. I know 
very much about legal rules […]. But I am a zero when it comes to soldiery. 
What you mean with soldiery? 
Making people do something, rushing them, do you understand? There were 
such things in high school. A guy, for instance, was smoking. A very close 
friend of mine... They found cigarettes on him, they could report it, but they 
didn’t. Not being reported suited his book as well. He was beaten at the 
night.
74
 
 
                                                 
74Efe: Ben kimseye laf söylemeyen bir insan olduğum için, “asker” diyemiyorum ben 
kendime zaten.  
Nasıl? 
Denizciliğim var. Hukuk alanında bilgim çok iyidir. Kanunları falan çok iyi bilirim 
[…]. Ama askerlikte sıfırım.  
Askerlikte derken? 
Birine bir iş yaptırmak, birini sıkmak. Tamam mı? Lisede böyle şeyler vardı. Adam 
mesela sigara içiyordu. Çok yakın arkadaşım. Adamın üstünde sigara buluyorlardı, 
rapor edebilirler, rapor etmiyorlardı. Onun da işine geliyordu rapor edilmemek. Adam 
gece dayak yiyordu.  
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As such, the reaction of a university student I recently met, who had to leave the 
Turkish Military Academy because he was in the ‘shock group’ [şok mangası] of his 
cohort was hardly surprising: “It had been better if you wouldn’t do your research with 
naval cadets, even aviation cadets are better. Naval cadets don’t even count as soldiers.” 
[Denizcilerle yapmasaydın keşke ya, havacılar bile daha iyi. Denizciler asker bile 
sayılmaz.] The members of the Air Forces who are better than naval ones in terms of 
soldiering according to this former army cadet are taken to be the most conservative 
part of the military by Ünsaldı. He argues that one reason for that might be the absence 
of an air force military high school. Selim, however, stated that though Air Force 
Command did not have a military high school from 1974 to 2008, the Air Force 
Academy was recruiting its cadets from Kuleli, Maltepe, Işıklar and Turkish Naval 
military high schools. Therefore, the perceived conservatism of aviation officers can 
have other reasons. As a proof of their conservatism, Ünsaldı also gives the number of 
officers, NCOs and cadets who have been expelled from each force between 12 March 
1971 and 1 June 1972, accused of being involved in the leftist movement: 388 members 
from Air Forces, 268 from Land Forces, and 120 from Naval Forces (Ünsaldı 2008, 
204). Yet, when I shared this information with some of my research participants while 
asking their opinions on the conservatism of the Air Forces, they drew my attention to 
the proportion of these numbers within the total number of personnel of each force. 
Thus, they said, the numbers of removals do not necessarily mean that Air Forces was 
more conservative and prone to exclude those who were accused of being involved in 
leftist politics. Unfortunately, I could not reach the numbers of personnel of each force 
in the years 1971 and 1972.  
Additionally, there are distinguishing social and political characteristics of the 
Gendarmerie, which constitutes a part of the Land Forces. Moreover, there is a deep 
hierarchy between the schools of military officers and non-commissioned officers since 
the latter are trained to work under the former without a chance to climb the ladder. One 
of the former cadets I encountered during my fieldwork explained the ‘legitimacy’ of 
this inequality of opportunity by making an analogy with engineers and technicians.
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For the study in hand, a deeper focus on the histories of Turkish Naval High 
School and Turkish Naval Academy is necessary to locate the narratives of my research 
participants historically. While discussing the distinguishing features of the Naval 
Forces within the military with Selim, I realized that some of Ünsaldı’s analyses on the 
institutional culture of the force lost validity. First of all, Selim stated that the marines, 
NCOs and even conscripts were sent to the US to purchase ships or for temporal 
education programs before 2000s. Since the navy stopped purchasing ships from foreign 
countries and started to order ships from Turkish shipbuilding yards, very few people 
from the Naval Forces are sent abroad –and only for master’s degrees. Secondly, which 
shall be valid for all forces in different degrees, he told me how a vice-admiral 
[tümgeneral] became the Chief of Education in the Naval Forces because all there was 
no admiral for this position due to the Balyoz trials. Selim also mentioned other changes 
about the widely known precedents about Naval Forces from 2007-2008 onwards, 
which I further elaborate on later. Before analyzing the quantitative repercussions of 
these changes on military schools, a focus on the history of Turkish Naval High School 
and Turkish Naval Academy is necessary to locate the narratives of my research 
participants in these macro processes of transformation. 
2.3. The history of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy 
Sea makes a nation live, enhances and enriches it. Turkish race tasted that thousands of 
years ago and they marched towards river and seaside when they left their homeland. 
Blessed Anatolia of 20th century Turks, who are the most vivacious descendents of 
Turkish world which was found thousands of years before the beginning of the history, 
is surrounded by this natural asset’s blue and fertile lines at three sides. Since before 
Islam, Turks who were in China, India and Iraq went down to seaside and worked in 
marine, it can be said that the first field Turkish sailors walked into was vast and 
stormy sea (Ertuğrul 194-?).76 
 
The destruction of the Ottoman fleet by the Russian one in the bay of Çeşme on 
6 July 1770 exerted both a shocking and motivating impact on the Ottoman Navy. This 
defeat became the force behind the reform movements that would continue until Selim 
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II ascended the throne in 1789 (Zorlu 2011, 10). However, the first school for the 
marines was established in 1773
77
, under the rule of Mustapha III who is also known as 
the first innovative Sultan, by a French military officer of Hungarian origin, Baron de 
Tott. Rear Admiral Upper Half Fahri Çoker states that the memoirs of Baron de Tott are 
the only source of information about the foundation of Naval Academy (Çoker 1977, 
12). In 1941, Ertuğrul suggests that the first naval school was established by Chief 
Admiral and Algerian war veteran Hasan Pasha in 1776 (Ertuğrul 194-?, 7). After the 
first school was closed down with a joint decision of Mustafa III and Baron de Tott, the 
second was founded in 1776. Yet, not only by Hasan Pasha but also with the efforts of 
Baron de Tott –Ertuğrul does not recognize this. 
Appointed by Sultan Mustafa III, de Tott explains his role in the creation of 
what he calls a ‘Mathematical School’ after the defeat of Ottoman navy in Çeşme, İzmir 
[Smyrna] by the Russian navy (1770) as follows: 
The sultan, not content with a few useful improvements, which might 
remedy, for a time, the Vices that infested every branch of Administration, 
was defurious to extend Knowledge of every kind, and requested me to 
found, and direct, a Mathematical School. The Body of Mathematicians, 
instituted by Soliman, exclaimed against this Innovation, which seemed to 
accuse the Muhendis (Mathematician) of Ignorance, for whose Knowledge 
their Chief was ready to answer. His Highness ordered these Geometricians 
should be previously admitted to an Examination, in the presence of two of 
the Ministers, appointed Commissioners for that purpose. (De Tott 1786, 
171) 
This School, principally intended to promote maritime Knowledge, as 
established at the Arsenal; but none could be admitted, except persons old 
enough to serve those views of present Advantage with which it was 
undertaken. Captains of Ships, with white beards, and other scholars of 
mature age, left me no occasion to forbid Playfulness, and boyish Tricks. I 
every day dictated the Lesson in Turkish, each Scholar wrote it down in his 
book, and I appointed one to repeat it to the whole School the following 
day. (De Tott 1786, 176) 
 
Naval academy, although in a very different form than we know it today, was founded 
on the old arsenal at Kasımpaşa, Beyoğlu, with the name of Mühendishane-i Bahr-ı 
Hümayun. It was deemed to be the result of the visionary insistence of Sultan Mustafa 
III, after the previous unfortunate trials of Ahmet III (1727), and Mahmud I (1734), 
which failed due to the oppositions of the guild of janissaries (Çoker 1977, 11). This 
was, however, more like a periodical training for aged and experienced captains than a 
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school that raises new ones. After the student-captains acquired necessary education 
about plane geometry and marine navigation calculations, Mustapha III and Baron de 
Tott decided to close the school down and follow the improvements of the former 
students in the field.  
 With the advice of Baron de Tott and the efforts of Chief Admiral Algerian war 
veteran Hasan Pasha, the first naval school on lands of the Ottoman Empire was 
established in Kasımpaşa, in 1776 (Turkish Naval Academy Official Website; Deniz 
Mektepleri Tarihçesi 1931, 47). The curriculum of the school was changed according to 
the program of Naval Academy of the United Kingdom, after the Second Constitution, 
in 1908.
78
 The impacts of the British naval model on the navy and naval education 
continued until World War I. 
As the school was extending both in number of captain-students and physically 
with its new buildings in Camialtı, in 1834, one department of the school (called ‘Ship 
Sailing’ [Gemi Seyir]) was moved to Heybeliada (formerly named as Halki in Greek), 
one of the Princes’ Islands in Istanbul. The area on which it was established was known 
as Kalyoncu Kışlası [Galleon Barracks], and was built by Mahmud II in 1828. Later in 
1838, Algerian Hasan Pasha’s Mansion [Cezayirli Hasan Paşa Konağı] was purchased 
by the Sultan, and the School of Naval Engineering was reopened to incorporate all the 
members and departments of the institution. Along with the Imperial Edict of 
Reorganization in 1839 [Tanzimat Fermanı], some significant changes were conducted 
in the education of the school and its name became Mekteb-i Bahriye-i Şahane [Great 
School of Naval Sciences]. After 1839, the school operated in Kasımpaşa for around 12 
years. In 1850-1851, the school was moved back to Heybeliada for the second and last 
time, to Kalyoncu Kışlası [Galleon Barracks]. Only in 1853, a separate idadi (high 
school) was created
79
. There is not detailed information about the changes took place 
between 1853 and 1928 on the official websites of Turkish Naval High School and 
Turkish Naval Academy. Though, the existence of a mosque until 1934
80
 within the 
naval school in Heybeliada is an interesting detail (Deniz Mektepleri Tarihçesi 1931, 
27). This is not mentioned on the official website of Naval Academy. Only during the 
                                                 
78
 "Tarihçe.", Turkish Naval Academy Official Website. 
http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00_Anasayfa/01_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html. 
79
Ibid. 
80
 For pictures of Turkish Naval High School in 1934 and in 1935 with the difference of 
the mosque see Cem Özmeral, “Heybeliada Deniz Lisesi 1932-1936.”, istanbullite.com, 
2008. http://www.istanbullite.com/tarihtenkapaklar/heybeliadadenizlisesi.html. 
58 
 
Balkan Wars (1912-1913), some changes were brought about to the curriculum, and 
young officers were exacted to take three years of engineering training after graduation.  
After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, first in 1924 new cadets were 
enrolled in the school under three different classes: Ship board, machinery, and 
clerkship [Güverte, makine ve katiplik]. The period of study was four years, including 
one year of preparation courses. With the command of Turkish General Staff, the name 
of the schools were changed once again to Deniz Harp Okulu ve Deniz Lisesi 
Komutanlığı [Naval Academy and Naval High School Command] from Bahriye 
Mektebi in accordance with the reform of the Republicans from Arabic alphabet to Latin 
alphabet. Whilst the schools were carried to Mersin, a city at the Mediterranean end of 
southeast Turkey, between 1941 and 1946, during the Second World War, it was 
relocated back in Heybeliada on September 9, 1946. On the official websites and 
written histories of the schools, it is not stated that before this removal to Heybeliada, 
the Greek Commerce Academy and the monastery [known as Panayia (Mother Mary) 
Kamariotisa] was extorted by the state and given to Naval Forces (Ertani 2012). The 
date of this extortion is meaningful since the 1940s have witnessed increasing levels of 
racism in the society as a result of the impacts of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, 
and the government’s compliance to this trend with its actions and discourses 
(Maksudyan 2005). 
A parenthesis about the foreign influence on the navy after the Republic is 
necessary at this point. While the German navy took over the command of the Ottoman 
Navy during World War I, early Republican politicians and military officers never let 
the command of the navy or the army to foreign militaries. During the first years of the 
Republic, from which country the new battleships and naval assistance should be taken 
was debated. The newly established parliament in Ankara preferred the German navy 
for the education and assistance of Turkish marines. Throughout the years from the 
1920s to the 1950s, Germany, Britain, France and Italy had different degrees of impact 
on and involvements in the Republic’s navy. (Güvenç and Barlas 2010, 233-253) 
However, the influence of the British military education system continued in naval high 
school and academy by hybridizing with the legacy of the Prussian-German military 
system. After the Truman Doctrine, the US impact set out a gradual transition in 
professional military education as argued above, which gained pace after the 1980 
military coup. 
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Until 1953, the education period of naval academy was only two years: one year 
for theoretical training, and one year for training in practice in the navy. Afterwards, the 
administration decided to switch this to a four-year license program. After several 
changes in the organization of the curriculum of these four years until 1974-1975, the 
academy was reshaped around the disciplines of International Relations, Machinery, 
Electric-Electronic, Control Systems, Operational Research/ Management, Naval 
Architecture, and Oceanography.  
After the 1980 military coup, the education was revised and narrowed down to 
four programs: Operational Research/ Management, Machinery, and Electric-Electronic 
(including sub-disciplines of Communications, Computer Science, Control, Electric). 
The ‘Our History’ section of the website does not bother explaining why programs such 
as International Relations or Naval Architecture were lifted after the 1980 military coup. 
Even the paragraph that shortly states this revision lacks content integrity. Though it is 
not the intent of this study to interpret this change, this may be a result of TAF’s 
accelerating transformation from the Prussian-German military system to the US 
military model in terms of the academic and intellectual equipment. Since the US 
understanding gives priority to military/ bodily training and practice over academic and 
intellectual improvement, it is not a surprise that the military decided on such a change 
after the 1980s. The same line of thinking can be traced in the gradual transition of the 
Military Academy from a multi-disciplinary structure to a single and management 
centered program, called Systems Engineering, in 1991. This transition overlaps with 
the escalation of war between TAF and the PKK, a period when military action, or 
armed conflict, was deemed more important than military thinking and political 
resolutions in solving ‘the problem of terror’. The curriculums of military academies 
were reshaped in 1990s, according to the criteria of the Higher Education Council, 
established after the 1980 military coup. These criteria were based on the engineering 
programs of universities such as Boğaziçi, Middle East Technical, and Istanbul 
Technical universities. Thus, the cadets of military academies gain the right to obtain a 
Bachelor’s degree in engineering along with the Military Officer’s degree [Subay 
Diploması] from 1996-1997 onwards.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, TAF initiated a discussion on the juridical status 
of military academies, and particularly the Second Article of the Law of Military 
Academies no. 1462. As a result, the General Staff ordered a radical change in the 
educational status and content of professional military education. By the 1992-1993 
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academic year, military academies had started to accept female students from civilian 
high schools
81
. In accordance with The International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW-95), the courses of 
vocational education, foreign language, meteorology, and intelligence were inserted to 
the curriculum. Physical training was taken to be a part of the academic program as a 
course entitled ‘Warfare Physical Training’ [Savaş Beden Eğitimi], which also overlaps 
with the abovementioned transition to the US model in terms of the academic objectives 
of professional military education. In 1995-1996, naval academy started to accept male 
students from civilian high schools to raise them for TAF’s departments of military 
engineering and marine corps
82
. One year later TAF decided not to accept students 
specifically for these purposes but the academy started to produce military officers for 
military engineering and marine corps starting from 1997-1998.  
The Naval High School was physically separated from the Naval Academy in 
1963, and started the 1963-1964 term in a building of Naval Education Command. This 
building was legally left to the Naval High School Command in 1971. On July 28, 
1977, the then President of the Republic Fahri Korutürk who is himself a 1923 graduate 
of Bahriye Mektebi officially brought the new facilities of naval academy on Tuz Burnu 
Peninsula in Tuzla, Istanbul into use. The new Turkish Naval Academy was inaugurated 
by General Kenan Evren the President of the Republic in 1985
83
.  
After 1985, all of the buildings in Heybeliada were left to the use of the Naval 
High School Command. Some of the new buildings among the facilities in Heybeliada 
were demolished after the August 17, 1999 earthquake in Turkey. The Naval High 
School continues to accommodate young cadets with its new and historical buildings in 
Heybeliada since January 8, 2004
84
. 
As I learned about the extraction of the Greek Commerce Academy by Naval 
Forces after my fieldwork, I was able to ask whether they knew about this only to two 
of my research participants. Neither replied affirmatively. They were actually surprised 
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and quite disturbed. From a different angle, in the 19
th
 century, there were three higher 
education institutions of the Ottoman Empire in Heybeliada (Χάλκη [Halki])85 , in 
Istanbul: Greek Commerce Academy [Rum Ticaret Akademisi], Halki Seminary 
[Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu], and Naval Academy [Bahriye] (Ertani 2012). Yet only the 
naval high school, and later the separated academy, have survived until today, and this 
information is obviously unavailable even to former cadets of the school. According to 
the official website of Adalar [Prince’s Islands] district, the school was moved to the 
Greek Commerce Academy, Halki Seminary and Panayia for the first time in 1917, for 
a year during World War I: 
In this context, Hüsrev Paşa, the Marine Commander of Selim III, was 
transferred to the building which was built in past as Marine Barrack in 
Heybeliada with the name of Mühendishanei Bahri (Marine Engineering) 
(1824). During Crimean War, Naval School was restored with a new mentality. 
For three-quarter century, it naturally remained at its old place as Marine 
School. However, it was replaced again during World War I (1917) and was 
settled into Turkish Orthodox School of Theology, the Holy Trinity, Greek 
Trade School and the ruins of Panayia. After a year, it was removed to its old 
place.
86
 
87
 
 
In accordance with the Law of Military Academies no. 4566, the Directorate of 
Education of military schools was reorganized on May 17
th
, 2000. The President of 
Education became the ‘Dean’. The disciplines that give Bachelor’s degree of 
engineering were legally established as departments, and the number of departments 
was increased to nine from four. From 2001-2002, theNaval Sciences and Engineering 
Institute started to operate as the graduate institution of Naval Academy, which overlaps 
with the time Naval Forces stopped purchasing ships from the US
88
.  
In April 2004, the academy became a party of the Erasmus Exchange Program 
of European Union. However, as I have learned from my interviewees, it has not been 
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put into practice. As the Turkish Coast Guard Command became a separate command 
(separate from Naval Forces) in 2005, the Naval Academy started to enroll cadets who 
have already chosen to work for Coast Guard Command whilst in Naval High School. 
My research participants who work for Turkish Coast Guard Command state that the 
cadets of Naval High School cannot choose Coast Guard Command since 2008-2009. 
Because the number of students of Naval High School decreased dramatically during 
the years 2007-2010, Naval Forces do not want to let Turkish Coast Guard Command to 
recruit cadets who were raised in a military high school. 
Naval Forces made a transition to LINE system in 2011. For the US military 
LINE is a combat system and the name stands for Linear Infighting Neural Override 
Engagement. Though how the military officers experience the system in a non-combat 
period is explained by Selim as follows: The system reuires each and every military 
officer of a command (Naval Forces and Turkish Coast Guard Command), coming from 
the same cohort, to serve in the same positions, although their time in the same duty 
might be in different years. While this means unification of the professional experiences 
of military officers, it also points to the further centralization of authority, lightening 
academic program and intensifying bodily military training in military schools from 
2007 onwards.  
2.4. Ergenekon and Balyoz [Sledgehammer] trials, and military’s falling from 
grace 
 This research is conducted in a period where the relations between the military, 
politics, and society have been changed dramatically, especially since 2007. A review of 
the milestones of this change shall lay the base for the analyses of the following 
chapters. 
The Ergenekon case was the first shock for the society, which showed military 
officers as citizens who can be arrested. What later came to be known as the Ergenekon 
trials began in July 2007, when police were tipped off about a stash of 27 hand grenades 
in a shanty house in the Istanbul district of Ümraniye. A retired non-commissioned 
officer was accused of the property of the grenades.
89
 The trial however, with the name 
of Ergenekon, started in 2008 the first of four indictments submitted to a special court in 
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Silivri, an adjacent town of İstanbul.90 Arrests of retired and active military officers and 
civilians, including journalists, writers, and businessmen sympathetic to the Kemalist 
opposition, quickly followed. Retired Commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie 
Command Full Gen. Şener Eruygur, retired 1. Army Commander Full Gen. Hurşit 
Tolon, Ankara representative of the newspaper Cumhuriyet Mustafa Balbay, and Doğu 
Perinçek, the General President of Workers’ Party of Turkey, were among the reputed 
arestees. Many current and former military officers were individually charged with 
criminal deeds, which involved links to Turkey's felonious underworld.  
The arrestees were claimed to be members of a "terrorist" organization, named 
"Ergenekon" after a mythical Central Asian valley connected to Turkish nationalist lore. 
It was described as consisting of mostly high ranking members of TAF and civilians in 
the media, academia, and opposition political parties. They were accused of being part 
of a secret "deep state", responsible for several extrajudicial killings that created chaos 
and state of non-confidence in the country. They were said to view themselves as the 
protectors of Turkish national identity and the secular values of the country's founder, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
91
 The Ergenekon trial lasted five years. It eventually grew to 
include 275 defendants, and 23 other cases, including the shooting of a judge at 
Turkey's Council of State building in 2006. On August 5, 2013, 19 current and former 
military officers were sentenced to life in prison by a court in Silivri, found guilty of 
being part of a cadre that aimed to overthrow the JDP. 
Large segments of society duly saw the trial as a way to come to terms with 
Turkey s violent past. An important group called ‘liberal democrats’ at the time, 
including academicians, leftists, and artists, supported the trial for a long time. But 
supporters of the defendants claimed that PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Gulen 
Movement, an international Turkish Islamic group that threw its weight behind the JDP 
in several elections, used the case as an excuse to take their revenge from the Kemalist 
military, journalists, and famous intellectuals. In time, it was argued that especially the 
arrested military officers were not accused of their publicly known but never proven 
violent acts towards leftists and Kurdish people between the 1970s and 2000s, were 
charged mainly with organizing a coup against the government. However, it is 
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noteworthy that some convicts were accused of the Council of State attack (2006), and 
the massacre of Zirve Yayınevi (2007), an Islamist publishing house, wore out TAF’s 
grace to a great extent. Only in March 2014, many of the previously sentenced arrestees 
who spent 5 years in prison were released because the Supreme Court ruled that they 
are arrestees but not convicts: special courts [özel yetkili mahkemeler] were lifted with 
the law no. 6526, and the maximum period of arrestees who have not been charged with 
a final sentence became 5 years with the law no. 5271.
92
 
Besides, the accused were denied a fair trial according to their lawyers and 
supporters, and faulty and in some cases fabricated evidence was presented. Pınar 
Doğan and Dani Rodrik were among the public figures who worked hard to make the 
fabricated evidences visible in international and domestic media. As the son-in-law of 
one of the arestees of the Sledgehammer case, General Çetin Doğan, Rodrik was 
attacked by media organs such as Zaman and Taraf, known to be close to the Gülen 
movement. He was even described as "a self-hating Jew in law with his executioner" 
(Rodrik 2014, 5).Seçkin Albayram, the lawyer of one of the defendants, said because 
twenty-three cases were merged together, there were four million pages of documents 
and it was impossible to read them properly for anyone in the process. Those accused of 
holding leadership positions in this ‘terrorist’ organization were only allowed 30 
minutes to present their defence, and Albayram said "These durations include the time 
that was used by them and their lawyers together." He also claimed that fabricated 
evidence was presented: 
For instance, an Air Force officer named Ali Celebi had his phone 
confiscated by the police. Later, 139 contacts were found to have been 
loaded into the phone and presented as evidence. It was later proven that at 
the time the contacts were entered, the phone was in the possession of the 
police.
93
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The police later stated this was a mistake, Albayram said to the press
94
. 
TAF forced out four civilian governments between 1960 and 1997. This is a big 
number especially considering it was a one-party regime before 1950, and People’s 
Republican Party constituting mostly of former military officers occupied the 
government. Almost 8 years after the JDP, which advertised itself as the representative 
of moderate Islam was elected for the first time in 2002, an alleged military plot named 
"Balyoz" [Sledgehammer] that aimed to create chaos inside Turkey to justify a coup 
was discovered in December 2010.
95
 The Sledgehammer coup plan [Balyoz Harekat 
Planı] was revealed to the public through three journalists (Mehmet Baransu, Yasemin 
Çongar, and Yıldıray Oğur) of the newspaper Taraf, which is known by its fondness for 
the Gülen community. 
The verdict for the conviction of 330 defendants was announced in 2012: they 
were convicted for preparing a plan to overthrow the democratically elected government 
of PM Erdoğan in a meeting at 1.96 Army Command, in 2003. Although they accepted 
the voice records of the meeting in which the top chiefs of the military make 
‘suggestions’ about how to intervene to the state of affairs led by the JDP government. 
They were also accused of plotting to bomb mosques and trying to trigger a war with 
Greece to prove a widespread civil unrest to justify an intervention. Though they 
accepted the voice records, the defendants, and their lawyers argued that the most of the 
evidence was fabricated as in the case of Ergenekon, and the trial was ‘unfair and 
unlawful’. The former head of the land forces, Gen. Çetin Doğan; the former head of 
the naval forces, Adm. Özden Örnek; and the former head of the air force, Gen. Ibrahim 
Firtina, received 20 years. Those terms were reduced from life in prison because the 
plot was never carried out. 
On June 18, 2014, the Constitutional Court delivered a landmark ruling stating 
that the rights of a majority of the convicted defendants have been violated, after 230 
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separate individual appeals. This decision paved the way for retrial.
97
 Some 81 convicts 
applied to a heavy penal court in Istanbul on June 19 for a release, but the court then 
released all 230 convicts in the same day, a day after the Constitutional Court’s rule.98 
While I am writing these lines, the last arrestee of the case, military prosecutor of Air 
Forces Command Ahmet Zeki Üçok, has been released.
99
 Many former military 
officers, such as Colonel Ali Türkşen, who have been acquitted, connect their 
unexpectedly easy releases to the conflict between the JDP and the Gülen community, 
as the evidence for the operations wasdeemed to be a job of the Gülen movement.
100
 In 
any case, it has been discussed since then in international and domestic press, whether 
the trial is to do justice to the Sledgehammer military plot along with the other non-
democratic plans and previous violent acts of the convicts, or it is a show off of the 
Islamist wing in Turkey to take its revenge from the military.
101
 
JİTEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Unit) trial is another case in 
which TAF’s illegal operations have become a juridical issue. JİTEM was established in 
1987 and known to be the responsible of many murders by unknown assailants and 
missing persons. The case started in 2006 in Diyarbakır with the confessions of 
Abdülkadir Aygan, former member of Kurdistan Workers’ Party who turned informant 
and later became a member of JİTEM.102 In 2012, Colonel Cemal Temizöz confessed 
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the foundation of ‘execution squads’ by JİTEM, constitutive of people to be executed 
by the military without any records.
103
  The case went back and forth between a special 
court and a military court. Finally in February 2014, the military court ruled a decision 
of lack of jurisdiction, stating the defendants are military officers but the accusations are 
not related to the military.
104
 
On December 28, 2011, 34 Kurdish civilians on the southeastern border were 
murdered by a Turkish military air strike.
105
 There are no efforts on the sides of the 
government or the military to determine the responsible of this massacre. Neither TAF 
not the government still do not take their responsibility for accountability.  
According to the quantitative research done by Kadir Has University in 2013, 
even from 2011 to 2013, trust in the military decreased from 59.9% to 51.7%.
106
 This 
percentage was 63.2% in 2011.
107
 Those who said the most effective way to ‘solve the 
problem of terror’ in Turkey is in the hands of the military declined from 44.2% to 35.9, 
whilst those who chose the politics over military, economic, social, and cultural 
solutions increased dramatically from 29.5% to 40.1%.
108
 Intriguingly, 2011 witnessed 
a rise in the reliance on the military against terror since the conflicts between TAF and 
PKK, and the attacks of TAF on civilian Kurdish people were in rise, including the 
Roboski Massacre. Looking back at the situation in the 1990s, the research conducted 
by Yılmaz Esmer in 1997 shows that the trust to the military increased from 60.7% of 
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the society in 1991
109
 to 71% in 1997. In the same period, the trust to the parliament 
decreased 28.8% to 17%. (Esmer 1999, 41-52) The most furious times of the war 
between the government and the PKK took place in the 1990s, in the predominantly 
Kurdish southeast part of Turkey. Therefore, the recent decrease as well as the increase 
in the 1990s to the military might be considered as signs of how the decisions of macro-
level actors affect the perceptions of the people.  
It would be of course overstepping the mark to claim that this research shows 
the declining trust in the military in Turkey, and thus in the militarization of perceptions 
on issues such as terror, politics, and social course of affairs. However, it is quite 
reasonable to argue that TAF became a questionable institution for large segments of 
the society, and public confidence in the military has actually been eroding. 
2.5. Quantitative repercussions of macro-level shifts in civil-military relations in 
military schools: from 2007 onwards 
 My youngest research participants, born between 1992 and 1994, made a special 
emphasis on the decrease in the number of graduates of Naval High School, and the 
disproportionately high difference between the number of Naval High School and 
civilian high school graduates in Naval Academy. Whilst the number of cadets 
decreases who finish Naval High School and enrolled in Naval Academy, the number of 
students accepted by civilian high schools, or in the words of TAF, ‘outsourcing’, was 
increasing, they stated. They interpreted this as an attempt of “unidentified powers” that 
want to change the profile of future military officers of the Naval Forces: because the 
graduates of Naval High School are disciplined and grew up according to the rules and 
values of a historically Kemalist institution from a very early age, they are not preferred 
by the new administration of Naval Academy, claimed Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert.  
 The last available explanation about this issue is made by the Minister of 
Defense İsmet Yılmaz in August 2012, as a response to the People’s Republican Party’s 
(PRP) [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)] parliamentary question about military schools. 
Proving the official statement of TAF, made in July 2011
110, to be wrong, Yılmaz stated 
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that there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of applicants to military schools 
from 2007 onwards.  
 The applications to military high schools of Turkish Land Forces Command 
declined to 45.367 in 2011 from 66.487 in 2007, with a 33% decrease. While the two 
Turkish military high schools of Land Forces, Kuleli Military High School and Maltepe 
Military High School, produced 895 graduates in 2007, the number of graduates in 2011 
was 305 in 2011, with a 65% decrease. The applications to Turkish Military Academy 
[Kara Harp Okulu] decreased 30% in one year: the number of applications declined to 
18.247 in 2011 from 26.043 in 2010. The number of graduates decreased to 576 in 2011 
from 761 in 2007. 
 The situation is slightly different in the cases of Naval Forces and Air Forces. In 
parallel to military high schools of Land Forces, there has been a decrease close to 30% 
in the applications to Turkish Naval High School from 2007 to 2011. The number of 
graduates, which was only 76 in 2011
111
 with a 55% decline. Even though Turkish 
Naval Academy witnessed an increase in applications during the same period, the 
graduates of the academy decreased 35%, and only 130 second lieutenants [teğmen] 
graduated in 2011, among whom some of my eldest research participants existed. 
Recent surprising attempts of Turkish Naval High School to advertise itself in the press 
give a hint for the institution’s request for more applicants.112 
 Işıklar Military High School that raises cadets for Air Force Academy since 
2008, received 29% less applications in 2011 than in 2007. In that vein, it produced 
39% less graduates in 2011, numerically speaking 125. However, the situation is much 
different for Air Force Academy, which witnessed an increase both in applications and 
in graduations in the same period.  
There has been a severe decrease of 46% in the applications to The Vocational 
School of Gendarmerie Non-commissioned Officers, which is legally bound to 
Gendermarie General Command
113
. I could not reach an accurate number for the 
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applications to military schools from 2012 onwards since there is not an official 
statement of the Ministry of National Defense or Turkish General Staff since 2011. 
An important note should be made on the relations between the numbers of 
applications and graduations. The former can be interpreted as one of the repercussions 
of the military’s falling from grace, while we should also acknowledge the possibility of 
some other reasons for this dramatic decrease. However, how can we interpret the 
decrease in the number graduations in such a context? Some of my research participants 
suggest there are many cadets who left the school because of the discrimination and 
mobbing they encountered. This issue appears also in the news since 2012
114
. 
Moreover, the parliament has been involved in this matter, and formed a commission to 
investigate the claims of former cadets who request revoking of their compensation 
penalty since they were forced to leave.
115
 Herewith, one can think of several factors 
serving to the decrease in graduations: the detachments of such cadets who faced 
mobbing and discrimination, drop outs motivated by the military’s falling from grace or 
increasing economic expectations of cadets
116
, or new situations such as decreasing 
academic success of cadets that have less or no connections with the macro level 
transformations. As it is practically impossible to reach the necessary data and 
narratives to confirm most of these possibilities, they are definitely worth keeping in 
mind while discussing the quantitative impacts of macro processes on military schools. 
There is another side of this coin. TAF has participated in “outsourcing,” a trend 
that defines the contemporary economic system in Turkey and globally, and began to 
employ ‘professionals’, meaning graduates of civilian high schools or universities; as 
specialized trained enlisted men [uzman erbaş sınıfı], gendarmerie specialized sergeants 
[jandarma uzman çavuş sınıfı], regular non-commissioned officers [muvazzaf astsubay 
sınıfı], regular military officers [muvazzaf subay], and most recently as contracted 
enlisted men [sözleşmeli er] since 2011.117 The latter was initiated with the motto of 
‘professional soldiering for war on terror’. Yet despite the high salary offered and low 
expectations on the educational background of the applicants, only 783 men applied to 
                                                 
114“Harbiye’de neler olmuş neler!”, Sabah, August 13, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/08/13/harbiyede-neler-olmus-neler. 
115
TBMM Dilekçe Komisyonu Genel Kurul Cetveli Vol. 13. Term 24. Legislative year 2. 
Published on June 27, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. 
116
This will be further discussed in the fourth chapter. 
117
For detailed information on the specifics of these positions see Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
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Turkish Land Forces while the quota was 5.103. Turkish General Staff was surprised by 
the situation, according to the news in 2011.
118
 After a year, in a news piece stating only 
the professional soldiers from all positions above-referred will go to the conflict zones 
in the eastern Turkey, it was stated that approximately 1500 men applied for the 
position of specialized trained enlisted men [uzman erbaş sınıfı] although the quota 
allowed for the all professional positions in TAF was 50.000
119
, and the salary offered 
to specialized trained enlisted men was 3.100 Turkish liras, which is a very high salary 
for a secondary school graduate. It is also very intriguing how TAF’s plans to leave the 
conflict zones, and thus the possible ‘martyrdoms’ inside the country only to 
professional soldiers are mentioned smoothly in the news.
120
 Whilst the bemusement 
about the number of soldiers who died in conflict was discussed in 2012, it was also 
debated whether TAF precludes the families of contracted enlisted men who lost their 
lives in conflict from making a statement to the press, with the contracts previously 
signed by their sons.
121
 
The Minister of National Defense İsmet Yılmaz, answering a parliamentary 
question of Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in 2012, stated that only 956 
professional soldiers were employed albeit a total quota of 25.000.
122
 This 
dissatisfaction drove TAF to make a significant raise in the salary of contracted enlisted 
men (adding possible extra payments such as ‘operation compensation’ to be paid in the 
                                                 
118“‘Sözleşmeli er’de Genelkurmay şaşkın.”, Radikal, December 1, 2011, accessed June 
15, 2014. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sozlesmeli_erde_genelkurmay_saskin-
1071175. 
119
Metehan Demir, “Çatışma bölgelerine profesyoneller gidecek”, Hürriyet, November 
21, 2012, accessed June 15, 2014. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21976926.asp. 
120“Irak sınırı ve terror profesyonele emanet.”, Hürriyet, July 15, 2010, accessed June 15, 2014. 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=15319388; “Zorunlu askerlik yapanlar 
çatışma bölgesine gitmeyecek.”, bianet.org,  November 21, 2012. 
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/militarizm/142262-zorunlu-askerlik-yapanlar-catisma-
bolgesine-gitmeyecek; “TSK sadece dış tehdide bakacak.”, Yeni Şafak. May 7, 2013, accessed 
June 15, 2014. http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/tsk-sadece-dis-tehdide-bakacak-
07.05.2013-518535. 
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 Ezgi Başaran, “Şehit sayılarındaki muamma.”, Radikal, September 13, 2012, 
accessed June 15, 2014.  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi_basaran/sehit_sayilarindaki_muamma-
1100118. 
122“25 in kişilik kontenjana 956 profesyonel asker.”, Habertürk, July 24, 2012, accessed June 
15, 2014. http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/761405-25-bin-kisilik-kontenjana-
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cases of armed conflict), and to reduce the criteria of application.
123
 However, it shall be 
noted that there is a great deal of confusion about these numbers since the news does 
not give detailed information on the quotas of each different professional position, and 
how many people applied to which one. It would be interesting to see, for example, if 
enough applications were made to higher ranking positions but not to the positions such 
as specialized trained enlisted men and contracted enlisted men, or vice versa. Murat 
Belge states that TAF resists the JDP government’s increasing encouragement for a 
gradually professionalizing military because institutionally, it sees the ideological 
educational transmission through compulsory military service as more important than 
efficiency or international standards, in teaching male citizens the ‘absolute importance’ 
of the military (Belge 2013, 186). Altınay and Tanıl Bora argue that not only the 
importance of the military but the militarist-nationalist doctrine is transmitted especially 
to men from the rural parts of the country during their military service. Though having 
lost its strength to a certain level after the 1980s, when Turkey gradually becamean 
internationally more open country since the coup, but this transmission still operates in 
the complex relations between the military, soldiering, manhood and culture (Altınay 
and Bora 2002, 141-144). Belge gives the example of the US military (Belge 2013, 182) 
although without mentioning how mostly men and women from lower classes and 
especially migrants’ children prefer professional soldiering as a career. However, there 
seems to be a resistance, or rather say, apathy towards a possible professional military, 
or a military career, on the side of the majority of the male citizens in Turkey, at least 
for now. 
  Linking back to the military schools, the Vice President of People’s Republican 
Party (PRP) [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)] Umut Oran, made the same arguments 
with my research participants in July 2013.
124
 There are many other unanswered 
questions about military schools besides the decrease of applications and graduations, 
he argued, relying on ‘the speculations he heard’. He asked why the graduates of 
military high schools fail to finish the military academies more than those who are 
enrolled in military academies after civilian high schools. Thus he questions the number 
                                                 
123“Profesyonel asker için devlet kesenin ağzını açtı.”, Asker Hakları, February 1, 2013, 
accessed June 15, 2014. http://www.askerhaklari.com/genel/profesyonel-asker-icin-devlet-
kesenin-agzini-acti. 
124
 For Umut Oran’s press release see: “CHP: Harp okulları ve askeri liselerde neler 
oluyor?”, chp.org, July 9, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. 
http://www.chp.org.tr/?p=120014. 
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of graduates of military academies from military high schools in comparison to those 
from civilian high schools. He queried whether the ‘shock groups’ [şok mangaları] 
really exist –cadets in military academies who are from military high schools and who 
face severe policies of intimidation from their commanders. He questioned the number 
of cadets who left military academies since 2007, which is 1439, although this number 
was only 1764 during the ten years before 2007. He has specific questions concerning 
particular cadets of Turkish Naval Academy, among whom there are people who took 
part in this research: 
6- In 2010, some of the students who graduated from Naval High School 
and went to Naval Military Academy were cast aspersions on, they were 
claimed to be “homosexuals” in some websites. It was proven that they 
were cast aspersions. What kind of legal transactions were applied to the 
newspapers or broadcasting corporations which put such claims forward? 
 
7- It is claimed that, some CDs including expressions like the students of 
Naval High School and Naval Military Academy were “immoral” and 
“homosexual” were sent to the houses of candidates who applied for those 
schools. How did they get the addresses of the people who applied to the 
school? Why the responsibles of those assaults aimed at Naval High School 
and Naval Military Academy were not revealed? 
[…] 
2- In 2010, the newspapers like Akit, Yeni Şafak, etc, and some internet 
sites wrote that some students who graduated from Naval High School and 
went to Naval Military Academy were homosexuals by also giving the 
names of those students. After that news, the students were subjected to 
investigations, their testimonies were taken and they were examined. 
Although, mentioned students were proven to be clear, they were subjected 
to punishments at school for various reasons and apart from banishments via 
disciplinary board; they quitted the school willingly to save themselves from 
those aspersions. Were those newspapers or internet sites subjected to any 
legal transactions?
125
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 6- 2010 yılında Deniz Harp Okulu’nda eğitim görmekte olan bazı Deniz Lisesi 
mezunu öğrencilere yönelik iftiralar atılmış, bazı internet sitelerinde “eşcinsel”oldukları 
iddia edilmiştir. Söz konusu öğrencilere iftira atıldığı ortaya çıkmıştır, bu iddiaları 
ortaya atan gazeteler ve yayın kuruluşlarına karşı hangi hukuki işlem yapılmıştır? 
7- Deniz lisesi ve Deniz Harp Okulu için müracaatta bulunan adayların evlerine, bu 
okullarda okuyan öğrencilerin “ahlaksız”ve “eşcinsel”olduğu yönünde birtakım ifadeler 
içeren CD’ler gönderildiği iddia edilmektedir. Müracaatta bulunan adayların adreslerini 
kim almıştır, Deniz Harp Okulu ve Deniz Lisesi’ne yönelen bu saldırının sorumluluları 
neden ortaya çıkartılmamıştır?  
[…] 
2- 2010 yılında, Deniz Harp Okulu’nda Deniz Lisesi’nden mezun öğrencilere ilişkin 
Akit, Yeni Şafak vb. gazetelerle çeşitli internet sitelerinde öğrencilerin isimleri verilerek 
eşcinsel oldukları haberi yayınlanmıştır. Bu haber üzerine soruşturma açılmış; 
öğrencilerin ifadeleri alınmış ve muayeneleri yapılmıştır. Söz konusu öğrenciler temize 
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 The issue of how many children and adolescents apply to military high schools 
and military academies, and how many of them graduate as second lieutenants are 
linked to the discriminations my younger interviewees stated to have faced. This is not a 
debate to be publicized for them since most do not want to remember their bad times in 
the naval academy and some of them are fearful of what might happen to them if they 
publicly state their experiences, even though left the academy. However, Kemalist 
politicians such as Umut Oran from PRP, and especially two newspapers that share the 
same anxieties about the future of TAF’s professional staff, Sözcü127 and Aydınlık128try 
to make an issue of military schools, especially since the beginning of Ergenekon and 
Balyoz operations.  
In sum, my research participants who went through the processes of 
discrimination and/ or investigations as a result of anonymous letters received by naval 
academy as well as PRP and Kemalist nationalist press argue that there are serious 
repercussions of the macro level changes in the positionality of TAF in Turkish politics 
to military schools. The public discussion on the issue starts from the numbers of 
applications to and graduations from the military schools because of the ongoing 
darkness about the internal affairs of TAF. However, the discrimination and/ or 
investigations that are confronted by some of my research participants reflect the effects 
of this transformation process in civil-military relations, especially of the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz operations, on professional military education, and thus, on the cadets. The 
diverse impacts of these macro processes on micro level will be further elaborated on in 
the following chapters. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
çıkmalarına rağmen okulda çeşitli sebeplerle cezalandırılmaya başlamış, disiplin 
kuruluyla uzaklaştırılmalarının yanında bu iftiralardan kurtulabilmek için kendi 
isteğiyle ayrılanlar olmuştur. Adı geçen gazeteler ve internet siteleriyle ilgili hukuki 
işlem yapılmış mıdır? 
126
Ibid. 
127 “Deniz Lisesi için şok iddia!”, Sözcü, July 9, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014. 
http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gunun-icinden/deniz-lisesi-icin-sok-iddia-331732/. 
128“Tasfiye Harbiye’ye uzandı.”, Aydınlık, March 12, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014.  
http://aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/19927-tasfiye-harbiyeye-uzandi.html. 
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CHAPTER 3:  MASCULINITIES IN MILITARY SCHOOLS: PUNISHMENT, 
EXHAUSTION, FRATERNITY 
 
 
"‘Using the same clay, we craft a fine vase at the military schools. Civilian schools 
produce jugs of poor quality.’" (Birand 1986, 36; quoting from a commander) 
 
They tell you “Man, we don’t give a shit about what features you have. We have a 
pattern, a grinder and we will throw you into that. No matter what function, what 
significant characteristics you have or what talents you want to develop, you will grind 
all of them here and be the model we want you to be.” (Berk)129 
 
"This is not a school, this is a life style." 
(Selim, quoting from a commander) 
 
 
 The making of military masculinities in Turkish Naval High School and Turkish 
Naval Academy is ethnographically inaccessible to me: not only because I am a non-
military person and a woman but also because the  “field” of this study, conventionally 
conceived, is inaccessible to all except the cadets and the military personnel working in 
the schools. Yet, the military personnel –military officers, officer-teachers, conscripts 
and civil servants–experience professional military education in simultaneously similar 
and different ways. Therefore, this research, which attempts to study professional 
military education via the narratives of former cadets, is limited in terms of both the 
                                                 
129
Berk: Sana diyorlar ki  “Kardeşim, senin ne özelliğin olursa olsun bizim sikimizde 
değil. Bizim bir öğütücümüz var, bir kalıbımız var, seni onu üstünden atacağız. Senin 
ne kadar uzvun varsa, ne kadar dışarı çıkan özelliğin ve kendine katacağın yeteneğin 
varsa bunların hepsini burada öğüteceksin ve bizim istediğimiz modele dönüşeceksin.  
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subjectivity of the researcher and in terms of the time gap, which exists between the 
lived experiences of the interviewees and their narratives. This chapter aspires to 
uncover both the making of military masculinities in Turkish Naval High School and 
Turkish Naval Academy and the changing dynamics of this making between 2003 and 
2013 based on the narratives of former cadets. 
Where can we begin to analyse the dynamic processes of the making of military 
masculinities as perceived and remembered by my research participants? The first 
surprise to me was the plurality of military masculinities among the former cadets. As 
the students of highly masculinized and militarized schools, many people would think 
of cadets and professional military men as homogeneously masculinized, nationalized 
and militarized. I too considered my gatekeeper Selim as an exception who somehow 
developed an alternative masculinity. However, as I continued by study, I observed that 
one could neither spot a singular version of military masculinity nor claim that cadets 
are manipulable bodies,  “vases” merely crafted by military education, as the above-
cited commander claims (Birand 1986, 36). During the fieldwork, I realized that 
military masculinities are not fixed in any way (Higate 2003): their multiplicity and 
diversity have to be taken into account for a “thick description” (Geertz 1973). As 
Connell argues, multiplicity as well as relationality of the social construction of 
masculinities matters in our social world (Connell 2005, 34-35). This diversity and 
relationality should be recognized to make a thicker description of how diverse military 
masculinities are possible despite a very homogenizing and oppressive military 
education: 
“Masculinity” to the extent the term can be defined at all, is simultaneously a 
place in gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage 
that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experiences, 
personality and culture. (Connell 2005, 34) 
 
The narratives and body languages of my research participants, to the extent that I was 
able to know them, provided me with a broader perspective that forced me to 
acknowledge this diversity and relationality. Therefore, I examine the construction of 
diverse military masculinities as processes realized by meticulous control of details, of 
bodily experiences, time and space (Foucault 1984, 185), and as processes intermingled 
with past lives, bodies and personalities of each cadet.  
As I draw attention to the diverse perceptions and relationships through which 
the masculinities of different former cadets were “crafted”, the changing circumstances 
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of different cohorts will play a major role in portraying this diversity and in building its 
connections to macro processes of the military’s falling from grace, namely, the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. Thus, I interpret the narratives of former cadets by 
focusing on the making of military masculinities, in accordance with the landmark 
impacts of the military’s falling from grace on Turkish Naval High School and Turkish 
Naval Academy, which were summarized in the introduction of this thesis. I argue that 
the making of military masculinities gradually became a more and more centralized 
process: the commanders increase the level of discipline and time management of the 
cadets’ daily routine, and they eliminate the alternative authorities of elder cadets and 
solidarity among fellow cadets. In the mean time, the new distinctions among cadets, 
which appear along the lines of Kemalism, class and ethnicity created a sense of 
insecurity within the school, especially in the naval academy. I argue that these 
distinctions serve to increase the discipline and to centralize the authority. They appear 
to be outcomes of the macro transformations took place in civil-military relations 
between 2003 and 2013, and change the perceptions of former cadets on professional 
military education. 
3.1. The Routine 
 The daily routine in the Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval 
Academy, in Mahmut’s words, leaves “nothing personal” to cadets: 
Mahmut: It was impossible for us to spare some quality time. We didn’t have 
time for ourselves. We didn’t have a room for ourselves. We had nothing 
belonging to us. 
130
 
 
The day starts approximately at 06:20 and ends between 23:00 and 00:00 depending on 
the decision of the sentinel military officer. The sentinel officer is one of 16 company 
commanders [bölük komutanı] in the academy and one of many officers responsible of 
different compartments of high school. It is a very tight program during which the only 
“free time” is the short intervals left for personal hygiene, including the cleaning of 
uniforms. Meal times are strictly controlled as well. Senior cadets arrive to the dining 
hall later than freshman and junior cadets. The latters wait for seniors to come and allow 
them to sit at ease (or in a lined up position if the atmosphere is tense in the school). 
                                                 
130 Mahmut: Kendimize vakit ayırmamız imkansızdı. Kendimize ayıracak vaktimiz 
yoktu. Kendimize ait bir odamız yoktu. Kendimize ait hiçbir şeyimiz yoktu.  
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This time and waiting hierarchy is the same for almost every part of the daily routine. 
For example, tabur hours are hierarchically organized, granting senior cadets 5 to 15 
minutes more than others before every meal. Tabur means battalion or troop in Turkish, 
and it is the name given to the members of one cohort in the context of Turkish Naval 
Academy. Yet among cadets, it also refers to the time period during which cadets of a 
cohort wait before and after every meal and before bedtime [yat saati] to get their 
“shape” (uniform, shoes, hair, facial cleanliness) checked and to be present if a 
company commander comes and takes attendance.  One never knows for sure whether 
someone will show up. Mahmut described how this works before breakfast as follows: 
Mahmut: We woke up at 06:20 a.m. on weekdays. As soon as we wake up 
we dealt with personal hygiene, etc. We ran to shave hastily. Before 
breakfast we went to battalion. Firts classes 20 minutes, seconds 15 minutes, 
thirds 10 and fourths 5 minutes earlier. Breakfast is given at 7:00.
131
 
 
This rigid time management is vividly remembered by my research participants. 
The present time was experienced fully with intense bodily and mental exhaustion. This 
shows the significance of “being in the present”, or “intensity of the present”, in 
professional military education: 
Mahmut: I mean, though there were nothing to be dealt with, we had to fill 
the spaces. You know, there are some bosses at factories who say the 
workers should not idle, they should work constantly, if they are empty, 
there will be trouble, they better work even if it is bubble work, even if they 
roll a rock… I think this was the mentality there.132 
 
Burak: Even eating is a phenomenon. You can come across lots of trouble 
after just waking up and going to breakfast. For instance, you may oversleep 
or diarrhea or something like that and you may not be able to clean your 
shoes for that. […] Or, I don’t know, your friend says something during 
battalion. You are a kid, you may laugh. […] The order off the school 
already requires the younger classes to be inferior. I mean, first classes are 
located at the highest flat, their dormitories. You pass to the dining hall 
going down all that way. When you get to the third classes’ flat, you have to 
bow your head, as a rule, you cannot have eye contact with them. When you 
face any of those students, the case is “he came eye to eye with me, he will 
come here immediately”.  They already know you. […] When passing 
                                                 
131
 Mahmut : Haftaiçi saat 06.20 gibi uyanıyorduk. Uyanır uyanmaz kişisel temizlik 
tıraş falan, hemen koştur koştur tıraş oluyorduk falan. Tabura geçiyorduk kahvaltıdan 
önce. Birinci sınıflar 20 dakika, ikinci sınıflar 15, üçüncü sınıflar 10, dördüncü sınıflar 
da 5 dakika önce. Kahvaltı 7’dedir.  
132
 Mahmut: Yani ortada hiçbir şey olmadığı halde sürekli bir boşluk doldurmaca. Hani 
böyle bazı fabrika patronları olur ya işçi boş durmasın çalışsın, boş durursa sıkıntı çıkar, 
çalışsınlar iyidir, boş iş de olsa, kaya yuvarlasa yine iyidir… O mantık diye 
düşünüyorum.  
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through third classes, you must bow your head and run. You cannot pass 
walking. For instance, when you go down as two hundred people you 
cannot, you know what I mean, you get stuck and can’t run. Then you must 
jump at your place. They shout “Those who can’t run will jump!” One third 
class shouts “Those who can’t run will jump guys!” for instance. They ask 
“what you have gone through at school, did anything happen?” No, nothing 
happened, but something just happens, something always happens.
133
 
 
“Being present in the present time” with the appropriate shape, and at the 
assigned time and place throughout the day is central to military education. This strict 
physical intensity is remembered the primary hardship experienced in the military. Even 
according to one of the most nationalist former cadets, who in theory found most of the 
disciplinary regulations necessary to create a powerful military, the time schedule was 
hard to manage: 
Oğuz: I mean there is also something like that, now, the mentality is that – I 
mean that is what I think in my own way. If you leave someone alone, he 
begins to think. It is the mentally at military school. They try not to leave 
you time, because then people begin to judge, to question: “Why am I here, 
what am I doing here?” or so. And when you question, I mean they tire you 
physically and so you get tired mentally as well and you can’t think after 
that. You start not thinking and that feeling of pain, the pain you feel after 
being physically exhausted, makes you stop thinking.
134
 
                                                 
133Burak: Yemeğe gitmek bile bir olaydır. Sabah kalkıp kahvaltıya gidene kadar başına 
bin türlü şey gelebilir. Örneğin o sabah geç kalmış, ishal olmuş falan filan olabilirsin, o 
yüzden ayakkabını temizleyememiş olabilirsin. […] Ya da ne biliyim taburda arkadaşın 
bir şey söylemiştir. Çocuksun, gülersin gülebilirsin. […] Okulun da düzeni zaten en alt 
sınıflar en alt katta olacak şekildedir. Yani lise bir sınıfı okulun en üst katındadır 
yatakhane olarak. Yemekhaneye de oradan böyle aşağı inerek geçersin. Aşağı inerken 
lise üç katına geldiğinde kural olarak başını öne eğmeli ve lise üçlerle göz göze 
gelmemelisin. Herhangi bir lise üçle göz göze gelmen zaten anında “o benimle göz göze 
geldi, hemen buraya gelecek” şeklinde olur. Zaten seni tanıyor olurlar. […]  Lise üç 
katından geçerken oradan koşarak ve başın öne eğik geçmelisin. Yürüyerek geçemezsin. 
Örneğin mesela bazen iki yüz kişi beraber aşağı indiğin için şey olur, ne diyeceğimi 
biliyorsun, iki yüz kişi beraber aşağı inerken bazen orada sıkışıklık falan olur, 
koşamazsın. O zaman da zıplarsın yerinde. “Koşamayanlar zıplasın” diye bağırılır. Lise 
üçlerden biri bağırır. “Koşamayanlar zıplasın beyleeer!” diye bağırır biri mesela böyle. 
Okulda ne yaşadın, bir şey oldu mu diye soruyorlar. Yoo olmadı ama bir şeyler oluyor 
işte, sürekli bir şeyler oluyor.  
134Oğuz: Yani bir de şöyle bir şey var şimdi mantık şudur –yani ben öyle düşünüyorum 
yani kendi açımdan. Eğer boş bırakırsan insanı, insan düşünmeye başlar. Askeri okulda 
da mantık bu. Böyle çok boş bırakmamaya çalışırlar çünkü insan yargılamaya, 
sorgulamaya başlıyor: “Niye ben buradayım, ben ne yapıyorum burada” diye 
sorgulamaya başlıyor. E sorguladığın zaman da yani adam seni bedenen yoruyor ki 
zihnen de yoruluyorsun, ondan sonra düşünemiyorsun. Düşünmememeye başlıyorsun; o 
acı duygusu fiziksel olarak yorgunluktan sonra hissettiğim acı da seni düşünmemeye 
sevk ediyor.  
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 All courses are compulsory. Skipping courses is next to impossible as there is 
nowhere to run away from them within the grounds of the military compound. Former 
cadets have no memory of absconding from school. Additionally, their memories of the 
daily routine are centered around bodily/ military training rather than on the courses. 
This reflects the severity of disciplinary/ military training in shaping one’s experience 
of professional military education. Indeed, most of my interviewees did not talk about 
the content of their courses but rather the high or low quality of them.  
 After the 2009-2010 term, the length of standard courses was reduced from 50 
minutes per day to 45 minutes. As such, the “inspection and applications tabur” 
[muayene-müracaat taburu], which was previously held after lunch, was shifted to after 
breakfast. These changes were implemented to extend the time for fitness and sports 
after the courses. However, extended sports time did not bring more freedom to cadets. 
In fact, the meticulous control of how they spent their sports time began with this 
change. Before this period, members of a sports team were going to their particular 
trainings, while the rest was running or performing other basic sports activities during 
the same slot. Afterwards, they were allowed to join the social group [faaliyet kolları] 
they had previously chosen, such as the music band or theatre community of the school. 
By the new rule though, everbody was obliged to join the collective, basic sports 
activities before they move on with their own particular training or social activity. My 
gatekeeper Selim commented that being a member of a sports team lost value after this 
change. While the commanders were respecting the time spent with one’s team before, 
they started to express their doubts about how “recklessly” the sports time is “wasted” 
when not under their control. 
 In addition, the rules about reading materials that one is allowed to bring into the 
school became more rigid. Although it was not difficult for cadets to have an authorized 
commander approve these reading materials, those who failed to get this stamp of 
approval started to be harshly punished. Burak tells his experience with the regulations 
during high school as follows: 
Burak: Being constantly watched over by someone is very disturbing, 
disturbing on its own. I read on a newspaper while coming here, the number 
of books a prisoner can keep is decreased and for instance, I can understand 
their situation. Someone can say, “so what of it? Will he read twenty books 
at the same time, after all?” Indeed it is so, will he read twenty books 
simultaneously? Having a few books is enough for a person, and then he can 
change. But it is just not the case. The case is the fact that someone can limit 
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the number of books you can keep. It is a kind of violence, I mean, this is 
even the worst kind of violence.
135
 
 
 In terms of time management, there seems to be at least some freetime left to 
cadets before 2009, according to many interviewees. The most important change in 
terms of time was the ban on staying up after bedtime, which was rigidly implemented 
after 2009-2010. Selim indicated the negative significance of this change in the daily 
lives of cadets as follows: 
Selim: Before 2009, you could stay up till the morning if you wanted, 
keeping your table lamp on. The punishments for even going to toilet began 
after 2009. With the grounds of breaking “dormitory order” or so…136 
 
Selim stated that many cadets were sharing their opinions with the commanders, 
on the unnecessary physical exhaustion caused by the last tabur of the day, held right 
before bedtime [yat taburu – bedtime tabur]. Nonetheless, the commanders did not 
listen to them. In fact, this interaction between cadets and commanders about 
educational issues was possible also only before 2009-2010. Afterwards, even this 
already hierarchical dialogue became impossible since the commanders stopped asking 
the opinions of cadets. 
 Other examples depicting the intensifying discipline within the schools concern 
the extent to which cadets can access educational materials and technology, such as 
Internet, MP3 players, and laptops. Selim indicated that the administration of the naval 
academy could establish the technical infrastructure for Internet access only during the 
second half of the 2008-2009 term. However, all technological devices and Internet 
were banned at the beginning of the next academic year, 2009-2010. Afterwards, they 
could listen to music only with walkmans, although it was quite hard to find cassette 
tapes in the market. After a while, the administration allowed the use of discmans with 
                                                 
135Burak: Sürekli biri tarafından izleniyor olma durumu çok rahatsız edici, başlı başına 
rahatsız edici. Şimdi gelirken gazetede okuyordum, cezaevlerinde mahkumların elindeki 
kitap sayısı belirli bir seviyeye düşürülmüş ya mesela ben onları o zaman 
anlayabiliyorum. Ne olmuş ki diyebilir bir tanesi, sanki yirmi kitabı aynı anda mı 
okuyacak? Hakikaten öyle, aynı anda yirmi kitap mı okuyacak? Bir iki tane kitap olması 
yeterlidir bir insan için sonra değiştirir. Ama durum öyle değil işte. Durum birinin senin 
kaç tane kitap bulunduracağını sınırlandırıyor olması. Bu da bir şiddettir yani, bu 
şiddetin alasıdır hatta.  
136
Selim: 2009’dan önce kendi masa lamban açık, istersen sabaha kadar oturabiliyordun. 
Tuvalete gidene bile ceza vermeler 2009 sonrası başladı. “Yatakhane düzenini” bozma 
gerekçesiyle falan…  
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the precondition of getting your CDs signed by the respective commander. “Before this 
bullshit, we could even check our e-mails,’ Selim stated.  
 Therefore, the significance of physical military training increased in comparison 
to the weight of courses in overall daily routine with the 2009-2010 academic year: not 
only basically because the courses became 5 minutes shorter, but also in terms of one’s 
hardening bodily experience of the daily routine. If discipline is “the political anatomy 
of detail”, “little things” became even more important after the above-listed changes in 
rules and in the practice of discipline. The mystique of everyday routine joined with 
“the discipline of minute” more keenly than before (Foucault 1984, 183-184). 
3.1.1. Growing up still standing:  Tabur hours 
 According to David Couzens Hoy, Pierre Bourdieu argues that reflexive 
sociology itself can be a form of critical resistance with an honest recognition of “the 
complexity of the phenomenon of the complicity of the dominated in their own 
domination” (Hoy 1999, 18). Bourdieu himself states that, 
If it is fitting to recall that the dominated always contribute to their own 
domination, it is necessary at once to be reminded that the dispositions 
which incline them to this complicity are also the effect, embodied, of 
domination. (Bourdieu 1989, 12; in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 24, 
Wacquant’s translation)  
My gatekeeper Selim said that a disturbing sense of visibility, or “nakedness”, 
was shaping his weekends outside the school. While talking with many former cadets 
during the fieldwork, I thought he was disturbed by feeling incorporating an effect of 
professional military training: his complicity in his own domination. The organization 
of tabur hours sets a lucid example to the dispositions, or embodied effects of 
domination.  
Tabur hours, which take approximately four to five hours a day, are narrated as 
the most exhaustive part of the daily routine by each and every interviewee. During 
taburs, cadets of all cohorts wait in line to give attendance. Different from other taburs, 
the tabur that they have after lunch is called “inspection and applications tabur” 
[muayene-müracaat taburu]. Therefore, they wait for someone to come and check 
cleanliness of their shoes, hats and all other parts of their uniform—the cut of their hair, 
the absence of their facial hair. They could make applications ranging from a request to 
go to infirmary to ask to leave a little early on Saturday morning if one’s parents are 
coming or if one has a doctor appointment outside the school. Like Tarık and Rıdvan, 
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all the interviewees expressed how “meaningless” these standing still and waiting hours 
were: 
Tarık: Battalion is very common, you mean? 
Very much, extremely! 
What do they tell during battalion? 
Nothing, you just wait idly. 
Does someone talk? 
No, I mean generally no… Generally 80% of the battalions are empty; you 
wait standing on your feet. If he bothers, the duty officer comes to count 
you.
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Rıdvan: Bedtime tabur lasted longer, like an hour and a half.  
Why? 
 No reason. The only thing need to be done is counting the attendants. It 
takes 10 minutes. They report it to the duty officer of the day. But we 
waited for one hour and a half. (Laughing)
138
 
 
I interpret the narratives of my interviewees about taburs as an expression of 
how absolute obedience was taught to them. Standing still and waiting for commander 
or representative company commander from senior cadets to come, without knowing 
until when and without being able to move from the exact spot one stands, serve as an 
educational tool, or as a disciplinary technique. Standing still during tabur hours for 4 to 
5 hours a day, without access to knowledge and management of time, is a powerful way 
of investing the body with relations of power and domination. 
But the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations 
have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, 
force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This 
political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex 
reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of 
production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; 
but, on the other hand, its constitution as labor power is possible only if it is 
caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political 
                                                 
137
Tabur çok oluyor yani? 
Tarık: Çok oluyor, aşırı oluyor bizde! 
Taburda ne anlatılıyor? 
Hiçbir şey. Boş boş bekliyorsun. 
Biri konuşuyor mu? 
Hayır yani, genelde yani… Genelde taburların %80’i boş hani, sessiz bir şekilde ayakta 
beklemekle geçiyor. Nöbetçi subay lütfedip gelirse seni sayar.  
138
 Rıdvan: Yat taburu daha uzun sürüyordu. Bir buçuk saat falan. 
Neden? 
Bir nedeni yok. Tek yapılması gereken mevcutlar alınacak. On dakikada alınıyor. O 
günün nöbetçi subayına rapor ediliyor. Ama bir buçuk saat bekliyorduk. (Gülüyor)  
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instrument meticulously prepared, calculated, and used); the body becomes 
a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. 
(Foucault 1984, 173) 
The regulation of taburs makes bodies of cadets both productive and subjected, 
most visibly when some senior cadets join the tabur organization [tabur teşkilatı]. 
Those who join tabur teşkilatı become representative company commanders [temsili 
bölük komutanı]. They hold the duty of doing all the checks of shape when demanded 
by the commander. They ask questions about Turkish politics, the history of Turkish 
Naval Forces, Turkish Naval High School, and Turkish Naval Academy or of naval and 
other military affairs of the Republic.  
The mere hierarchy between different cohorts makes the bodies of cadets both 
productive and subjected since the hierarchical superiority and power constantly 
approach towards younger cadets. The making of simultaneous productivity and 
subjection, thus, already operates through the knowledge of younger cadets that they 
will become a senior soon, and they can take part as a representative company 
commander in the school hierarchy, in a couple of years. Mahmut who was very critical 
of waiting during taburs without a purpose, told that he became a representative 
company commander as a senior: 
What they do during the battalion then? 
Mahmut: In battalion, as I said, they check if your cap is ironed, if your 
pants are ironed, if your cap is clean, you jacked is like that or so… 
Who controls it? 
Forth classes. They had a battalion team at forth class. They had the duty of 
putting you in order, because they were in order! 
Was that ironic? 
Of course! (We laugh) I was one of them. (I get surprised and we laugh) At 
the second term of fourth class, I also went in. But, for instance… No, no I 
didn’t have any trouble though… I was the company commander, 
representative company commander. I mean, I didn’t have trouble with 
those bad behaviors, didn’t have to. 
When you say didn’t have trouble, do you mean you didn’t do it? 
I didn’t do it. Doing is also experiencing it, I think. When you do it, you do 
it to yourself as well.
139
 
                                                 
139Taburlarda ne yapılıyor peki? 
Mahmut: Taburlarda işte bahsettiğim işte, senin şapkan ütülü mü, yok pantalonun ütülü 
mü, şapkan temiz mi, ceketin şöyle mi falan… 
Kim geliyor kontrole? 
Dördüncü sınıflar. Dördüncü sınıflardan tabur teşkilatı vardı. Onlar seni hizaya 
sokmakla görevli kişilerdi çünkü onlar hizadaydı! 
85 
 
 
Ümit who was not a member of tabur teşkilatı expressed this in another way: 
Ümit: The part named courses was ok already. It passes casually, we have 
lunch break, after lunch we have a battalion called examination and 
inspection, where the officers responsible for us want to meet us, spend 
some time, etc. Meanwhile, they examine you, your shape, the whiteness of 
your cap, and fourth classes command the process.
140
 
 
 How Mahmut expressed his experience of “playing the commander”, the pauses 
and intonation of his narration, and the bashfulness that visits his body language for 
brief seconds made me think that he sees his part in tabur teşkilatı justifiable by 
creating a distinction between himself and the majority of representative company 
commanders: He did not treat younger cadets harshly but he tried to give them good 
advice about their courses and military discipline. His role as a representative company 
commander may seem as a self-contradicton. Yet I think, how his negative narration of 
taburs was followed by his role in them as a senior cadet reflects the complexity of the 
phenomenon of the complicity of the dominated in his/ her own domination. To explain 
Bourdieu’s argument, Hoy suggests that: 
[…] the dominated can resist by trying to efface the signs of difference that 
have led to their domination. But this strategy has the same effect as 
assimilation, and thus looks like submission. Or the dominated can instead 
try to dominate their own domination by accepting and accentuating the 
characteristics that mark them as dominated. But this too does not look 
much different from giving in to domination. (Hoy 1999, 18) 
Regulations such as tabur teşkilatı which allow cadets to “play the commander” 
during their military eduation, produce the relations in which cadets are complicit in 
their own domination. The strict hierarchy between different cohorts functions in the 
                                                                                                                                               
Bu ironikti galiba? 
Tabii canım (Gülüyoruz). Ben de onlardandım. (Ben şaşırıyorum, gülüyoruz) Dördüncü 
sınıfta, ikinci dönemde ben de gittim. Ama mesela… Yok ya ben hiç sıkıntı yaşamadım 
ama… Ben bölük komutanıydım, temsili bölük komutanı. Yani o kötü davranma 
açısından hiç öyle bir şey yaşamadım, yaşamak zorunda kalmadım. 
Yaşamadım derken yapmadım diyorsun? 
Yapmadım. Ya yapmak da yaşamaktır ya bence. Yapan kendine de yapar bence.  
140
 Ümit: Dersler denilen kısım zaten yani iyiydi. Rahat geçiyor, hani öğle yemeği 
aramız var, öğle yemeğinden sonra böyle muayene ve denetleme taburu denilen bir şey 
var başımızdaki subayların bizle görüşmek istediği, vakit harcamak istediği vs. O arada 
işte muayene yapıyorlar seni; şekline bakıyorlar, şapkanın beyazına bakıyorlar, bir de 
dördüncü sınıf öğrencileri komutanlık oynuyor. 
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same direction as well. For example, the shortening of the time one spends with his 
particular sports team by inserting a collective sports hour into the routine was not only 
to standardize and centralize the whole program: among the members of a team who are 
from different cohorts, there is almost no hierarchy. Therefore, not only the regulation 
of taburs that allow certain cadets to “play the commander” but the hierarchical order 
itself create grey zones in which cadets can be both productive by beleaguering and 
disciplining their youngers, and subjected by obeying their seniors. This complicity, 
thereupon, function as a powerful means of professional military education 
3.1.2. Punishment and Anxiety 
Punishment is central to the experience of military education.  It is an 
indispensible part of professional military education. Tarık’s words, cited in the 
previous section, show that the bodies of cadets are meant to be meticulously and 
strictly controlled with punishment and the anxiety created by the constant possibility of 
it. However, bodies resist this control in many instances such as disruption of the daily 
routine by “inappropriate” bodily fluids. These resistances result mostly in punishment. 
For instance, Tarık could not leave the school for three weekends in a row as a price of 
his bleeding nose.  
In the narratives of all my interviewees, the anxiety of getting reported and 
having to stay at school during one or more weekend(s) is a constant fear for cadets: 
Kaan: And constantly you are struggling to be survivor like did that happen, 
did this happen, should I do that like this, should I do that like that, should I 
do that from here, should I do that from there, should I do that in there at 
that hour… Do you understand? And what happens then? Always “will 
anything happen?” This time you start to get paranoid. “did they catch 
that?” For instance, you are reading a book. You bring it in at Sunday night 
and you need to get it signed in Monday morning. You forget it and it has to 
wait for the next day but what if you get caught? In the end, there will be a 
book without approval when they check your cupboard.  Even if the book is 
not a forbidden one, you need to have it signed. The company commander 
must approve it and sign. You cannot bring whichever publication pops into 
your head. Because this is not a high school like the ones you know, not a 
university, either. This is the simplest example. After all, you start to get 
paranoid constantly. And as I said, if you have small, trivial misbehaviors; 
did this happen, did that happen…141 
                                                 
141
 Kaan: Ve sürekli şu mu oldu, bu mu oldu, şunu şöyle mi yapsam, bunu böyle mi 
yapsam, şurdan şunu mu yapsam, buradan bunu mu yapsam, burada bu saatte bunu mu 
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Kaan referred to the anxiety, fear, or a exhausting sense of not being able to control the 
consequences of your actions as “paranoia”. This was expressed with different wordings 
by all of my research participants. As Foucault argues, “The perpetual penalty that 
traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions 
compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes.” 
(Foucault 1984, 195) The fact that Kaan managed to graduate from Turkish Naval 
Academy and become a military officer seems to be the “fruit” of his normalization of 
punishment, and of the fear of punishment as a regular part of his daily routine.  
Foucault argues, “the art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is 
aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression.” It brings rather, he states, 
five distinct operations into play:  
It refers to individual actions to a whole that is once a field of comparison, a 
space of differentiation, and a principle of a rule to be followed. It 
differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall 
rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average 
to be respected, or as an optimum toward one must move. It measures in 
quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value, the abilities, the level, 
the “nature” of individuals. It introduces, through this “value-giving” 
measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it 
traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, 
the external frontier of the abnormal (the “shameful” class of Ecole 
Militaire). (Foucault 1984, 195) 
 
As such, my interviewees narrated how this perpetual penalty compares, 
differentiates, homogenizes, hierarchizes and excludes through diverse techniques and 
degrees of punishment. Before discussing these techniques, and particular motives of 
students to obey them and to become perpetrators of physical violence themselves in 
many cases, please note that each cadet enters the Turkish Naval High School and the 
Turkish Naval Academy with a full disciplinary point of 120. As they get punished due 
to their disrespectful behaviors to their seniors, or because of their other misdemeanors 
                                                                                                                                               
yapsam, sürekli bir survivor halindesin, anladın mı? Bu sefer ne oluyor? Hep “bir şey 
olur mu”? Bu sefer paranoyaklık başlıyor. Acaba şunu yakalamışlar mıdır? Atıyorum 
kitap okuyorsundur. Getirmişsindir Pazar akşam, pazartesi sabah imzalatman lazımdır, 
unutursun, ertesi güne kalır ama yakalanırsan ne olur? Sonuçta dolabını kontrol ederken 
imzasız kitap. Kitap yasak olmasa bile imzalanması lazım. Bölük komutanının bu 
uygundur deyip imzalaması lazım. Okula öyle kafana göre yayın getiremezsin yani. Bu 
bildiğin gibi bir lise değil çünkü, üniversite de değil. Bu en basit bir örnek. Sonra 
sürekli paranoyaklaşıyorsun. Bir de dedim ya ufak tefek haytalıkların varsa şöyle mi 
oldu böyle mi oldu…  
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such as dirty shoes or hats, they consume these points. Even in the academy, when a 
cadet falls under a certain amount of points, the family of the cadet is invited to the 
school. The parents are those who will pay the price of their military education if they 
consume the total of their disciplinary points and get expelled as a result. Exhausting 
the entire 120 points results in being expelled from the school no matter how successful 
one is in his/ her courses. 
Since the disciplinary rules tightened after 2009-2010, the number of 
punishments given by commanders and seniors, and thus, the anxiety of getting 
punished increased significantly. Selim stated that this anxiety led cadets also to self-
censor more, to obey the rules more carefully by reframing obeyance to the disciplinary 
rules as precaution rather than oppression. Weekends are the most important source of 
motivation to obey during weekdays, both before and after 2009-2010.  
3.1.3. Weekends: The good reason to comply 
 When he was in the Turkish Naval Academy,Selim once told me he hated 
himself because he was doing everything “right”, obeying each and every rule to go out 
at the weekends. Herewith, the issue of “the complicity of the dominated in their own 
domination” reappears. Deniz Kandiyoti conceptualizes the “tactic” or choice of women 
to accommodate and uphold patriarchal norms to maximize their power and options in 
the future as “patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988). One can consider the obeyance of 
cadets prompted by the dream of a weekend outside as a bargain with disciplinary 
power. However, even when one goes out on Friday and comes back on Sunday
142
, the 
weekend is never a weekend as such. Military education is remembered as a very 
claustrophobic experience by all of my interviewees. 
When you say “I gave my youth away” do you mean just being closed 
down there? 
Oğuz: You are closed down, of course, 5 days of a week you are closed 
down. I mean… Closed down as you know. You attend the courses, get out 
of them, trainings and so happen… Of course it is not so easy. Difficult… I 
mean, I don’t know, the environment is totally inconsistent with the 
perceptions you had when you got into that school. It is not like that: hang 
in there for five days and then go out at Friday night. You can’t think like 
just leaving on Saturday and Sunday because you have to come back on 
Sunday night. I mean, as happy as you are when leaving at Friday, you get 
                                                 
142
This means he is a weekly boarder [evci] because he has a relative in the city of the 
school and he is very lucky according to my interviewees who were not –the state of not 
being evci is called bekar, meaning “single”, “farmworker” or “loafer” in Turkish. 
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as much upset when you get back to school on Sunday. At least, it was so 
for me because going through the same thing on every Sunday, every Friday 
and having those complicated feelings is so… It affects you deeply.143 
 
Kaan: It is desperation, in the end. You are one person, there is just one 
brain and one psychology and you are trying to divide it into two. Why do 
you divide it into two? Because you are restless inside, you are always in a 
closed place, constant training, difficult courses… Daily activity program 
begins in the morning…144 
 
 Imprisonment, or with a word for word translation, “being closed inside the 
school” [içeride kapalı olmak], and thus isolation from the city outside, is expressed as a 
painful bodily experience by my research participants. With the revised disciplinary 
rules of TAF
145
, room confinement–called disko [ward of discipline, disiplin koğuşu] 
among conscripted soldiers and as room confinement [oda hapsi] among cadets– is not 
used as a punishment anymore. It is out of use at least in practice. However, being 
forced to stay within the borders of the school, albeit not in a single room, still appears 
to be a very “effective” and painful punishment, and a very powerful source of 
motivation to one’s complicity in his/ her own domination “not to be dominated” at 
least at the weekends. Therefore, the good reason to obey became harder to achieve as 
the standards of compliance began to increase by the 2009-2010 academic year. 
3.1.4. Exhaustion and bodies 
 Within the overall picture of the daily routine, exhaustion as a dynamic bodily 
state is what almost never goes away: 
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 Peki sen şeyi mi kastediyorsun, “gençliğimi verdim” demekle, yani sadece orada 
kapalı olmayı mı kastediyorsun? 
Oğuz: Ya kapalısın tabii haftanın beş günü kapalısın. Yani... Bildiğin kapalısın. Derse 
geliyorsun, dersten çıkıyorsun, eğitim oluyor bir şey oluyor falan... Ya tabii ki çok 
kolay olmuyor yani. Zor... Yani öyle yani ne bileyim okula girerkenki mantığınla 
kesinlikle ve kesinlikle uyuşmuyor ortam yani.  Şöyle değil; hafta içi beş gün zaten takıl 
ondan sonra Cuma akşamı çık. Cumartesi-Pazar git olmuyor çünkü o Pazar akşamı 
okula dönüş yani. Cuma akşamı nasıl bi sevinçle dışarı çıkıyorsan Pazar akşamı onun 
tam tersi bir üzüntüyle geri dönüyorsun okula yani. En azından ben öyleydim, çünkü 
bunu her Pazar akşamı yaşamak, her Cuma ve her zaman o kadar karmaşık duygular 
yaşamak o kadar bir şey ki insanı çok etkiliyor.  
144
 Kaan: Umutsuzluk yani sonuçta… Tek bir insansın, tek bir beyin var, tek bir 
psikoloji var ama sen bunu ikiye bölmeye çalışıyorsun. Niye ikiye bölmeye 
çalışıyorsun? Çünkü içeride huzursuzsun, sürekli kapalı bir ortamdasın, sürekli eğitim, 
dersler zor. Günlük faaliyet programı sabah başlıyor…  
145“Parliament approves law on TSK disciplinary rules”, Today’s Zaman, January 31, 
2013, accessed May 15, 2014.  
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=305731. 
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Kaan: The life inside always has a monotone, a routine. I shouldn’t say 
monotone, it sounds slow. There is a routine movement, do you understand? 
Physically and mentally you are already tired, you are always in the middle 
of a hurry. There are always rules you have to obey. You are tired, after all, 
do you understand? And after a while, you get bored whether you want or 
not. Because there is no extra activity you do just for yourself. I mean, for 
instance, sport teams, whatever else, this and that, they all get into that 
routine. Do you understand?
146
 
 
Burak emphasized how they were always sleepy although it was forbidden to sleep 
anywhere other than one’s own bed, and any time other than between bedtime and 
waking time: 
Burak: We were very very tired, always tired, I mean. I remember that, 
during course breaks, I have never gone through such things later in the 
university or so. […] I guess it wasn’t a normal thing. […] For a kid to get 
that tired everyday can’t be a healthy thing. […] I don’t think that in a 
civilian high school or university people put their heads on the desks and 
sleep at 5-minute-breaks.
147
 
 
As Burak mentioned the “undesirable” possibility of diarrhea, Tarık was punished to 
stay in the school for three weekends because he arrived two minutes late to tabur 
because he was washing his bleeding nose. He stated that this type of irrational 
punishment led him to question the logic of educational disciplines: 
Tarık: When I went down, I said I was one or two minutes late. When I said 
that, he said “Write it in your apologia”, I said I was writings all the 
explanation needed, etc. Wrote something so and gave. Then I checked and 
what: three weekends! Two or three weekends, something like that. Ok, I 
was late but that shouldn’t be, I mean. There was a logical reason; after all, 
it wasn’t intentional. I went there, though, usually I didn’t bother. I said 
“Sir, what does three weekends mean?  Ok, I know I was late; I don’t have a 
thing to say for that, I also got the apologia. But what was the purpose of 
that apologia, then? What are you doing?” For the first time I 
questioned…for 8 years, this was the only thing I questioned. I said “If not 
                                                 
146Kaan: İçerideki yaşantıda sürekli bir monoton var, rutin var. Monoton demeyeyim, 
monoton yavaş kalıyor. Rutin bir hareketlilik var tamam mı? Fiziken ve ruhen zaten 
yoruluyorsun, sürekli bir koşturmaca içindesin. Uyman gereken sürekli bir kurallar var. 
Yorgunsun yani anladın mı? Ve canın bir yerden sonra ister istemez sıkılıyor. Çünkü 
kendin için yaptığın ekstra bir faaliyet yok. Mesela atıyorum spor takımı, bilmem ne, 
cart curt, şudur budur, onlar da rutine giriyor aslında. Anladın mı?  
147
Burak: Çok yorgunduk, çok, sürekli yorgunduk yani. Şeyi hatırlıyorum, ders 
aralarında, ben hiç üniversitedeyken falan öyle şeyler yaşamadım sonra, […] Bu normal 
bir şey değildir sanırım. […] Bir çocuğun her gün bu kadar yoruluyor olması sağlıklı bir 
şey değildir. […] Ben sanmıyorum ki sivil bir lisede ya da üniversitede her 5 dakikalık 
arada herkes kafayı sıraya vurup uyusun?  
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this, what do you accept, Sir?” And he said “Look T., it is not like that, we 
do that…” or so. I said “Sir, what could I do, my nose bled, you already 
know that, you yourself sent me to the infirmary. It bleeds with no reason, 
what can I do? I was 2 minutes late, alright, but what happened after all, I 
didn’t even run after the battalion, I was down there not 5 minutes but 3 
minutes earlier.”148 
Former cadets’ memories about such cases are positioned in distinct ways within their 
overall narratives. While Burak did not continue onto naval academy of his own 
volition, Tarık is working as a military officer. In Burak’s narrative, the experience of 
being exhausted by military education is one of the main reasons why he left. For Tarık 
on the other hand, getting punished because of his nosebleed marks one of the rare 
moments he questioned the logic of power relations and domination within the school. 
Throughout his narrative, only what he ‘did’ unintentionally (such as having a 
nosebleed) justified his questioning. As a military officer on duty, his bodily exhaustion 
during military education could find voice only with the moments his body acted 
beyond his control. 
Exhaustion thus plays a key role in the construction of military masculinities 
because social construction of the body not only forms it but also deforms it (Hoy 1999, 
4). This deformation through exhaustion was expressed by most of my interviewees. 
Obviously, it produced resistance too: sometimes as a positive energy that disturbs the 
commanders and that always returns as a negative feedback, and sometimes as 
resistance not to sleep to create time to think: 
Kaan: Now, do you know what it is like in there? People are weary, 
finished, exhausted. I, to the contrary walk nose in the air, for example, eyes 
looking upwards, chin not lowered, raised; and my arms move little too 
                                                 
148 Tarık: Aşağı indiğimde bir dakika ya da iki dakika gecikmiştim dedim. Bunu 
söylediğimde de “savunmana yazarsın” demişti, ben de savunmamda gerekli açıklamayı 
yapıyorum falan dedim. Öyle bir şey yazdım, verdim. Sonra bir baktım, bir geldi, üç 
haftasonu! İki haftasonu mu üç haftasonu mu, öyle bir şey. Tamam geç kaldık da şey 
yapılır hani. Mantıklı bir şey çünkü ben keyfimden geç kalmadım. Gittim ben, normalde 
şey yapardım, böyle sallamazdım. Dedim komutanım üç haftasonu ne oldu ya dedim. 
Hani anladım tamam geç kaldım da, ona bir şey demiyorum, savunmayı da aldım. Bu 
savunmanın amacı ne dedim ya o zaman?! Siz ne yapıyorsunuz?! İlk defa sorguladığım 
şey… 8 sene boyunca sorguladığım tek şey odur yani. Bu kabul olmuyorsa neyi kabul 
ediyorsunuz komutanım ya dedim. O da bak T. öyle değil falan, biz şey yapıyoruz 
falan… Dedim komutanım ne yapayım yani, burnum kanadı, siz de biliyorsunuz, 
kendiniz gönderdiniz hastaneye dedim. Durduk yere kanıyor, ne yapayım dedim. İki 
dakika geç kaldım da bir şey mi oldu dedim, taburun arkadasından da koşturmadım 
dedim, sadece 5 dakika kala yerine 3 dakika kala indim aşağıya.  
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much. I walk comfortably, do you understand? When walking casually, you 
know, I have big gestures, mimes… […] It is eye catching. If you catch 
attention in that school, it has a feedback whether good or bad. It will 
definitely have.
149
 
 
Kerem: Because, the marathon that begins in the mornings didn’t end with 
courses. After courses, there were conferences or other activities, a kind of 
rush until 10 or 11 p.m. There is no time you can spare for yourself, so there 
is no time to think. To be honest, I also had the concerns about getting 
robotized, so I couldn’t sleep at night. I also didn’t sleep purposefully. 
Because when they say “sleep” you may not sleep at all as a reaction, doing 
other activities…150 
 
 This penetrating deformation and exhaustion works in complex ways. The 
tightness of discipline inevitably creates brief moments of resistance when the body acts 
on its own even if the cadet is a very docile one. It gives a break on weekends in return 
for obedience and compliance. Thus, it produces productivity within subjection. 
Therefore, tightening the rules, and increasing discipline intensify exhaustion too after 
2009-2010. More exhaustion serves to the same purpose with a higher, more detailed 
and bodily consuming level of control.  
3.2. Men’s Friendship and Class Unity [Sınıf Birliği] 
Men’s friendship or fraternity 
Friendship is the only common good memory of my interviewees about military 
education. In parallel to Scott Swain’s study of college men’s intimate behavior in 
same-sex friendships and their standards of assessing intimacy (Swain 2001, 131), 
former cadets pointed out the significance of shared action in building intimacy. Efe 
                                                 
149Kaan: Şimdi orada nasıl biliyor musun? İnsanlar bezgin, bitik, yorgun. Ben de aksine 
çıktığım zaman, ben mesela böyle burnum havada, gözlerim böyle yukarıda, çenem 
aşağıda değil, çenem yukarıda, bir de kollarım biraz fazla sallanıyor. Rahat yürüyorum 
yani anladın mı? Normal yola yürürken, benim biliyorsun zaten el kol hareketlerim, 
mimiklerim falan… […] Dikkat çekiyor ya. Sen o okulda dikkat çekiyorsan, iyi ya da 
kötü kesinlikle bir geri beslemesi olur onun. Kesinlikle olur yani.  
150Kerem: Çünkü hani sabah başlayan bir maraton dersler bittiğinde bitmiyordu. Dersler 
bittikten sonra da konferans ya da başka faaliyetler, akşam 10-11’e kadar süren bir 
koşuşturmaca. Kendi başınıza kalacağınız bir zaman yok, dolayısıyla düşünmeye de 
zamanınız yok. Açıkçası bende biraz robotlaşma kaygısı da vardı, o yüzden gece 
uyuyamıyordum. Özellikle de uyumuyordum. Çünkü “uyu” dendiği zaman tepki olarak 
uyumayabiliyorsunuz, başka faaliyetlerde olup...  
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expressed a feeling of peace only when he was talking about their friendships. He 
emphasized the intimacy produced through shared action and shared pain: 
Efe: Friendship is there, though, the friendship in high school cannot be 
replaced. […] Friendship is something else. Even if I had lived with 200 
girls as a guy, I would have had the same feelings; if we don’t count the 
sexuality. You share the same feelings when you live with boys, as well. 
There is no difference for me, I mean. But what happens there, you became 
friend, rather, you become brothers. Because you suffer. That feeling is 
really important. If you meet 200 girls like this, perhaps then you will marry 
one of your best friends, one that you get on well the most. You meet 200 
people in that case. They all become close friends to you. You hang out with 
the ones you feel closer to yourself. That common taste, common share is 
developed this way.
151
 
 
Along the same line, Onur and Ümit differentiate friendships inside from frienships 
outside the military school:  
Onur: I mean, because of those detentions, you get closer. Those 
punishments set huge barriers to your social life, it withholds you, and you 
get punished for silly reasons. Of course you get punished when you skip 
courses, etc, this is normal, but, I don’t know, for instance you may get 
detention for two weeks if you miss polishing your shoes. This kind of 
stuff… There is also a group who gets detention with you. […] The 
friendships you raise when going through such troubles are much stronger. 
In the end, when you leave the school, you see that you cannot experience 
the same things in a civilian university. There is no way to find that same 
harmony with other people.
152
 
 
Ümit: I didn’t have a friend outside who was as reliable as those from 
school. I mean, my best friends forever were those from school, and they 
still are. […] If you try to build that friendship environment of school 
                                                 
151Efe: Arkadaşlık orada yani, lisedeki arkadaşlık hiçbir yerde yok. […] Arkadaşlık 
bambaşka bir şey. Bir tane erkek 200 kızla yaşasam da aynı duyguları paylaşırdım, eğer 
cinselliği çıkarırsak. Erkeklerle de yaşasan aynı duyguları paylaşırsın. Benim için hiçbir 
farkı yok yani. Ama orada ne oluyorsun, arkadaş oluyorsun kardeş oluyorsun daha çok. 
Acı çektiğin için. O duygu gerçekten önemli bir şeydir. Belki 200 tane kızı aynı şekilde 
tanısan bu sefer belki en yakın arkadaşlarından, en kafan uyduğu kişiyle evleneceksin 
bu sefer. Orada da 200 kişiyi tanıyorsun bu sefer. 200’ü de çok yakın arkadaşın oluyor. 
Sana en yakın gelenlerle takılıyorsun. Ortak paydaların, ortak eğlendiğin şeyler böyle 
oluyor.  
152Onur: Yani şöyle, cezalardan dolayı daha da yakınlaşıyorsun aslında. Cezalar senin 
sosyal hayatına çok büyük bir engel -ket vuruyor yani- ve saçma sapan şeylerden 
alıyorsun cezayı. Tabii ki derse girmezsen falan bunlaran ceza alıyorsun, bu normal de 
hani ne bileyim işte; ayakkabın boyasız mesela bu yüzden iki hafta ceza alıyorsun. Bu 
tarz şeyler... Senle birlikte ceza alan bir ekip de var. […] Bu zorlukları yaşarken 
edindiğin arkadaşlıklar çok daha büyük oluyor. Sonuçta okuldan çıkınca, sivil 
üniversitede falan bu arkadaşlıkları yakalayamadığını görüyorsun. İnsanlarla bu ahengi 
tutturamıyorsun hiçbir şekilde.  
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outside, you get cheated. Because in military school, you have the feelings 
that left pure and clean since the age 14… Because outside everybody tries 
to take you down, I didn’t have a person with whom I shared everything 
about myself, like I did at military school; I felt that I had to be strong 
against them. In any minute they can backstab me, so they don’t know about 
my weaknesses, and I don’t tell them.153 
 
 Most of my interviewees were very liberal about expressing affection to each 
other. I witnessed many phone calls and social meetings during which former cadets 
from the same cohort expressed their love to each other very comfortably: 
Berk: You can get on well with everyone in our school. Everyone without 
exception, whether they are good or bad, they know how to speak or not, 
close to your character or not, you have to like them unconditionally, have 
to respect them and adopt them as your friends. That obligation is binding 
for the first year; after second year, it is not a necessity anymore. You really 
like those guys.
154
 
 
Without being questioned, many interviewees shared how they demonstrate 
affection to each other physically in a distinctively “masculine” style. A practical joke 
Kaan made to his friend at the Turkish Naval Academy, which he narrated as an 
expression of closeness, was interpreted, albeit never explicitly named, as a homosexual 
tendency. This joke was seen by their company commander and reported. They were 
punished with 7 days of room confinement, which consumes one’s 28 discipline points. 
Then, because of the “serious” implication of their commander’s accusation, the defense 
that they wrote was taken seriously and their punishment was reduced to 3 weekends in 
school, 6 discipline points. This is a distinct example of the anxieties around 
homosexuality in military schools. Homosocial intimacy stands on a thin line between 
close friendship, or comradeship, and homosexuality. It becomes a problem when it 
comes to physical/ bodily intimacy: 
                                                 
153 Ümit: Dışarıdaki arkadaşlarımdan öyle okuldaki kadar güvenebileceğim bir 
arkadaşım olmadı. Yani benim ebedi arkadaşlarım okuldakilerdi, hala da öyle. […] O 
askeriyedeki dost ortamını dışarıda kurgulamaya çalışırsan kazık yersin. Askeriyede 
çünkü gerçekten 14 yaşından beri çok saf temiz kalan duygular... Dışarıda millet 
birbirinin ağzına çıktığı için, okuldaki kadar benim her şeyimi paylaştığım kişi yok 
çünkü onlara karşı güçlü olmak zorunda olduğumu hissediyorum. Hançeri her an benim 
sırtıma saplayabilirler, o yüzden benim güçsüz taraflarımı bilmezler ben de söylemem.  
154Berk: Herkesle anlaşabilmek diye bir şey var bizim okulda. Herkesle istisnasız, iyi de 
olsa kötü de olsa, konuşmayı da bilmese, senin tarzına hiç uygun da olmasa, onu 
koşulsuz şartsız sevmek, saygı duymak ve arkadaşın olarak benimsemek zorundasın. Bu 
zorunluluk bir sene için böyle, ikinci seneden itibaren bu zorunluluk ortadan kalkıyor. O 
adamı gerçekten seviyorsun.  
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Kaan: We, I mean me and my friend, the last time before graduation, was it 
third year or fourth year… We were in danger of dismissal, then we wrote 
petition to a superior. But in a very… after taking some risks… […] I will 
write this and get expelled, or won’t write and get expelled. At least if I 
write this I will be satisfied, I will say “I wrote that, I claimed my right.” 
Perhaps it would yield result. And in the end, it gave result; our claim was 
found rightful… […] We were like drunk, it was a very interesting incident 
(he means getting victory drunk, we laugh). However, it was nonsense, we 
stayed in for the same period of time, the content of the punishment was 
changed, and it got lighter.  
[…] Of course, it was an ethical accusation but had nothing to do with ethic. 
Just, as you know… You are in a boarding school, after all. As you know, if 
you are graduated from there, even if you meet as old, retired people, there 
would be hand jokes, rough-and-tumble, do you understand? A close, saucy 
relationship, you know… There, in the hall, I just pushed him, holding his 
collar like this. The incident got crazy, went too far, but thanks God there 
were cameras put to observe the students and the witnesses, everything was 
brought to light…155 
 
 Nonetheless, as many other regulations and unwritten rules, men’s friendships 
started to change after 2009-2010. Eren had to leave the school because of the 
interrogations he went through as a result of anonymous advice letters received by the 
administration of the naval academy. He described the friendships as a home in which 
one can take shelter from the discipline and oppression in the school. Eren stated that 
their friendships were very strong before the emergence of fear and insecurity among 
cadets with the start of these interrogations: 
Eren: In class, especially during high school in class, everybody composed a 
unit, they liked each other… You know, like “we should be a unity for the 
                                                 
155Kaan: Biz işte, arkadaşımla beraber en son mezun olmadan, üçüncü sınıfta mıydı, 
dördüncü sınıfta mıydı... Atılma potasına falan girmiştik, o zaman hani dilekçe 
yazmıştık bir üste. Ama onu da böyle bayağı bayağı, artık bir şeyleri göze aldıktan 
sonra… […] Ben bunu yazacağım atılacağım ya da yazmayacağım atılacağım. En 
azından bunu yazarsam kendimi tatmin edeceğim, ben bunu yazdım diyeceğim yani, 
hakkımı aradım en azından diyeceğim. Belki de sonuç gelecek. Ki nitekim sonuç da 
geldi, haklı da bulundu dilekçemiz. […] Biz bildiğin zaten sarhoş olmuştuk, çok ilginç 
bir şeydi o. [Zafer sarhoşu olmayı kastediyor, gülüyoruz] Halbuki alakasız yani, gene 
aynı süre kadar içeride kaldık, cezanın içeriği değişti hem de hafifledi. 
[…]Tabii, ahlaki bir şekilde suçlamıştı yani, ama ahlaki hiç alakası yok. Sadece orada 
bildiğin… Zaten yatılı okuldasın, anladın mı? Yani sen de bilirsin, oradan mezun olsan, 
aynı yaş grubu emekli adamlar bir araya gelse el kol şakaları olur, bilmem ne olur, 
anladın mı hani böyle, itiş kakış olur. Enseye şaplak göte parmak yani, anladın mı? 
Orada biz koridorda sadece böyle bir, ben tuttum ittim onu, yakasından. Olay sapıttı 
başka yerlere gitti falan ama sonrasında zaten Allah’tan öğrencileri gözlem altında 
tutmak için tuttukları kamerasından şahidine kadar her şey patır patır döküldükten 
sonra…  
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same goal… Do not cheat each other, do not snitch on each other” it is a 
notion called class unity, after all, we always acted together. You can hear it 
from anyone; you must know it, too. A relationship built upon one common 
thought, that notion called class unity, not very real but still so… Because of 
those incidents which occurred in later years. That is military school, where 
everyone gained new dimensions with their latest breaking points… But this 
way is better. At least that class spirit serves as a strength source for people. 
It becomes a support, a welcoming home against the problems you face with 
superiors, inferiors or officers.
156
 
 
Class unity [Sınıf birliği] 
 What Eren called “home” refers to “class unity” among cadets. Class meaning a 
particular cohort, class unity is told to be one of the most important values of military 
schools. According to Hakan, Eren and Arda, from the second group, this unity started 
to be disrupted after several anonymous letters full of accusations about certain cadets 
were found. Although these letters and interrogations started after their two gay friends 
were apprehended by their friends and had to leave the school as a result
157
, they stated 
that this “incident” was not the reason of the start of the attacks on particular cadets but 
an excuse and opportunity to initiate them:  
Eren: I think this is the reason they caught homosexuality. The reason they 
said “let’s try this means now.” Such an incident happened in school. After 
these two people left, think like “linkedin”, to everyone they may have a 
connection with, everyone they can link in the story, as I just said, 
homosexuality, etc… They tried to set that kind of links, as well. […] But 
before that, I guess, that kind of incidents here and there were not known 
much. Since it was a case creating sensation in school… And then, taking 
this as an opportunity, they added many different things into that 
investigation. I have just told, haven’t I? I think I can make a comment like 
this. 
158
 
                                                 
156Eren: Sınıf içinde özellikle lise zamanı sınıf içinde herkes birlik, herkes birbirini 
seven… İşte “Birlik olmalıyız, aynı amaç doğrultusunda… Birbirimizi satmayalım, 
birbirimizi ispiyonlamayalım.” falan ve hep beraber birlikte hareket edilen, sınıf birliği 
denilen bir kavram zaten. Herkesten duyarsın, hatta biliyorsundur da. O sınıf birliği 
denilen kavram etrafında herkesin tek düşünce etrafında yoğunlaştığı bir ilişki, aslında 
pek de gerçek olmayan ama o şekilde… O da daha sonraki yıllarda ortaya çıkan 
olaylardan ötürü. Bu harp okulu, en son kırılma noktalarında herkesin farklı farklı 
boyutlar kazandığı… Ama öyle olması daha iyi. En azından insana bir güç noktası 
oluyor sınıf arkadaşlığı ruhu. Alttır, üsttür ya da subaylarla yaşadığın sorunlarda 
insanlara bir dayanak noktası, ona sahip çıkan bir ev olarak da duruyor yani.  
157
 Murat Utku, “Deniz Harp Okulu ve ‘Gey’ler.”, bianet.org, August 20, 2010, 
accessed April 1, 2014. http://www.bianet.org/biamag/bianet/124271-deniz-harp-okulu-
ve-gey-ler 
158Eren: Eşcinselliği bence yakalama sebepleri de o yani. Bir de bu koldan yürüyelim 
demelerinin sebebi bu. öyle bir olay yaşandı okulda. O iki kişinin ayrılmasından sonra 
onları böyle, linkedin gibi düşün, onları bağ kurabildikleri herkese, hikayeyi 
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Hakan: Why it started in our term… Indeed, it started just after that 
incident. Homosexuality case broke out. Those things were truly 
exaggerated, anonymous letters or so… It became very normal, do you 
understand? Letters were sent to all newspapers. To everyone’s family… 
How could they find them? In our term, everyone’s family received CDs, 
etc. There said to be videos, pictures, etc. I don’t know, I didn’t see the 
content. […] These happened after I left. How could they find everyone’s 
address? And after that, it broke out. Most probably it started at our term. 
159
 
 
 Hakan, Eren and Arda stated that with these anonymous letters, administrative 
interrogations and military court cases, started with their cases, started to transform 
men’s friendships and the sense of fraternity, and convulse class unity with fear and 
insecurity. The first reason behind this fear was the basic tendency of cadets, whose 
name was not involved in any of these letters, towards not being seen with the accused 
lest they catch the attention of company commanders. Second, the main accusations 
were “decorated”, or framed, with true details about the life of the accused, which can 
be known only by one”s classmates: 
Eren: I think, well, these are exterior things, in the end. A letter or 
something else... Because these written things are fictional as I said. 
Grabbing something from somewhere… If there is a truth rate of 10%, the 
rest 90% is made up. But, well, how can I say, they are not totally 
imaginary, do you understand? They were written according to some 
information, it seems. I link it to insiders, whatever kind of an evil-minded 
group they are… Let me mention the parallel structure… (Laughing) I don’t 
know, the insiders may be a student group, or maybe they are officers. I 
guess they are students. If this kind of incidents happened more in our term 
during registrations… In short, if there were ten or fifteen rotten people in 
those two hundred students which was called a class, it might have been 
easier for them to do that things inside, carry information to the things they 
                                                                                                                                               
birleştirebildikleri herkese  işte az önce dedim zaten, eşcinsellik falan. O tarz bağlantılar 
da kurmaya çalıştılar. […] Ama onun öncesinde de herhalde tek tük olaylar olduğunda 
duyulmuyordu. Daha böyle okul çapında sansasyon yaratan bir olay olduğu için. İşte 
bunu fırsat bilerek o soruşturmanın içine birçok farklı şeyleri kattılar. Az önce 
bahsettim ya. Herhalde öyle bir yorum yapabilirim.  
159Hakan: Niye bizim dönemde başladı… Aslında o tam şey olaylarından sonra başladı. 
Eşcinsel olayı patlak verdi. O şeyler iyice abartıldı, isimsiz mektuplardır bilmem 
nelerdir. Çok normal hale geldi, anladın mı? Bütün gazetelere mektuplar gitti. Herkesin 
ailesine gitti. Nereden bulabiliyorlar? Bizim dönemdeki herkesin ailesine CD’ler falan 
gitti. Görüntüler varmış, resimler varmış falan filan. Bilmiyorum içeriğini görmedim de. 
[…] Ben ayrıldıktan sonra oluyor bu olaylar. Bütün herkesin adresini nereden 
bulabiliyorlar? Bundan sonra işte patlak verdi. Bizim dönemde başlamıştır büyük 
ihtimalle.  
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provide service. Maybe they weren’t able to reach that much specific 
information about the upper classes.
160
  
 
Eren described the insecurity he was feeling which led him to leave the school as 
follows: 
Eren: About my departure, at first years, I think for most people it is like 
this, though lots of incidents happen inside the military; thinking like, far 
away two or three people experience it, not something general, the year I 
left I started to feel it nearby, at my right, at my left, in front of me, at the 
back of me then. Insecurity, I mean, battalion commander getting arrested, 
regimental commander getting arrested, lots of investigations… 161 
 
Even Ümit, from the first and eldest group, stated to feel this insecurity during his last 
years in the naval academy:  
Ümit: Since officers don’t catch it themselves and they do the same shit for 
20 years, this time it is more practice. In that period, the change incident, 
you know. People were afraid of saying it to the ones nearby because “what 
if the officer hears it?” And if the officer hears, he says “If it goes to Ankara 
and I don’t punish him then someone else will come and ask why I didn’t do 
that.” Then, I mean, the trust people felt for each other was ruined. In fact, 
the basic point was friendship and it started to get spoiled. People felt 
distrustful for each other. Because things that very few knew were being 
heard from outside. But you… That remaining 9 people are very close 
friends, you don’t know who the one is and then you prefer not to tell 
anyone.
162
 
                                                 
160Eren: Bence şey sonuçta bunların dışarıda, dış kaynaklı şeyler. Bu mektup bilmem 
ne. çünkü bu yazılan şeyler dedim ya kurgusal. Bir yerden bir şeyi tutup… İçinde yüzde 
10 doğruluk payı varsa yüzde 90 sıkma. Ama şey, nasıl denir, tamamen de hayal ürünü 
değil, anladın mı? Bilgiler dahilinde anlaşılan yazılmış bir şey. Şeye bağlıyorum bunu 
yapanlar da içeride bulunan nasıl bir art niyetli grupsa… Paralel yapıdan bahsedeyim… 
(Gülüyor) İçeride bulunan herhalde bir öğrenci grubu mu artık, belki subay gurubudur 
bilmiyorum. Herhalde bence öğrencidir diye tahmin ediyorum. Bizim senemizde giriş 
kısmında daha fazla sayıda bu tarz bir şey olduysa… Kısaca o sınıf denilen 200 kişilik 
şeyin içerisinde 10-15 tane böyle çürük insan varsa onların servis ettiği ve içeride 
yaptığı şeyler, bilgi uçurmaları falanlarla herhalde daha kolay yapabilmişlerdir. Bir üst 
sınıflarla ilgili bu kadar çok, net bilgiye ulaşamıyor olabilirler yani.  
161
 Eren: Benim ayrılmama gelince ilk bir iki sene, herhalde birçok insan için de öyledir, 
birçok olaylar yaşanıyor ama askeriye içerisinde; sanki uçta üç beş kişi yaşıyor, daha 
genel bir şey değil diye düşünürken, benim ayrıldığım sene artık yanıbaşımda, sağımda, 
solumda, önümde, arkamda hissetmeye başladım. Güvensizlik, işte tabur komutanının 
tutuklanması, alay komutanının tutuklanması, birçok soruşturmalar…  
162
Ümit: Çünkü subaylar bunu kendisi yakalamadığı için ve 20 yıl boyunca aslında 
kendisi de aynı boku yediği için, hani bu kez daha uygulama. O dönemde, değişti olayı 
o hani. Millet yandakine söylemeye korkuyordu, çünkü ya “Subayın kulağına giderse”. 
Ve eğer subayın kulağına giderse, o da diyor ki “Bu Ankara”ya gittiyse ve ben de buna 
ceza vermezsem başka biri gelir ve der ki “niye ceza vermedin”. Artık yani milletin 
birbirine karşı güveni kirlendi. Aslında en temel noktası arkadaşlık bağıydı, o kopmaya 
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This insecurity was reflected less like an unpleasant surprise and more like an 
expected consequence of the macro processes in the narratives of Rıdvan, Ali and Mert, 
from the youngest-third group. They told they were among the 12-15 cadets who were 
forced to leave the school with company commanders’ continuous mobbing. They said 
class unity and intimacy within the cohort became a dream especially for them: 
 
Mert: At some point, I remember sitting in the conference hall with my both 
sides empty. Nobody wanted to sit by me, be seen talking to me. 
163
 
 
In sum, the deformation of class unity and men’s intimate friendships/ fraternity 
within the cohorts was an impact of the transformation of the disciplinary power and 
written or unwritten values and principles of professional military education from 2009 
onwards. The only common good memories of military school for my elder research 
participants became insecure and estranging relationships for younger ones.  
3.3. “Lady Students” [Bayan Öğrenciler] and Fraternal Contract 
 The female cadets of naval academy were refered as “lady students” by all of 
my interviewees. Even those those who use the word “kadın” [woman] without 
inclining towards the word “bayan” [lady]164 said “lady students are lady students” but 
not women. Marginalized and discriminated, “lady students” are remembered as a 
homogeneous category and non-relevant to the experience of military education by my 
research participants. Even when fear and insecurity among male cadets were in rise, 
female cadets were not deemed to be “friends” or “fellow soldiers” by their male 
counterparts. As Higate argues, “Although failing to achieve the intense levels of 
camaraderie characteristic of army life, men’s company was nevertheless considerably 
safer and easier than that of women.” (Higate 2003, 38). 
                                                                                                                                               
başladı. Millet birnirine güvensiz olmaya başladı. Çünkü çok az insanın bildiği şey 
dışarı yansımaya başlıyor. Adam ama... O geriye kalan 9 kişi de çok yakın arkadaşı, 
kimin şey olduğunu bilemiyor ve o yüzden hiçbirine söylememeyi tercih ediyor.  
163
Mert: Bir noktada, konferansa gittiğimizde iki yanımın da boş kaldığını hatırlıyorum. 
Kimse yanıma oturmak, benimle muhabbet ederken görülmek istemiyordu.  
164The word “bayan” [lady] is commonly used to avoid the distinction of “girl” and 
“woman” [“kız” ve “kadın”] in Turkish language, which implies the presence or or 
absence of viginity. 
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 First of all, my research participants mentioned the common perception that 
almost all the female cadets are “ugly” in the naval academy. This perception was not 
exclusive to male cadets: though their existence is precious to a modern military
165
, 
female cadets are treated accordingly neither by their male counterparts nor by their 
commanders: 
Efe: They always get ugly girls into Naval Military School. Company 
commander called her “horse thief” in front of me, “what a look is this, you 
are like a horse thief” he said. […] She hadn’t done make up, hadn’t done 
anything, hadn’t tied back her hair or so. I mean, she was a shabby girl, 
didn’t care for her looks. Tall like this… […] But she cried, still a kid, do 
you understand? She doesn’t care much about her look or so. In the 
morning, you get scared of her, looking like she just got out of the bed. 
There was something like inspection battalion. We are preparing ourselves. 
They don’t know about it. She should care more, tie her hair back. She 
should use different hairpins; she can wear a slight make up. Then she came 
like that, he said “what is this, like a horse thief”. (Laughing) In front of the 
whole battalion…166 
 
 Secondly, positive discrimination of female cadets by officer-teachers is 
considered to be unfair and vexatious. Many interviewees voiced their negative feelings 
about “lady students” both bodily (such as a grimace forming on their face followed by 
turning their face away) and verbally. Oğuz articulated his hatred towards positive 
discrimination of women and of women themselves very openly: 
Oğuz: To be honest, I don’t think that those girls would be officers. They 
usually don’t anyway; they somehow go to sea, get married, two years later 
become pregnant, lie down to give birth. I mean it will sound – let’s say 
despotic – a despotic idea but woman to be military officers, at least at 
marine… There can’t be woman officers at marine. Even if they will, it is 
more logical to get in on contract, rather than graduating from military 
academy. Better get involved from outside. […] There will be running, for 
example, heaven knows how, they are always on period on Mondays. They 
cannot say “Open and let me see it” so they just say “ok, go.” Positive 
                                                 
165“Kadın öğrenciler: ‘Sayımız az olduğu için çok değerliyiz’.”, Milliyet, September, 4, 
2010, accessed June 5, 2014. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-sayimiz-az-oldugu-icin-cok-
degerliyiz-/pazar/haberdetay/06.06.2010/1285145/default.htm?ref=haberici. 
166
 Efe: Deniz Harp Okulu’na hep çirkin kızlar alıyorlar. Bölük komutanı gözümün 
önünde “at hırsızı” dedi ya, “bu tipin ne, at hırsızı gibisin” dedi. […] Makyaj yapmamış, 
hiçbir şey yapmamış, toplamamış saçlarını falan filan. Yani çok paspal bir kızdı, 
kendine bakmazdı. Uzun boylu böyle. […] Ama ağlıyor, çocuk daha, tamam mı? Böyle 
bakmaz falan filan çok fazla kendine. Sabahları korkarsın, yataktan uyandığı gibi falan 
filan. Denetleme taburu mu ne vardı işte. Hazırlık yapıyoruz. Bunlar da bilmiyorlar.  
Biraz daha bakması lazım, saçını toplaması lazım. Değişik tokalar takması lazım, çok 
hafif makyaj yapılabiliyor. Geldi böyle ondan sonra, “bu ne böyle, at hırsızı gibisin” 
falan filan diyor. (Gülüyor) Bütün taburun önünde.  
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discrimination it is. My friend, on the other hand, what was the name… He 
has a wet dream at night, but when changing the sheets… He gets shower or 
so, for instance, and gets detention. I don’t think that girls are able to handle 
this job. I will never think so, anyway.
167
 
 
As I discussed earlier about men’s intimate friendships, “being with boys”, or 
homosociality, is one of the rare things that all interviewees remember as a warm 
memory of military education. Yet, female cadets were never included in men’s 
friendships or class unity, according to the narratives of my research participants. I 
partially agree with Carol Pateman that the social construction of homosocial 
relationships, or say fraternities, is realized through the exclusion of women. From a 
historical perspective Pateman argues that: 
When I first began to think about these matters from a feminist perspective, 
I assumed that the social contract was a patriarchal contract because it was 
made by fathers whose agreement was taken to bind their families. 
Certainly, “individuals” in the universal sense in which the category is 
usually mean anyone and everyone, do not make the social contract. 
Women have no part in it: as natural subjects they lack the requisite 
capacities and abilities.[…] The contract is made by brothers, or a fraternity. 
It is no accident that fraternity appears historically hand in hand with liberty 
and equality, nor that it means exactly what it says: brotherhood. (Pateman 
2002, 124) 
 
On the other hand, I would argue that female students are in fact included in fraternal 
contract with their “different” bodies. As Begoña Aretxaga argues for the states, the 
disciplinary power in military institutions need constant exclusions: “Those who are 
excluded are included through their exclusion.” (Aretxaga 2003, 407). Not only their 
bodily differences and positive discrimination by commanders mark the borders of 
fraternal contract, but also those who engage in further (further than saying hello and 
answering if they ask anything) contact with female students are deemed to be 
                                                 
167 Oğuz:  Açıkçası o kızların subay olacağını da düşünmüyorum. Zaten subay 
olmuyorlar; gidiyor ıttırı vıttırı denize gidiyor, evleniyor, 2 sene sonra hamile kalıyor 
doğurcam diye yatıyolar. Yani çok şey gelcek -hani despot diyeyim- despot bi fikir 
diyeyim ama kadınlardan subay olmasını en azından denizden... Denizci olarak kadın 
subay olmaz. Olursa da harp okulu mezunu olmasın, sözleşmeli alsınlar daha mantıklı. 
Dışarıdan alsın. […] Koşu oluyor mesela, ne hikmetse bunlara her Pazartesi özel günler. 
Adam da “Aç bakayım göster” diyemiyor, “E tamam git” diyor. Pozitif ayrımcılık işte. 
Ama benim arkadaşım, işte sen söyle adını... Gece işte rüyasında rüyalanıyor ama 
çarşaflarını değiştirirken... Duşa muşa gidiyor çocuk mesela, o ceza aldı. Ben kızların 
bu işi kotarabildiğini düşünmüyorum. Hiçbir zaman da düşünmeyeceğim zaten.  
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“hypocritical”. Therefore, female students also “function” in determining who can join 
the contract.   
Oğuz: Let me say this, I also do not believe in their sincerity. “We are 
friends, we are talking” or so but after a while it seems more attractive to 
talk to a girl in that heap of guys, attractive for the one who talks with her. 
Then you get distanced to your other friends, it is like you are getting into a 
relationship. I don’t want that. I am already with my girlfriend in the 
weekend, what can I talk about with a girl?! I am in military, what will I talk 
about?! When you talk to your friends, after all, the subject is politics, or 
matches, football, or courses. It is not my thing; I already don’t get involved 
with girls outside… It wasn’t my thing. Outside, well, I just meet my 
girlfriend, my friends or so. Just for she is a girl, I mean, I find it 
additionally pointless. […] 
They really change people’s fate. I have a friend, a very close one. The boy 
is a ten, I saw him as the commander of the future; he passed directly to the 
military academy. There was a girl, they hung out, etc, incidents happened. 
Having relationship is forbidden, you know… Not physically, just in means 
of being together. After then, while thinking this may happen, that may 
come out, detentions, etc, they kicked the man out of school all of a sudden. 
People don’t take it well. Unfortunately they don’t. […] And still the ones 
who get involved are like this: you see the people around them and you 
understand. The guy doesn’t have a social environment outside, for 
instance. He thinks of the girl like, “We might do something at the 
weekend”, perhaps he really has good intentions; but if you hang out with 
them at weekend, a relationship will start eventually. […] Five days… They 
both are in that military environment, it doesn’t fit in I think… Not nice. I 
don’t take it well.168 
                                                 
168
 Oğuz: Şöyle diyeyim, bir de ben samimiyetine de inanmıyorum yani. “Arkadaşız, 
konuşuyoruz falan bir şekilde bir yerden sonra o erkek yığınının içinde kızla muhatap 
olmak insana daha cazip geliyor o insana, muhatap olana. Bu sefer o diğer 
arkadaşlarından kopuyorsun; bir ilişki başlıyormuş gibi oluyor. İstemem ben. Zaten 
hafta sonu kız arkadaşımla beraberim, bir kızla ne konuşabilirim ki ben?! 
Askeriyedeyim, ne konuşacağım?! Zaten arkadaşlarla oturunca ya siyaset konuşuyorsun 
ya da maç konuşuyorsun, futbol konuşuyorsun, ya da ders konuşuyorsun. Bana göre 
değil bu; ben zaten dışarıda çok böyle kızlarla muhatap... Bana göre değildi. Dışarıda da 
ben işte kız arkadaşım, arkadaşlarım falan var onlarla görüşüyorum. Sadece kız olarak, 
hani ekstradan gereksiz görüyorum. […] 
gerçekten insanların kaderini değiştiriler. Benim arkadaşım var tamam mı, çok samimi 
arkadaşım. Çocuk on numara geleceğin en iyi komutanı diye bakıyordum çocuğa, net 
adam harp okuluna geçti. Bir tane kız vardı onunla takıldı falan filan, olaylar oldu. İlişki 
yaşamak yasak ya... Fiziksel olarak değil; birlikte olmak anlamında. Ondan sonra işte 
şöyle olur, böyle olur cezalar mezalar falan filan derken tak diye o herifi okuldan attılar. 
İnsanlar hoş bakmıyor. Karşılamıyor ne yazık ki. […] Gene de zaten muhatap olan 
insanlar şöyle: görüyorsun onların etrafındaki insanları ve anlıyorsun. Adamın bir 
sosyal çevresi yok mesela dışarıda. Kızı “Belki hafta sonu bir şeyler yaparız” diyor, 
belki sadece çok gerçekten iyi niyetli düşünüyor ama sen hafta sonu onlarla gezersen 
ister istemez bir ilişki başlıyor. […] Beş gün... İkisi de o ortam askeri ortamda, olmuyor 
bence ya . Hoş olmuyor. Ben hoş olduğunu düşünmüyorum.  
103 
 
 
 
As made obvious by Oğuz’s narration of how one of his friends was expelled from the 
school as a result of his relationship with a female cadet, “lady students” are also 
considered to be “sexual beings” although all of my interviewees except two, 
emphasized the impossibility of any emotional and sexual relationship with a female 
cadet. From a different angle, I think what Ruth Miller argues about women’s 
containment by the state as citizens through their reproductivity and sexuality in the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkey is in accordance with Aretxaga’s argument on social 
exclusion: 
It is precisely when women are made equal to the male norm, when political 
rights become emphatically uniform, that women’s different sexuality 
becomes crucial, that the womb becomes an inviolate place possessed not 
by an individual woman but by each and every citizen in the modern nation-
state. (Miller 2007, 361) 
 
Each year, only six women enroll in the Turkish Naval Academy. They have the 
same legal status with men as cadets and prospective military officers. However, male 
cadets think of themselves as suffering more than female cadets during military 
education and therefore have difficulty in recognizing the equal status of women in the 
military. Miller’s argument falls short for the case of professional military education. It 
is such a bodily/ physical and masculinized process that the uncontrollable female 
bodies, giving birth to babies or menstruating, cannot be “tolarated” by their “fellow 
soldiers”.  
Oğuz: They usually don’t anyway; they somehow go to sea, get married, 
two years later become pregnant, lie down to give birth. […]There will be 
running, for example, heaven knows how, they are always on period on 
Mondays. They cannot say “Open and let me see it” so they just say “ok, 
go.” Positive discrimination it is.169 
 
Female cadets are included through their exclusion, or say, through their “different and 
unrestrainable biology”. In Miller’s words, it is precisely when women are legally made 
                                                                                                                                               
 
169Oğuz: Zaten subay olmuyorlar; gidiyor ıttırı vıttırı denize gidiyor, evleniyor, iki sene 
sonra hamile kalıyor doğurcam diye yatıyolar. […] Koşu oluyor mesela, ne hikmetse 
bunlara her Pazartesi özel günler. Adam da “Aç bakayım göster” diyemiyor, “E tamam 
git” diyor. Pozitif ayrımcılık işte.  
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equal to the male norm of the military “that women’s different sexuality becomes 
crucial”. However, because of the masculinized and physicalized content of military 
education, this sexuality is not embraced as the modern nation-state appropriates its 
female citizens, but it is scraped along with policies such as minor positive 
discriminations. In the end, the policy of taking six women per year to “modernize” the 
institution as the military of a modern nation-state, positive discrimination of women in 
bodily training creates hatred towards female cadets.  
 With the changes emerging with the 2009-2010 academic year, almost nothing 
has changed about the inclusion of female cadets through their exclusion. However, 
when I asked Selim about this after the fieldwork, he responded indecisively. He stated 
that a woman from his cohort was punished again and again until her discipline points 
were exhausted and she was expelled, only because “she is more beautiful than she 
should have been.” He perceives this incident as an intentional act of the commanders 
to eliminate everything that might distract male cadets. However, other interviewees did 
not mention this kind of a change about the increasing preference of “less beautiful” 
women or elimination of “beautiful” ones after 2009-2010. Most of them stated that the 
commanders were approaching female cadets according to their looks also before this 
period. 
3.4. Homophobia, legally “asexual” masculinities, and sexism 
 Heterosexism and homophobia are integral parts of professional military 
education at the naval academy, as the exlusion of female cadets is. When I asked my 
interviewees about their sexual experiences in the naval high school and the academy, 
their answers were always very short. My interviewees told me that how people were 
sharing their sexual experiences depended on their personality. While some were 
bragging about how they “banged a girl last weekend” some were sharing their 
experiences only with their closer friends —the same as how non-military men would 
act. 
 In one of two exceptional interviews, Hakan admitted that he and his friends 
used to watch porn with groups of 15-20 cadets in the Turkish Naval High School. After 
he says this, I cannot resist asking more questions about this experience: 
 
Hakan: There was that thing, at first years of the high school, there were 
things like watching porn as a group. 
I get it. 
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Secretly, as 15 or 20 people. 
There were computers than, of course? 
There were no computers, CDs, etc (laughing) 
How did you watch the CDs? 
On TV. 
In TV room? 
Yes, it was pretty exciting. […] 
Was anyone caught during those incidents? 
There was for a few times, I think, but they didn’t make it a big deal. […] 
But in high school I mean, as you get older I think… Yes, at fist years of the 
high school…During prep class we were alone upstairs. [He means that the 
building of preps was different and there weren’t any higher classes.] Since 
there was only one term at school, that happened a lot. After that, I don’t 
recall that kind of things, to be honest.
170
 
 
 
When I was listening to the problems of my friends from military schools about their 
relationships, learning about the rules restricting cadets’ romantic and/ or sexual affairs, 
this appalled me. If the school administration somehow detects that a cadet cohabits 
with a woman or a man without being legally married, he or she is expelled from the 
school. The same applies when a male cadet gets a woman pregnant. A cadet is not 
allowed to stay at a hotel at the weekends. It is strictly forbidden to have any kind of 
relationship except a limited friendship with female cadets.
171
 Considering the fact that 
cadets have to stay in the school during weekdays, it is almost as if they cannot have 
any kind of sexual/ romantic relationships. The tolerance of commanders towards naval 
high school students watching porn finds meaning then. This actually means that cadets 
                                                 
170Hakan: Ya şey de oluyordu, lisenin ilk yıllarında toplu porno izleme tarzı şeyler 
oluyordu. 
Anladım. 
Kaçak bir şekilde, 15-20 kişi. 
Tabii bilgisayar var o sıralar? 
Bilgisayar yok. CD’den falan… (Gülüyor) 
CD’yi nereye koyuyorsun? 
Televizyona. 
Televizyon odasında? 
Evet. Bayağı heyecanlı oluyordu. […] 
Yakalanma oluyor muydu hiç öyle durumlarda? 
Oldu galiba birkaç kere de çok ses çıkarmamışlardı. […] Ama lisede yani, büyüdükçe 
herhalde şey… Evet lisenin ilk yıllarında. Hazırlıkta biz şeydik, yalnızdık yukarıda 
[Hazırlık sınıfının binasının ayrı olmasını ve üst dönemlerin olmayışını kastediyor]. 
Okulda tek bir dönem olduğu için o zaman çok olurdu. Ondan sonra çok 
hatırlamıyorum açıkçası. 
171“Harp Okulları Yönetmeliği”, September 27, 2001, accessed September 15, 2013. 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.5848&sourceXmlSearch=&
MevzuatIliski=0 
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are breaking the rules of daily routine since they watched porn after the bedtime as 
Hakan stated later, during the time they should have been in their beds. Such a violation 
would be harshly punished as demonstrated with several examples by my interviewees, 
if they had been doing something else. Even going to the toilet after bedtime is 
punished, as Rıdvan experienced once. On the other hand, as narrated by Oğuz, 
although female cadets’ bodily fluids was a legitimate excuse not to join some physical 
trainings, men’s involuntary orgasm during sleep was not tolerated:  
 
Oğuz: My friend, on the other hand, what was the name… He has a wet 
dream at night, but when changing the sheets… He gets shower or so, for 
instance, and gets detention. 
172
 
 
The other exceptional narrative is of Burak, who left the military at the end of 
high school. He referred to physical intimacy of male cadets as he spoke of accusations 
with sexual content towards military officers in the Ergenekon courtcases: 
Burak: A closed group in the end, with their leisure centers, jobs and 
everything… […] This also causes people to make up many things about 
them (soldiers). You usually make up more about the things you don’t know 
of. Did you heard about that story, for instance? I talked much, much about 
sexuality. But there are really many stories on this. For example our, I heard 
such a story; in America some nights, men and women come together some 
nights and change their car keys. Whichever key of the car you take, you get 
the owner’s wife for the night. When going to the university entrance exam, 
I heard the same story from a boy, about military officers. Because it is a 
closed place, do you see? The same trump was used in Ergenekon 
operations, sexuality was used a lot, you would remember, homosexuals 
came out; it was said that women were arranged, secret documents were 
sent out via prostitutes. The same was done to religious ones in military 
during 28
th
 February cases. […] And we did many things in high school, 
what would happen if those were found out?! I mean, between the legs, 
jumping on each other…173 
                                                 
172Oğuz: Ama benim arkadaşım, işte sen söyle adını... Gece işte rüyasında rüyalanıyor 
ama çarşaflarını değiştirirken... Duşa muşa gidiyor çocuk mesela, o ceza aldı.  
173
Burak: Kapalı bir grup yani, sosyal tesisleri, işi, her şeyiyle. […] Bu insanların onlar 
[askerler] hakkında çok fazla uydurmasına da sebep oluyor. Bilmediğin şey hakkında 
daha çok uydurursun genelde. Mesela şu hikayeyi duydun mu? Çok cinsellikten, çok 
fazla bahsettim. Ama böyle hakikaten çok fazla bahsediliyor. Mesela bizim, ben şöyle 
bir hikiaye duymuştum, Amerika’da bazı akşamlar adamlarla kadınlar bazı akşamlar bir 
araya gelip araba anahtarlarını değiştiriyorlarmış, hangi arabanın anahtarını çekerse 
akşam onun karısıyla beraber oluyormuş. Ben bu hikayenin aynısını üniversite sınavına 
girerken bir çocuktan subaylar hakkında duydum. Çünkü kapalı bir yer tamam mı? Aynı 
koz Ergenekon davalarında kullanıldı, çok cinsellik üzerinden vuruldu yani, hatırlarsın, 
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Michael S. Kimmel argues, “Homophobic flight from intimacy with other men is the 
repudiation of the homosexual within –never completely successful and hence 
constantly reenacted in every homosocial relationship” (Kimmel 2001, 276). As 
expressed by a few interviewees and as I observed during some social meetings, verbal 
and physical demonstrations of affection, mostly love, such as physical jokes or big 
hugs, are common in military schools and among former cadets. At first glance, a 
homophobic flight from intimacy is not intuited. Trying to develop a hegemonic 
masculinity in the absence of physically present femininities during their childhood and 
adolescence, I think, former cadets negotiated with the intimacy and love they feel for 
each other, which is the only feeling that make them feel home as Eren expressed it, by 
engaging in homophobic and sexist joking behaviors (Swain 2001, 141). Such 
behaviours range from “metaphorical” goals they score between the legs of another to 
jumping on a friend’s body en masse and shouting “I fuck you now!”  I find these jokes 
both sexist and homophobic because when performed by men who try to build a 
heterosexual, normative masculinity, the repetitive mockery of homosexual intercourse, 
or putting the mocked man in a “passive, female” position clearly reinforce sexism and 
homophobia.  
Reflecting back upon the practical joke Kaan made to his friend, physical 
intimacy is not always appreciated by the commanders. As swearing is punished when 
heard by commanders because it is not appropriate for a prospective military officer to 
speak unpolitely in public, physical jokes that go “too far” are also formally charged, 
which is a reflection of homophobia within the schools.  
Briefly commenting on swearing among cadets, I shall give reference to my 
gatekeeper, Selim again. He said swearwords were unacceptable and a major cause of 
fights among cadets of same class when they first came to Turkish Naval High School. 
For example, when someone swore to another’s mother, father or sister, it was 
definitely a legitimate reason to get involved in a fight. Yet, as time progressed and a 
class unity was formed, swearing at each other’s mother, father, sister or other family 
members became surprisingly tolerable. Selim thinks this is not the case among men 
                                                                                                                                               
eşcinseller çıktı işte, kadınlar ayarlanıyormuş, gizli belgeler hayat kadınları aracılığıyla 
dışarı çıkarılıyormuş gibi şeyler uyduruldu. Aynısını 28 Şubat sürecinde askeriye, 
dincilere yaptılar mesela. […] Ki biz neler neler yapıyorduk lisede, onlar çıksa neler 
olur?! İşte bacak araları, birbirinin üzerine atlamalar…  
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outside. He also sees this as a consequence of becoming “like a family.” I observed the 
closeness of cadets with the parents of their classmates too. It is almost like they make 
one huge family that tolerates swearwords and fights inside, like the majority of 
heteronormatively-structured families today. As Swain argues, swearing serves as a 
developmental credential (Swain 2001, 134) among cadets. Like the gradual 
normalization of swearing to each other’s (mostly female) family members, bluntness 
and profanity legitimize masculinities by toughening the language. My interviewees 
also stated thinking that this language is more appropriate around other former cadets 
(not necessarily around other men who would be offended when someone swears at 
their family).  This explains why I have not heard almost any swearwords while 
hanging out with former cadets. In sum, as Swain interprets joking behavior as an 
expression of attachment rather than a distancing gesture and hostile act (Swain 2001, 
142), I interpret joking behavior and swearing among (former) cadets during and after 
military education both as an expression of attachment and as a mechanism to cope with 
this homosocial and affectional environment “thanks to” the sexist and homophobic 
content of the jokes and swearwords. 
 Rareness of the voice of misogyny (with the “exception” of female cadets of 
course) in the narratives of my interviewees was one of the most unforeseen outcomes 
of my fieldwork. Knowing quite a few former cadets as friends, I could not but realize 
that some of them are surprisingly “anti-sexist” compared to the majority of non-
military men I know. However, I gradually realized that I was prejudiced towards cadets 
and military men: I was thinking of them as mostly sexist and misogynist men. 
Therefore, I was considering my friends who are mostly not as exceptions. I have 
learned that this is not the case. As my friends, many other former cadets are critical of 
patriarchal order if not of heterosexism. There is indeed heterogeneity among former 
cadets in terms of sexism and misogyny as Burak asserted: 
Burak: When I look at my friends who studied there, I see a wide spectrum. 
Just as when I look at any other male group. There are those who perceive 
the world with a very male-dominant view, but of course people are at that 
side usually. But of course the general tendency is that, you can see that 
from general tendencies.
174
 
 
                                                 
174Burak: Orada okumuş arkadaşlarıma baktığımda geniş bir yelpaze görüyorum. Tıpkı 
herhangi bir erkek topluluğuna baktığımdaki gibi. Çok erkek egemen bir gözle dünyaya 
bakanlar da var, ama tabii daha çok o tarafta insanlar. Ama tabii genel eğilim de o 
yönde, genel eğilimden görebilirsin.  
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This though, does not necessarily mean that they are anti-sexist and they have feminist 
tendencies. As mentioned above, first of all, the perception of “lady students”, who can 
never be “actual military officers”, as an ugly, homogeneous entity reflects the ways in 
which they are a part of patriarchal gender regime within military schools. Secondly, 
many interviewees such as Oğuz, Efe, and Mahmut expressed their negative feelings 
about positive discrimination of female cadets.  
Mahmut is the only kabak among my interviewees. Among all, he is also the 
only one who reported having minimum but decent friendships with some female cadets 
explicitly. Even then however, at the end of his answer about “lady students” he 
asserted that female cadets should learn how to get tougher: 
Mahmut: […] That is my view: that female students took the chances when 
they got in, they should adapt to the same circumstances, I mean. They 
should learn living under same conditions, under that stress. (Laughing) 
Whenever they hear a noise, a voice or whenever someone shouts at them, 
they shouldn’t leave the battalion crying. I don’t know, well, whether I am 
too harsh. No no, I am not. I don’t think that I am too harsh. I don’t know, 
whatever…175 
 
I was inclined to perceive positive discrimination of female cadets as positive until very 
recently. I did change my mind completely but I realized, one can perceive the intended 
or unintended usage of periods of menstruation by women in professional military 
education as a patriarchal act. One can interpret the same situation also as a survival 
strategy of women in a highly militarized and masculinized environment. On the other 
hand, if a female cadet prefers to be treated equally with her male counterparts, does 
this necessarily mean she masculinizes for purposes of integration and approval? How 
does masculinization and militarization of female bodies differ from the utilization of 
women’s certain differences from men by women, in order to receive positive 
discrimination? Most importantly to me, how to answer these questions and approach 
critically the very existence of women soldiers from a feminist and anti-militarist 
perspective? These are very hard questions to answer in this study. Rare researchers 
such Cynthia Enloe critically locate female soldiers within the wider context of 
                                                 
175Mahmut: […] benim düşüncem şu: Bayan öğrenciler de göze alarak oraya geldiler, 
onlar da aynı şartları taşımalılar yani. Aynı şartlarda, o stres altında kalmayı bilmeliler. 
(Gülüyor) Bir gürültü duyduğunda, bir ses duyduğunda, biri ona bağırdığında ağlayarak 
taburu terk etmemeliler. Bilmiyorum hani, çok mu sert düşünüyorum. Yok ya değil 
bence. Çok sert düşünmüyorum bence. Ne bileyim, öyle işte.  
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international politics of militarizing women’s lives, and provide answers to some of 
these questions while raising new ones (Enloe 2000a and 2000b). 
 Another fact that has surprised me is most of my research participants’ ability to 
maintain long-term heterosexual relationships. Although I never asked my interviewees 
about their romantic relationships, the subject of one’s girlfriend usually came up 
during our conversations. Despite this openness to discussing one’s relationship, on the 
other hand, Berk’s statement offers a different opinion on cadets’ relationships. He 
stated that former cadets have long-term relationships only because they never had the 
social capital that would allow them to “choose” who they want to be with. Thus, they 
fell in love with whoever impresses them first and stay with that person until they are 
married. He claimed that the experience of same-sex schools creates a frailty for women 
[zaaf]: 
Berk: As military high school students, about girls we have, since we had 
very little or no relationship with girls between the ages 13 and 18, we feel 
something different for girls. And we always want to have a girl in our lives. 
[…] A normal guy can go to school, graduate, live without having a girl, a 
girlfriend in his life. He may not have a girlfriend. But for us, military high 
school graduates, whether you become a military officer or quit and do 
another job, what you need is a connection with women, etc. We have a big 
interest on girls, as military school graduates. Because we are aware that, 
that pressed feelings are on the vertical rise for all our lives. Let me give a 
very simple example. Even if I have a girlfriend, I can have a very different 
connection with another girl, if I admire her. This is not about loyalty, for 
every military officer… […] It can be a one night stand, for instance.176 
 
Berk explained long-term relationships of former cadets with this frailty. Efe, who is a 
military officer on the other hand, has a quite different approach to relations with 
women. He expressed his need for affection in every relation and his aversion to sex 
with sex workers: 
                                                 
176Berk: Biz askeri lise öğrencileri olarak, bizim kız konusunda, sadece 13-18 yaş 
arasında hiçbir kızla muhabbetimizin olmaması ya da çok az olması sebebiyle biz 
mesela kızlara karşı ayrı bir şey duyarız. Ve hayatımızda her zaman bir kız olsun isteriz. 
[…] Normal bir insan hayatında bir kız olmadan, kız arkadaşı olmadan da hayatını 
devam ettirebilir, okuyabilir, mezun olabilir. Adamın kız arkadaşı olmayabilir. Ama biz 
askeri lise mezunları, ister subay ol, ister ayrıl başka bir iş yap, ihtiyaç duyduğun şey 
kız münasebetleri vesaire. Kızlara çok ilgiyle bakarız biz askeri liseden mezun olan 
öğrenciler olarak. Çünkü o bastırılmış duygunun hayatımız boyunca dikine bir 
yükselişte olduğunun farkındayızdır yani. Çok basit bir örnek vereyim. Kız arkadaşım 
olsa bile başka bir kızla münasebetim çok daha farklı olur, eğer kızı beğendiysem. Bu 
sadakatle ilgili değildir, her subayda… […] Tek gecelik bir ilişki olabilir mesela.  
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Efe: Setting my relationship on a serious base… Most probably I won’t 
begin a relationship unless it is earnest. I try to know them for a while. After 
two or three months, perhaps I will start something somehow. And later, I 
most probably get married if it continues that way. I think so. I like kids a 
lot. For me to marry there are lots… The person I will marry should be a 
woman after my own heart. And she should talk and laugh a lot (we laugh). 
Or, well, I can get married just because of my love for kids. […] It is 
senselessness against the person you live through such things… I can’t be 
like normal guys, I mean. My sense of morality is a little different than 
those other people. […] The guy thinks just not doing that thing is being 
moral. He is married, has kids. Morality lies in the way you think. He thinks 
not going to a woman is being moral. He tells me about his thoughts, he 
shouldn’t. […] If I don’t like a person, there is no way I tell them that I like 
them. I can’t meet my needs with them. The same applies for a prostitute… 
I find it very wrong, meaningless. They say “you are single, why don’t you 
go to them” etc.177 
 
There are also a few interviewees who have never been in a romantic relationship. 
Hence, the diversity of military masculinities holds also for their romantic and/ or 
sexual relationships with women and the values they attribute to these relationships. 
 Kimmel asserts that the great secret of American manhood is that men are afraid 
of other men. Men’s fear is the fear of humiliation, and they are ashamed to be afraid. 
(Kimmel 2001, 277) The absence of fear from each other, or the fear of being 
humiliated in front of a classmate is replaced by physical demonstration of affection, 
swearing or joking behavior. Fear powerfully shapes the experience of military 
education through impositions of penalty to younger cadets by seniors. As an unwritten 
rule, especially of military high schools, these penalties have a crucial part in the 
                                                 
177Efe: İlişkimi ciddi bir şey üzerine kurup… İlişkiye ciddiyet olmadan başlamam 
büyük ihtimalle. Bayağı tanırım. İki üç ay geçtikten sonra belki bir şeye başlarım bir 
şekilde. Sonra da zaten büyük ihtimalle evlenirim o şekilde devam ederse. Öyle 
düşünüyorum. Çocukları çok seviyorum. Evlenmemin zaten çok… Evleneceğim kişinin 
çok kafa dengim olması lazım. Benimle gezecek tozacak, acayip kafa dengim olması 
lazım. Bir de çok konuşması gülmesi lazım. (Gülüyoruz) Ya da çocuk sevgimden 
evlenebilirim ya. […] Öyle bir şey paylaşacağım insana karşı duygusuzluk hani… 
Normal erkekler gibi olamam yani. Ahlak yapım biraz daha değişiktir yani diğer 
kişilere göre. […] Adam sadece o işi yapmamaya ahlak olarak bakıyor. Evli, çocuğu 
var. Ahlak düşünce tarzındadır. Kadına gitmemeyi ahlak olarak değerlendiriyor. 
Düşüncelerini söylüyor bana, söylememesi lazım. […] Sevmiyorsam birisini ona hiçbir 
şekilde seviyorum falan diyemem. Bir ihtiyacımı onunla gideremem. Aynı şekilde bir 
hayat kadınına da… Bana çok yavan, anlamsız geliyor. Onlar diyor hani bekarsın, sen 
niye şey yapmıyorsun falan…  
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making of military masculinities. I call this tradition “traditional disciplinary bargain”, 
for reasons I will explain in the following part. 
3.5. Imposition of penalty by senior cadets [Ceza talimi]: Traditional disciplinary 
bargain 
 The penalties imposed upon younger cadets by senior cadets are addressed 
under this section but not under the section “Punishment and Anxiety”. I chose to 
strictly cover punishments inflicted by officers/ commanders before addressing the 
established tradition between younger and elder cadets especially in the naval high 
school, because the recent changes in traditional disciplinary bargain spill out a great 
deal of shifting paradigms of professional military education.   
The relationship between senior and younger cadets traditionally involves a 
certain loyalty to the unity of all cadets of a school against the commanders in 
administrative positions and officer-teachers.  If a senior cadet spots an inappropriate 
and disrespectful behavior or statement of a younger cadet, he can call him to the floor 
of seniors after bedtime, “to be inspected in uniform” [denetlemelik gitmek], and impose 
any form of penalty he likes. These penalties are generally called sikiş178. 
Efe: At high school after work hours. Since company commanders are 
everywhere during work hours. And because you have a closed program 
during work hours, I mean there is yacht battalion at 10 and after that the 
action begins.
179
 
 
This is a question of “report or sport” as framed by Rıdvan. By imposing a penalty on a 
junior by his own terms, the senior cadet becomes the authority himself. He prefers the 
criminal justice of cadets rather than of commanders. Along with this preference, he 
practices to act at will to punish a misdemeanor [kabahat], and thus, he plays the 
commander. He also saves the “faulty” [kabahatli] from the lawful criminal justice of 
the commanders/ of the school.  
 Misdemeanors that are punished by seniors range from a crooked soldier salute 
to a senior high, to a messy pair of shoes or a dirty hat. Some forms of punishments the 
senior highs prefer are as follow: waiting as if sitting on an imaginary chair with arms 
                                                 
178Sikiş means “fucking” or “to screw” in Turkish. Additionally, it has very sexist 
connotations as sik means “dick” and sikiş implies a single-sided act. 
179Efe: Lisede de mesai saatinden sonra. Mesai saati boyunca bölük komutanları her 
yerde olduğu için. Mesai saati boyunca senin de kapalı bir programın olduğu için yat 
taburu oluyor işte 10’da, ondan sonra hani olaylar başlar.  
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raised forward; push-ups; climbing and descending a ladder carrying heavy suitcases
180
; 
hitting on the head with the thick plastic edge of a hat; pressing or hitting on the hard 
bottons of the uniform on the chest to bruise the covered parts of one’s body. Only in 
extreme cases, the senior(s) take the part of their uniform that indicate their grade and 
call the “faulty” to fight on an equal ground by saying “Take’em off if you have the 
balls!” [Yiyorsa rütbeyi çıkar!]. There are some other forms of punishment as well but 
many interviewees stated that their awe stems mainly from the fear of an unexpected 
form or degree of penalty rather than from the possibility of physical pain. 
Hakan: Well, they make you jump over the berth. Make you fight each 
other, etc. Like playing a game... Throw your right punch, left punch or 
things like that. Those are a bit enjoyable parts. You also have fun but when 
there is an aggressive person in front of you, you have the risk of getting 
beaten, it is much worse. 
181
 
 
Burak: If you ask whether we got beaten badly, thrown to left from right, 
broken a leg or so, no. But this fear is enough for a person; that possibility 
gets into your brain. Being watched over by someone constantly is very 
disturbing, disturbing on its own.
182
 
 
As Burak and Rıdvan shared, a senior high usually comes with his friends to punish the 
younger cadet, or say, he is sent with other people from his class if he is a ‘diesel’ 
[dizel]. Diesel is the adjective for seniors who are physically very big and known with 
their extreme tendency to use violence. Classmates of such a senior do not send him 
alone to punish someone in order to prevent incidents that would cross the line, and 
inflict more harm than a certain limit.  
Senior cadets also enforce mass punishments upon younger groups of cadets too. 
If class unity means solidarity and love among classmates, it also means sharing the 
responsibility of a classmate’s misdemeanor. One of the most striking examples of mass 
punishment is the “bang-bang week” [sikiş haftası].  A week becomes a bang-bang 
                                                 
180
 This is why the senior highs call the “faulty” to the suitcase room for his penalty 
where suitcases of cadets wait the end of the semester, and where no commander ever 
visits. 
181 Hakan: İşte ranzaların üstünden falan atlatıyorlar. Birbirimizle kavga falan 
ettiriyorlardı. Oyun oynar gibi. Sağ yumruk at, sol yumruk at falan filan tarzı. Onlar 
biraz eğlenceli kısmı olayın. Sen de eğlenerek yapıyorsun da karşında sinirli bir insan 
olunca, dayak yeme korkusu olunca çok daha kötü.  
182Burak: Böyle çok büyük dayaklar yediniz mi, sağdan sola vurulup ayağınız bacağınız 
kırıldı mı dersen, hayır. Ama zaten bu korku insana yetiyor, olma ihtimali beynine 
işliyor. Sürekli biri tarafından izleniyor olma durumu çok rahatsız edici, başlı başına 
rahatsız edici.  
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week when, for example, a junior cadet gives a physical or verbal response to the senior 
high who has used violence against him. If seniors decide that all juniors carry the 
responsibility of this “insolence”, the bang-bang week begins. Everything becomes 
harsher. The written or unwritten rules that are not in use under normal circumstances 
come into rule. For example, younger cadets wait lined up rather than at ease each and 
every time they wait for seniors, such as before every meal. Burak remembers bang-
bang weeks very graphically although it has been eight years since he left the military 
school. I will make a long quotation since his narration leaves me no place to make 
further analysis:  
Burak: […] For example you may come across such a thing, a boy says it is 
enough, I am pissed off, damn you, or he may swear or so; this incident for 
example is paid out of the whole class. The polish of your shoes is not 
proper, but this kind of thing is seen as a huge indiscipline and taken out of 
the whole class. For example, if such a thing happens at night, next morning 
whole third classes know about it and they take a decision together like “we 
will keep first classes under pressure this week” and the expression is “we 
will fuck them”. Indeed it is “they will be fucked”, yes, “this week they will 
be fucked”, this is the expression. This means we will be kettle fish that 
week; you put extra attention on everything you do. If such a thing happens, 
you will stand at attention on dining table. At 5 past 7 first classed come 
down, at 10 past 7 second classes come and sit on their tables again running 
and so. Third classes wake up at 7, after all. For them everything is relaxed 
and loose. It is very interesting, they also have a role in the hierarchy but 
since they are the oldest group of students, officers bestowed a big privilege 
on them. I don’t know why. When we were third class, this didn’t happen, it 
was put away, and that was another blow for us. […] Third classes come at 
20 past 7 for the breakfast and since without them the breakfast won’t start, 
we wait. I mean, you stand in vain for 15 minutes on your feet, whether at 
attention or at ease. Since you’ve just woken up, your body aches. […] You 
won’t talk, you wait in silence, for 15 minutes, you don’t talk; you wait with 
your hands tied back, without making any noise, no sound to be heard. At 
that time you may want to say something as a kid and then you are in 
trouble. Because third classes are inspecting you. Whether you are talking 
or not, moving or not… You wait with warnings like “stand in order guys!”, 
“don’t move guys!”, “don’t talk!” or so. After all, third classes come and 
breakfast begins; were they saying “bon appetite” or what, without that 
saying, the breakfast won’t start. Something like “you can start” is said. 
There are certain rules at table, as well. You cannot put your elbows on the 
table. When you ask something to a third class, you put your hands down. 
They can’t stand on the table; you stop eating, put your fork and knife down 
and put your hands below.  
Is it a third class on your table? 
Of course, you are asking to a third class on your table. The questions are 
like “Can I take the left over tea?”, “Can I take more bread?” or there is 
cheese left on the table “Can I take that left over cheese?” Or, for instance, 
115 
 
we had a dessert, we made up a dessert by pouring honey on biscuits and 
pouring some tea on it, it was tasty; then you ask “Can I put some honey on 
the biscuit, sir?” Because it is out of rules, do you understand? You will eat 
the biscuit, drink the tea, won’t you? This is expected of you. Then what 
you do? Put the biscuits on your table, pour down honey and pour tea… 
Have they ever refused to give permission for that? 
Of course that might happen. But usually they gave, not so… Not that much 
(we laugh). They usually said ok but as I said if it was fuck week, I am 
using their expression right now, if that is fuck week they won’t allow such 
things and you won’t ask anyway.183 
                                                 
183Burak: […] Mesela başına böyle bir şey gelmiştir, çocuk der ki yeter işte, bıktım da 
bilmem ne de, lanet olsun size, ya da küfür etmiştir bir şey demiştir, bu mesela bütün 
sınıfa patlatılır bir olaydır. Ayakkabının boyası patlamaz da böyle bir olay olduğunda, 
büyük bir itaatsizlik olarak geçecek bir şey olduğunda bütün sınıfa patlatılır. Örneğin 
bir önceki gece böyle bir şey olduğunda, sabah bütün lise üçler bundan haberdardır ve 
sabah karar almışlardır kendi aralarında, bugün biz, bir hafta boyunca lise birleri baskı 
altında tutuyoruz, bunun da tabiri “sikiyoruz”. Tabiri söyliyim, “sikiş var”, ha evet, “bu 
hafta sikiş var”, böyle bir tabir vardır mesela. Bu hafta yandık demektir bu, her şeyine 
daha çok dikkat edersin. Böyle bir durum olduğunda masa başında [yemek masası] artık 
hazır olda bekliyorsundur. Saat yediyi beş geçe lise birler iner aşağıya, saat yediyi on 
geçe lise ikiler gelir masalarına dağılırlar, yine koşarak vs. yine aynı durumlar. Lise 
üçlerse zaten yedide falan kalkmışlardır. Onlara her şey, olay çok gevşektir. Çok 
enteresan zaten, onların da hiyerarşide bir yeri var fakat okulun en üst sınıfı oldukları 
için subaylar onlara müthiş bir iltimas geçerlerdi. Niye öyle olurdu bilmiyorum. Biz lise 
üç olduğumuzda olmadı, o drum kalktı, o da bize patladı. […] Lise üçler yediyi yirmi 
geçe falan gelir kahvaltıya ve kahvaltı onlar gelmeden başlamayacağı için başlamaz. 
Yani sen on beş dakika boyunca ayakta boşuna beklersin, hazır olda ya da rahatta. 
Sabah yeni kalkmışsındır, her tarafın ağrır. […] Konuşamazsın, sessizce beklersin, on 
beş dakika boyunca konuşamazsın, ellerin arkada, hiç ses çıkarmadan beklersin, çıt 
çıkmaz. O ara çocuk olarak bir şeyler söylemek isteyebilirsin, başın yanabilir. Çünkü o 
esnada bazı lise üçler seni denetliyordur. Konuşuyor mu konuşmuyor mu, hareket 
ediyor mu etmiyor mu, “beyler düzgün durun”, “beyler kıpraşmayın”, “beyler 
konuşmayın” gibi ikazlarla beklersin. Neyse lise üçler gelir ve yemek başlar, lise üçler 
“afiyet olsun” mu diyordu, bir şey diyordu, onu demeden başlayamazsın. 
“Başlayabilirsiniz” gibi bir şey denir. Masada da çeşitli kurallar vardır. Dirseklerini 
masaya koyamazsın. Lise üçe bir şey soracağın zaman ellerini aşağı indirirsin. Masada 
durmaz ellerin, yemek yemeyi bırakırsın, çatalını bıçağını masaya koyarsın, ellerini 
aşağı indirirsin.  
Senin masandaki lise üçe? 
Tabii senin masandaki lise üçe bir şey soracaksın. Sorduğun soru da şudur: “Fazla çayı 
alabilir miyim?”, “Fazla ekmeği alabilir miyim?”, ya da peynir artmıştır masadaki, 
“Fazla peyniri alabilir miyim?”. Ya da işte böyle mesela bir tatlımız vardı, bir tatlı 
uydurmuştuk kendimiz, bisküvinin üzerine bal döküyorduk, onun üzerine çay 
döküyorduk, böyle güzel tatlı bir şey oluyordu, işte “böyle böyle bisküvinin üzerine bal 
koyabilir miyim efenim?” Çünkü bu kural dışı yani, anladın mı? Bisküviyi yiyeceksin, 
çayı içeceksin, değil mi? Bunu yapman bekleniyor senden. Ama sen ne yapıyorsun? 
Tabağına bisküviyi koyuyorsun, üzerine biraz bal döküyorsun, üzerie çay döküyorsun.  
İzin verilmediği oluyor muydu buna? 
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According to Rıdvan the majority of impositions of penalty by seniors, if not 
bang-bang weeks, is a win-win situation for cadets. If reported to a commander, one has 
to spent one or more weekends at school: 
Rıdvan: […] there was such a thing: Report of sport. Everyone likes sport, after 
all, when you are reported your discipline grade is taken and you have to stay at 
school at weekend, in the end. The only motivation source for us is weekend. 
Therefore, generally sport was chosen and both sides left happy. But this system 
is changed. A little tougher at Military Academy. At the slightest mistake, 
statements were taken down and reports were given. 
184
 
 
However, Rıdvan and my other research participants from his cohort are an exception in 
this respect. The perception of this tradition differs from cohort to cohort. Most of the 
former cadets from the first group value this tradition to a great extent. Though, most of 
the younger cadets do not.  
The commanders decided to start enforcing the already existing regulations to 
prevent the impositions of penalty by senior highs to younger cadets in 2006-2007. 
Clearly stating that those who are reported to punish younger cadets or who are caught 
in the act will be expelled from the school was obviously an efficient precaution. 
According to my interviewees, this transformation commenced after a major incident 
between two classes. Some cadets made complaints about their seniors to the 
commanders while leaving the school. The incident took place when all the cadets were 
at a basketball court for an event. The eldest cohort attacked the younger cadets en 
masse, and the younger cohort responded to this.  This turned into a mass fight of 
almost 400 children. My interview with Eren offers a different perspective on this 
subject: 
Eren: When we were at … class, higher classes were caught. Someone 
leaving school told everything in detail. And even in Forces scale... Like 
“there is lots of tormenting in this school.” Again, the information given 
outside was the same as given to class officers without letting anyone know, 
                                                                                                                                               
Tabii olabilir. Genelde veriliyordu, o kadar da… O kadar da (gülüyoruz) yokmuş. 
Genelde veriliyordu ama mesela dediğim gibi o hafta sikiş haftasıysa, tabirleri öyle 
kullanıyorum şu anda, o hafta sikiş haftasıysa böyle bir şeye izin verilmez, sen de 
sormazsın zaten.  
184Rıdvan: […] hatta şöyle bir şey vardı: Rapor mu spor mu gibi. Herkes sporu seviyor, 
sonuçta rapor edildiğinde disiplin puanın kırılıyor ve haftasonu okulda kalmak zorunda 
kalıyor. Sonuçta elimizde tek motivasyon kaynağı haftasonu. O yüzden genelde spor 
seçiliyordu, iki taraf da memnun ayrılıyordu. Ama değişti bu sistem. Harp okulunda 
biraz daha sert. En küçük bir hatada tutanak tutuluyor, rapor ediliyor.  
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etc. I think the school board took that decision, like, “We should stop it 
know, such things shouldn’t happen anymore”. And we were warned as 
“Such things will absolutely not happen and ones caught will get expelled” 
or so. It is a very simple precaution, in the end, when you say that nobody 
disturbs the other. 
You say it has been better, does the majority think so? 
Generally everyone thinks so. In the end it is not a good thing, it harms your 
psychology. (Laughing) Especially, I had some friends who went through 
these personally, more than adequate. Though we weren’t so close in the 
class… These events affected both their success and psychology. People 
doing that were already people who experienced such things in the past, so 
that way, the chain was broken. […] Perhaps if you ask older ones, they will 
ask why this happened. Then there was such a saying, “the school became 
gay” saying. Then, probably it was said “In the past those things were 
handled manly, now officers are into everything, always reporting”.185 
 
As many others, Eren also told that these punishments given by the senior cadets 
suddenly stopped when they enter naval academy: 
Eren: When you pass to Military Academy after high school everybody gets 
mature all of a sudden and these things start to be seen childish. Though in 
academy nobody was so, such things wouldn’t happen.186 
 
 The impositions of penalty by seniors though, differ from the punishments that 
can be inflicted by the commanders in a distinctive form. Those who are punished by 
the seniors are saved from the commanders justice, and thus, from wasting weekends in 
school. Young cadets also know that someday they too be seniors and will be able to 
                                                 
185Eren: Biz lise …deyken üst sınıfların yakalanma olayı olmuştu. Okuldan ayrılan 
birinin çok ayrıntılı olayları anlatması olmuştu. Taa kuvvet çapında falan. Bir sürü 
böyle eziyet var bu okullarda falan diye. Yine herhalde dışarıya verilen bilgiler, içeride 
sınıf subaylarına kimseye söylemeden verilen bilgiler falan. Herhalde okul yönetimi şey 
kararı aldı: Artık bu işe bir dur diyelim, böyle olmasın dendi. Bize de şey uyarısı 
yapıldı: Kesinlikle böyle şeyler olmayacak, yakalanan okuldan atılır falan filan gibi. 
Çok basit bir önlem aslında, onu dediğin takdirde kimse bulaşmıyor birine.  
İyi oldu dediğin, çoğu kişi öyle mi düşünüyordu? 
Genelde herkes öyle düşünüyordu. Sonuçta iyi bir şey değil yani. psikolojiye zarar 
verecek bir şey. (Gülüyor) Özellikle bunu birebir çok fazla seviyede yaşayan 
arkadaşlarım da vardı yani. Sınıf içerisinde çok yakın olmasa da… Onların hem 
derslerini de etkiliyordu bu olay, belki psikolojisini de etkiliyordu. Zaten genelde bunu 
yapanlar geçmiş senelerde kendine yapılan tipler olduğu için, o da kırılmış oldu yani. 
[…] Belki eskilere sorsan, niye böyle bir şey yaptınız diyorlardı. O zaman öyle bir 
muhabbet vardı. “Okul top oldu” muhabbeti vardı mesela. “Eskiden daha delikanlıydı 
bu işler, şimdi her şeye subaylar karışıyor, rapor ediliyor” falan filan muhabbeti 
oluyordu herhalde o zamanlar.  
186Eren: Liseden harp okuluna geçilince herkes bir anda olgunlaşır ve o tarz şeyler 
çocukça görülür. Harp okulunda kimsenin şey olmamasına rağmen hiç öyle şeyler 
yaptırılmazdı.  
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impose their own punishments.  Further, there is another advantage one can take from 
this tradition: those who are punished the most by senior highs are choosen to hold 
prestigious representative positions by their classmates in the following years of high 
school. Hence, this tradition can be defined as a bargain of discipline and punishment 
between different cohorts: a traditional disciplinary bargain. This reenforces the 
complicity of the dominated in their own domination, just like tabur teşkilatı and the 
strict hierarchy itself.  
3.6. Broken selves, composed selves 
3.6.1. The child self and violence in professional military education 
While listening to these stories of violence and domination, I often forgot that 
my research participants, who are adult men at the time of my interviews, were children 
whilst they were experiencing professional military training. They experienced physical 
and other types of violence both as victims and perpetrators. In regards to this subject, I 
ask a question similar to the one Haydar Darıcı asks about politicized Kurdish children 
in urban Turkey (Darıcı 2011, 8): Is it possible to talk about “childhood” when the lives, 
words, and memories of children under siege of an austere discipline, perpetual penalty 
and political violence? Because some cadets become perpetrators, first when they 
become senior, then when they are military officers, can we overlook the violence they 
face as children during high school? I think we must not. As in the case of Kurdish 
children, bodies, time and spaces are given meaning by violence within military 
schools, and violence is a constitutive part of the order and a (bodily) disposition of 
cadets.  
As the cadet suffers from the constant fear of violence, violence itself creates a 
source of constructing the self. This source requires the knowledge and embodiment of 
the meticulous details of all these punishments and rules surrounding them. To acquire 
this knowledge, one should stop “being a child” when he becomes a cadet, and one 
should stop “being a women”, i.e let go of all “feminine” characteristics, which signify 
a sign of weakness (Segal 1995). How Efe narrated the tabur during which a female 
cadet cried when the commander scolded and humiliated her by saying that “What the 
hell are you doing skulking around with this looks?!” [“Bu ne hal böyle at hırsızı 
gibi?!”], reflects the importance in differentiating male military men from women and 
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children. Being a man means not acting “like a woman”, “like a child” or “like a 
homosexual” (Nagel 2000): 
Efe: She hadn’t done make up, hadn’t done anything, hadn’t tied back her 
hair or so. I mean, she was a shabby girl, didn’t care for her looks. Tall like 
this… […] But she cried, still a kid, do you understand?187 
 
That is also why those who enter the naval academy without the experience of military 
high school are labeled as kabaks.Kabaks are excluded from men’s friendships and 
fraternity/ class unity, albeit not as irreversibly as female cadets: 
Efe: In normal pumpkins, also, I usually don’t get involved in the ones who 
didn’t go to high school. Not only girls. If they are thirty in number, I talk to 
two of them. I see two of them as high school graduates, I mean, I take them 
to that class, my class. I, for example, call that two. […] the others, whole 
girls and boys are not high school graduates, for me. 
188
 
 
Eren: Culturally it is set. However higher classes suppress lower classes, 
there is a perception that female students cannot be accepted as one of us. 
What about pumpkins? 
The same… Nobody coming from civilian background was accepted in; 
girls were a step more away from that.
189
 
 
Even those who come one year later to military high schools are denied friendship and 
the comfort of inclusion for a while: 
Efe: What I mean is, that man says “I’ve suffered from this for a year during 
the first year of the high school”, that is his mentality. He says “this man 
came without going through the first year and now he is looking down upon 
us” do you know what I mean? You are at first class, you finished a year at 
high school, you brag about being a soldier, and this man comes directly. 
Why? Because his English is good. Then you teach him how to walk, you 
make fun of him bla bla, a million things.
190
 
                                                 
187Efe: Makyaj yapmamış, hiçbir şey yapmamış, toplamamış saçlarını falan filan. Yani 
çok paspal bir kızdı, kendine bakmazdı. Uzun boylu böyle. […] (Gülüyor) Ama ağlıyor, 
çocuk daha, tamam mı?  
188Efe: Ben normal kabaklarla da, liseyi okumamış olanlarla da çok muhattap olmam 
zaten. Sadece kızlarla değil. Aralarından otuz tane varsa, iki tanesiyle konuşurum. Şu an 
iki tanesini lise okumuş gibi görürüm, onu da o sınıfa alırım yani, kendi sınıfıma alırım. 
O ikisini mesela ararım. […] Diğerleri, bütün erkekler, bütün kızlar, lise 
okumamışlardır benim için.  
189Eren: E kültür olarak şey yerleşmiş. Nasıl üst sınıf alt sınıfı ezer kültürü varsa bayan 
öğrenciler de içimize alınmaz gibi bir algı var.  
Peki kabaklar? 
Onlar da aynı şekilde. Sivilden gelen hiç kimse içeri alınmıyordu, kızlar bir adım da 
daha dışarıda tutuluyordu yani. 
190Efe: Öyledir yani adam “ben lise birde bir sene bu acıyı çektim” diyor, o mantalitede. 
Bu adam bir sene okumadan geldi de bizi eksik görüyor diyor, tamam mı? Sen lise 
birsin, bir sene okumuşsun, askerlik yaptım diyorsun, gaza geliyorsun, adam direk 
120 
 
 
 Whilst those who left the schools at different ages stated or implied being 
victimized, especially those who are military officers used a language of callousness 
rather than a narrative of total victimization. However, there are different “choices”, if it 
is possible to call them “choices”, made by former cadets to survive military education. 
Some like Burak choose to report the violence of senior highs to the commanders from 
the beginning of high school and expect commanders to protect him as long as he obeys 
their rules. Many others like Rıdvan, Eren and Efe try very hard not to be punished at 
all, by seniors or by commanders. Some others dare to sacrifice what makes them the 
object of violence during military education: their bodies. Jesse argues “Sacrifice does 
not waste power in order to replace it. Instead, sacrifice conjures a subversive sovereign 
existence, a life beyond utility and reification” (Goldhammer 2005, 23; cited by Darıcı 
2011, 24). Yet, sacrifice does waste power in order to replace it in professional military 
education. Military schools are institutions raising children to become military officers 
who are ready to be exposed to violence and to use violence at the same time. As Selim 
quoted from their commanders, cadets shall live under war-like conditions so that they 
are able to react quickly, and adapt to combat when there actually is a war. Some cadets 
intentionally make themselves vulnerable to physical violence of seniors by breaking 
the rules, in order to become the perpetrator of physical violence in following years: 
Efe: For me it was ok generally. But there is this thing: There were the ones 
who were beaten at high school, for example. There is that kind of… Since 
it is not ok with my character, I didn’t get beaten. If it was so, I would also 
get beaten. The guy says “I will crush my inferiors in the future”, “I also 
have to show disobedience”. There were those kinds of guys, for example. 
The guy smoked for instance. 
Why? 
I mean, the guy says he will crush people, so he needs to suppress the 
inferiors now. 
Does that give him legitimacy? 
He says, for example, there are ones who say, nobody said to me, I didn’t do 
anything to anyone, as well; “you” he says “were very lame at second class 
of high school, why do you crush that people?” or so… There are odd things 
among themselves. Since I cannot say anything to anyone, I don’t call 
myself a soldier, after all.
191
 
                                                                                                                                               
geliyor. Niye? İngilizce’si iyi diye! Sonra ona yürümeyi öğretiyorsun, dalga geçiyorsun 
falan filan, milyon tane şey. (Gülüyor)  
191Efe: Benim iyiydi yani genel olarak. Ama şöyle bir şey var mesela: Lisede dayak 
yiyenler de vardı mesela. Şey tipler var… Benim karakterime hiç uymuyor da onun için 
ben dayak yemedim. Öyle olsa ben de dayak yerdim. Adam diyor ki yani “ben diyor 
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The violence experienced as children and adolescents in Turkish Naval High 
School and Turkish Naval Academy is integral to the institutional structure of the 
military. The institutionally recognized hierarchies and thr regulations of punishment 
include both psychological and physical violence –such as bodily and mental 
exhaustion, forced physical training, violation of many children’s rights or violation of 
the right to privacy. Yet, only senior cadets exert bare physical violence. The 
systematization and structurality of violence originate in the dynamism of military 
hierarchy within military schools. In other words, the means of oppression passes from 
hand to hand as everybody becomes senior sooner or later.  
For instance, to become a legitimate perpetrator of physical violence, the cadet 
sacrifices what is left from his (bodily) integrity, which is constantly being broken down 
by disciplinary power. Behaving insubordinately on purpose, in order to subordinate 
and violate other cadets in the future, is an extreme version of the traditional 
disciplinary bargain. The moment when all comprehension breaks down and the self 
falls apart is the moment when those who waste power in order to replace it compose a 
subjectivity/ a self: the subjectivity that military education toils to form, a subjectivity 
that is both productive and subjected. The requirement of being subjected to physical 
violence in order to become a legitimate perpetrator is also another face of the hierarchy 
of suffering –which makes up the class unity while excluding those who suffered less 
(i.e. female cadets and kabaks), as argued above. 
From the moment one becomes a part of violence in professional military 
education as a child, he or she starts contributing somehow to the blurry lines between 
the categories of perpetrator and the victim of physical violence –which makes it hard to 
break down the agents of violence into two narrow categories. Cadets contribute to this 
blurriness by avoiding (like Efe) calling themselves “soldier” but acting like one in both 
                                                                                                                                               
gelecekte çarpacağım astlarımı” diyor, “benim de asilik yapmam lazım” diyor. Mesela 
bu tipte adamlar vardı. Mesela adam sigara içiyor… 
Neden? 
Ya adam diyor ki ben çarpacağım millet diyor, onun için de şimdi asi gezmem lazım 
diyor.  
O ona meşruiyet mi sağlıyor? 
Diyor ki mesela şey diyenler vardı, bana kimse demedi, ben kimseye bir şey yapmadım 
da, “sen” diyor işte “lise ikide çok coftun, sen niye çarpıyorsun adamları?” falan filan 
diye… Kendi aralarında değişik şeyler var. Ben kimseye laf söylemeyen bir insan 
olduğum için, “asker” diyemiyorum ben kendime zaten.  
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cases, by sacrificing their (bodily) integrity to become a reputable perpetrator next year, 
or by their complicity in their own domination to oppress the younger cadets of the 
future years “legitimately”. This involvement in turn, helps laying the ground for 
violence integral to the institutional structure of the military, or for “enabling conditions 
of structures that are both ‘sinful’ and ostensibly ‘nobody’s fault’” (Farmer 2004, 307). 
My research participants expressed still experiencing the psychological consequences 
today. 
3.6.2. The “heroic” self  
The role of nationalist and heroic feelings in the making and transformation of 
military masculinities in the Turkish Naval High School and the Turkish Naval 
Academy started to change in 2009-2010 as well. The question of “what is the role of 
nationalist and heroic feelings in the making and transformation of military 
masculinities in military schools?” was a question I forgot during the first month of my 
fieldwork. After my third interview during which Rıdvan made a special emphasis on 
how nationalism and Kemalism were major subjects during high schools whereas not in 
naval academy, I started to pose “did nationalism and Kemalism play a role in your 
education in high school and/ or in academy?”  This flaw in my questions was a 
consequence of my prejudice that former cadets and military officers are discursively 
not as nationalist and Kemalist as most would consider them to be, again, because my 
friends who are cadets were not of this opinion. Raised to be “the sophisticated 
professionals” of an institution reestablished on nationalist and Kemalist values, and on 
the myth of the military-nation (Altınay 2004), I thought former cadets as an entity are 
less “enthusiastic” about nationalism and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. However, the truth of 
the matter is different and it connects to the military’s falling from grace, and the 
succeeding transformations in professional military education.  
I argue that the narratives of former cadets about nationalism, Kemalism as 
abstract ideologies, and their physical experience of military education do not genuinely 
overlap. All of them stated experiencing military education as a gendered, 
claustrophobic, disciplinary and exhaustive physical place in which they were closed for 
years. Yet when asked about what they think of being a military officer as a profession, 
or about nationalist and Kemalist content of military education, they pointed out to an 
abstract, nonexistent space where patriotic values and future protectors of the nation are 
raised. According to Rachel Woodward, “The construction, operation and reproduction 
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of military masculinities are processes operating across space (in the abstract) and in 
place (as physical location)” (Woodward 2003, 45-46). As such, while the military 
masculinities of my research participants were constructed in the physical locations of 
Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy, their perceptions on 
professional military education were affected not only by this physical experience but 
also by abstract values of nationalism and Kemalism. 
As my interviewees stated, they were almost always unhappy, exhausted and 
sick of unquestionable, meticulous details of disciplinary power. Yet, according to 
many such as Kaan and Oğuz, their discontent is subjective/ personal since this is more 
or less how the military order should be: 
Kaan: Yes, I was very unhappy, but there is a system there and this system 
has gone on for years; it raised our elders, it raised me and it still continues 
raising… Of course in this conjuncture the things are handled very 
differently but still the same system. And this system is necessary for the 
maintenance of the army, with army I mean Turkish Armed Forces. It is 
different for our army, do you understand? We cannot be the Swedish 
Army, a European army. They already are people living in a cocktail 
environment.
192
  
 
Onur: I left because I realized that I didn’t want to live under that 
oppression, all the time. I raised the courage for that during military 
academy but only later I could do that.  And normally, there were lots of 
people who thought about leaving. They hesitate because there is the 
concern “will I be successful at civilian life?” […] 
I understand. Then, what do you think about military officership? I am 
a little confused now… 
About military officership… Why are you confused? 
Well you said “I didn’t want to live under that oppression, all the time” 
and you said “it is a sacred mission in fact”… 
With oppression, I mean, your life is always limited with some duties. If 
you are working at coast guard, for example, you can never leave the 
garrison. Well, there are rules. Then, I won’t say “under oppression”; the 
rules and regulations are very strict and they have to be implemented.  
Do you think they are necessary? 
I think they are necessary. If an officer became an officer, if he chose that 
profession himself, if he didn’t quit – because this option is put in front of 
you after all, you can choose it… 
But there is also the money issue… 
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Kaan: Ben evet çok mutsuz oldum, ama orada bir sistem var ve o sistem çok uzun 
yıllardır devam eden, bizim büyüklerimizi de yetiştiren, beni de yetiştiren, şu an da hala 
yetiştirmekte olan… Tabii ülkenin şu döneminde çok daha farklı gelişiyor olaylar ama 
aynı sistem. Ve bu sistem bu ordunun devamlılığı için gerekli, bu ordu dediğim Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetleri için. Bizim ülkemiz için farklı anladın mı, biz bir İsviçre ordusu 
olamayız, bir Avrupa ordusu olamayız. Onlar zaten kokteyl havasında yaşayan insanlar. 
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There is money issue but it is, well, an amount you consume. In the end, the 
government puts an investment on you and does this for you to reach 
somewhere. I mean, let’s say, it can put investment on a X person passing 
by at the street without expecting some results and then it won’t want any 
return. But it invests on you expecting you to serve as a military officer but 
you decide not to be a military officer. At first it was so unfair with 120.000 
TL; after all, you can go to a private school or a foreign collage with that 
money. When you look that way it was a ruthless amount but now it is 
decreased. […] I mean, don’t get it wrong, by “oppression” I mean since its 
duties and responsibilities are tied with strict rules, well, I thought I would 
be unhappy but I have friends who graduated, doing their job and are happy 
about it. Well, “are you proud of this job”; I am both proud with my friends 
and think that it is a very honorable and good job.
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Then what do you think about military officership as a profession? 
Hakan: God help them (laughing). […] When I think like if I did it, well, I 
can’t. But I respect the ones who do it because it is a sacred job. In fact, I 
don’t want to put such value on it. It is a result of… Well, country, nation, 
                                                 
193Onur: Ben her an o boyunduruk altında yaşamak istemediğim için ayrıldım. Bunun 
da cesaretini harp okulunda kazandım ama sonradan buna cesaret edebildim. Ayrılmayı 
düşünen çok fazla da insan vardı normalde. İnsanlar ayrılmaktan çekiniyor, çünkü “sivil 
hayatta başarılı olacak mıyım” kaygısı var. […] 
Anladım, peki subaylık hakkında ne düşünüyorsun? Benim biraz kafam karıştı 
da... 
Subaylık hakkında... Neden kafan karıştı? 
Hani şey dedin “ben sürekli boyunduruk altında yaşamak istemiyorum” dedin, 
“aslında kutsal bir görev” dedin... 
Boyunduruk altında derken, senin hayatın sonuçta belli görevlerle sınırlandırılmış 
durumda. Sonuçta sahil güvenlikte çalışıyorsan mesela garnizonu terk edemiyorsun 
mesela. Hani böyle kurallar var yani. Hani “boyunduruk altında” demeyeyim; kural ve 
kaideler çok sıkı ve bunların uygulanması gerekiyor.  
Gerekli olduğunu mu düşünüyorsun? 
Gerekli oduğunu düşünüyorum. Subay bir insan subay olduysa ve bu görevi kendi de 
seçtiyse, ayrılmadıysa –çünkü bu seçeneği önüne sunuyorlar, böyle bir opsiyonun var 
sonuçta... 
Para mevzusu da var ama... 
Para mevzusu var ama, para mevzusu senin atıyorum, tükettiğin bir meblağ. Sonuçta 
devlet sana böyle bir yatırım yapıyor ve senin belli bir şeye ulaşman için yapıyor bu 
yatırımı. Yani atıyorum, sonuçta sokaktan geçen X kişisine de bu yatırımı yapar belli 
bir sonuç beklemeden yapacaksa, sonuçta bir geri dönüşüm beklemez. Ama sana bir 
yatırım yapıyor ve ona subay olarak hizmet etmeni bekliyor ve sen subaylık etmeme 
kararını alıyorsun. İlk başta çok haksızdı 120 milyar; o parayla özel bir okulda ya da 
yurt dışında o parayla okuyabilirsin yani. Öyle baktığında çok acımasız bir ücret, ama 
şimdi o düşürüldü. […] Hani yanlış anlaşılmasın “boyunduruk”, hani görev ve 
hizmetleri çok katı kurallara bağlı olduğu için hani ben mutsuz olacağımı düşündüm 
ama şimdi mezun olup, bu işi yapan ve mutlu olan arkadaşlarım da var. Ama “bu işten 
gurur duyuyor musun”; ben hem arkadaşlaımla gurur duyuyorum, hem bu mesleğin de 
çok onur verici güzel bir meslek olduğunu düşünüyorum. Tabii yapısına uyan, seven, 
severek yapan için tabii ki güzel bir meslek yani.  
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emboldening… In reality it is not such an important thing. In no country of 
world soldiers are this respected, in our country, too… Again, how can I 
say…  
[…] Well, it is a sacred job indeed. Because I respect them for being 
devoted. But I think, it doesn’t need to be so…Generally there is that 
perception in our nation, like, military is a, well, sacred profession or so; in 
fact it shouldn’t be like this, I think, it shouldn’t be such a sacred job. 
Why? 
Why, because war is not something good, after all. Even if you defend your 
country, weapons or so, fire, these things…194 
 
 
Most of my research participants, from the first group, have a double perception 
like Kaan, Onur and Hakan. However, younger cadets clearly have a more overlapping 
view of nationalism and military education. This situation, I think, stems from the 
factors they explained as the reasons of their secession from the academy. Rıdvan stated 
that: 
Rıdvan: And there is one more thing. Let’s put aside that big quotation. 
There was constantly an Ataturk in high school, always Ataturk being 
mentioned, Ataturk… 
How, for example? 
Well… (Hesitating) Our handbook needed to be Nutuk, since it is Ataturk’s, 
after all… In military academy education, we realized a little decrease in the 
mention of the name Ataturk. They just gave us a Nutuk summary as 
homework. But that thing happened; we put such an effort, summarized the 
book nicely, handled it but there was no return. 
Is there normally? 
Normally it has to be. Like “we didn’t like it, improve that part” etc. 
Nothing like that happened. We, as a group of 10-15 people, expected our 
                                                 
194
 Peki meslek olarak subaylık hakkında ne düşünüyorsun? 
Hakan: Allah yardımcıları olsun. (Gülüyor) […] Kendim yapmış olsam diye 
düşünüyorum, yapamam yani. Ama yapanlara da saygı duyuyorum çünkü kutsal bir 
meslek. Aslında o kadar değer yüklemek de istemiyorum. Şeyin olayı, işte… Bu vatan 
millet, gaza getirme… Aslında o kadar önemli bir şey değil yani. Dünyanın hiçbir 
ülkesinde askerler bu kadar saygı görmüyordur, bizim ülkemizde de… Yine de nasıl 
diyeyim…  
[…] Ya kutsal bir meslek aslında. Çünkü saygı duyuyorum bağlı oldukları için. Bu 
kadar da şey olmaması lazım bence. Genel olarak milletin bizde şey algısı var ya 
askerlik böyle, işte kutsal bir meslek olayı vary a. aslında olmaması lazım bence, bu 
kadar kutsal bir meslek olmamalı askerlik. 
Neden?  
Neden çünkü sonuçta savaş güzel bir şey değil yani. ülkeni korumak için de olsa insan, 
silah falan, ateş, böyle şeyler…  
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homework not to be accepted. Because they weren’t usually, they were tore 
apart and done again. We were waiting for disapproval.
195
 
 
Rıdvan, Ali, Mert and Furkan, my youngest interviewees, are the only ones who 
strongly emphasize how nationalist and Kemalist they are, just like they are the only 
ones who emphasized their passion for the military, and that they did not enroll in 
military high school for a life-long guaranteed salary.  
I suggest that both the double perception of elder cadets and the more 
nationalized perceptions of younger ones who were discriminated by their commanders 
confirm Ayşe Gül Altınay’s argument that the linkages between the military and the 
nation are not automatic or natural but are productions of culturalized, masculinized and 
militarized political processes (Enloe 2000a; cited in Altınay 2004, 6). I argue therefore, 
the ongoing transformations in military schools in simultaneity with the military’s 
falling from grace masculinize and militarize professional military education and 
political subjectivities/ selves of (former) cadets even more than they were already.  
3.7. New distinctions 
As our interview with Rıdvan made me realize the importance of asking about 
the significance of nationalism and Kemalism in military education, I also noticed the 
reference of younger cadets to new distinctions among their classmates and among all 
cadets, unlike my elder research participants. These distinctions cluster around three 
issues: Kemalism, economic and ethnic backgrounds. Since I attempted to elaborate on 
the distinctions created with Kemalism and nationalism in the previous section, I will 
continue with the latter subjects.  
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 Rıdvan: Bir de şöyle bir şey vardı. O büyük ayrıntıyı da geçtim. Lisede sürekli bir 
Atatürk vardı, sürekli bir Atatürk geçiyor, Atatürk… 
Nasıl mesela? 
İşte… (Duraksıyor) Başucu kitabımızın Nutuk olması gerektiği, Atatürk’ün sonuçta… 
Harp Okulu eğitiminde birazcık Atatürk adının kaybolmaya başladığını fark ettik. 
Sadece bir Nutuk özeti ödevi verdiler. Ama şöyle bir şey oldu, o kadar uğraştık ettik, 
Nutuk kitabını özetledik gayet güzel bir şekilde, verdik ama sadece verdik. Herhangi bir 
geri dönüş olmadı. 
Normalde olur muydu? 
Normalde olması gerekirdi. Beğenmedik, şunu biraz daha geliştir falan gibi. Hiç öyle 
bir şey olmadı. Biz bu 10-15 kişilik grup olarak bizimkinin beğenilmemesini 
bekliyorduk. Çünkü yaptığımız ödevler genelde beğenilmiyor, yırtılıp tekrar yaptırılıyor 
falan. Beğenilmemesini bekliyorduk.  
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Nobody except Rıdvan, Ali and Mert mentioned being Kemalist, the economic 
background of their family, ethnic background of some other cadets, their passion for 
being a military officer, or being positively different from their classmates in any 
respect without my related questions. For instance, the eldest-first group of my 
interviewees emphasized how coincidentally they enrolled in Turkish Naval High 
School or Turkish Naval Academy. This does not mean none of them were passionate 
about being a military officer. Yet, they did not highlight their passion towards the 
military as a career field unlike Rıdvan, Ali and Mert. 
On the one hand, elder cadets constantly referred to the unity of classmates, the 
love they feel for each other and the continuing solidarity between classmates after the 
school. On the other hand, Eren, Arda, and Hakan from the second group differentiated 
those who were confronted with severe accusations and interrogations including 
themselves. However, Rıdvan, Ali and Mert made other distinctions among cadets. Two 
of them are the passion one holds for a career in the military, and one’s economic 
background. These are perceived a intrinsically interlinked: 
Rıdvan: Only people who like it can do it. I was having pleasure, to be 
honest. […] to develop our commandership skills, they gave 
commandership duties at small boats. I was having pleasure doing that, 
frankly. Money was not a big deal for me, as I said the condition of my 
family is good. My father earns more than most military officers; it is God’s 
honest truth.
196
 
 
Another one is ethnic background: 
Rıdvan: Of course everybody is like brothers as I said. Nobody has 
problems. Even if there is, student union detects it and tries to reconcile 
them. Or, there were two friends who fought, our commanders put them in 
the same double room, saying “you two will stay here now, talk to each 
other and compromise.” But there was this thing, look, in military academy, 
there was a large group speaking in Kurdish among themselves. 10 people 
or so would close themselves in a room and speak loudly in Kurdish. 
Interesting. They called us things like Turkey soldiers. […] It is like joking 
but there can’t be such a joke, how?... Even as a joke it is horrible, they call 
us Turkey soldiers. When I hear this, the first thing coming into my mind is 
PKK, to be honest.
197
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 Rıdvan: Sadece seven insan yapabiliyor. Ben haz alıyordum açıkçası. […] bizim de 
komutanlık şeyimizi geliştirmeye yönelik, küçük gemilerde komutanlık görevi 
veriyorlardı. Ben bunları yaparken haz alıyordum açıkçası. Para benim için bir şey 
değildi yani. dediğim gibi ailevi durumum da iyi benim. Benim babam çoğu subaydan 
çok daha fazla para kazanıyor açıkçası, doğruya doğru yani.  
197
 Rıdvan: Tabii, herkes birbiriyle kardeş gibi dedim ya. Kimsenin arasında bozukluk 
yok. Olsa da öğrenci birliği tespit edip onları kaynaştırmaya çalışıyor. Ya da kavga eden 
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 It is neither the purpose nor the place of this research to make claims about the 
truthfulness of these narratives. However, I assert that these new distinctions helped 
cadets who had to leave the school because they were treated in a negatively different 
way to distinguish themselves positively from the rest. They distinguish themselves by 
the distinctions they make, in which their position in the “objective” classifications “is 
expressed or betrayed”, as Bourdieu frames it. (Bourdieu 1984, 6) The economic well 
being of the families of Rıdvan, Ali and Mert, their Turkishness, and strongly 
emphasized, non-need based Kemalism and passion for a good career in the military 
appear as powerful lines of new distinctions. Not only because these “qualities” 
distinguish them from other cadets and make a statement about what the military is 
loosing but because they consider some of these qualities as reasons of their 
discrimination and forced detachment from the academy. 
While new distinctions are sources of anxiety for the “qualified” and 
discriminated if one is still inside, they are reasons to find comfort if one is already 
pushed out of the school. These distinctions operate in order to individualize and 
subjetivize cadets, and centralize the authority along with other changes in disciplinary 
power, but they also respond to “the necessity of creating sense through the subjective 
reorganization of the conduct of self and of others” (Hildebrand-Nilshon, Motzkau, and 
Papadopoulos 2001, 289) as they appeared in the narratives of Rıdvan, Ali and Mert. 
3.8. Melting unities, centralization of authority and remaking military 
masculinities 
 Suffering from perpetual fear of violence and physical violence itself is integral 
to the institutional structure of professional military education –in this case, of Turkish 
Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy. The hierarchies of suffering created 
                                                                                                                                               
iki arkadaş olmuştu, komutanlarımız onları aynı iki kişilik odaya koymuşlardı: “Siz 
artık burada kalacaksınız, birbirinize şey yapın, anlaşın konuşun” falan diye. Ama şey 
vardı bak, Harp Okulu’nda aralarında Kürtçe konuşan büyük bir kesim vardı açıkçası. 
10 kişi falan biro dada kapanıp Kürtçe bağıra bağıra konuşuyorlardı. İlginç. Şey 
diyorlardı bize T.C. askeri falan diyorlardı yani. […] Dalga geçer gibi ama böyle dalga 
geçemezsin ki, nasıl..? Şakası bile bunun korkunç. T.C. askeri diyor bize. Benim bunu 
duyduğumda ilk aklıma gelen şey PKK açıkçası. 
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by cadets determine who is more original
198
, or say, who is more militarized. However, 
not even the originals among my interviewees construct similar masculinities. The 
diversity of military masculinities finds expression in the narratives of my research 
participants as an effect of the cadets’ will to contribute to the making of their military 
masculinities. 
My research participants pointed out to major changes in the disciplinary 
techniques and organization of professional military education starting from the 2009-
2010 academic year. This commencement date overlaps with Ergenekon and Balyoz 
trials, and with the overall falling of grace of the military. As stated before, it is beyond 
the limits and intentions of this research to draw a normative picture of all the micro 
level impacts of macro level processes and actors, such as the trials against high ranked 
military officers or Hizmet Movement, on professional military education. Yet, my 
research participants narrated some crucial repercussions of the ongoing process of 
transformation in military schools, and they indicated paradigmatic shifts in the making 
of military masculinities. 
The deformation of traditional disciplinary bargain between elder and younger 
cadets, and class unity/ fraternity together with the intensifying discipline shape this 
transformation process on the side of cadets. Those who suffered from the 
consequences of anonymous letters, administrative interrogations, military court cases, 
and discrimination and mobbing consider these changes in the relationalities within the 
schools as “side” effects of Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. This comprehensive 
deformation and recomposition is realized through increasing centralization of authority 
and discipline within the schools by eliminating comfort, solidarity and power zones of 
cadets. Thus, the making of military masculinities gradually become a more and more 
hierarchically and centrally organized process. As this process was already shaped by 
violence that is the logic of professional military education with its earlier version, 
along with the increasing centralization and discipline, violence intensifies since 2009 
with the increasing complicity of cadets in their own domination.  
New distinctions that emerge since the beginning of this transformation process 
produce new and structurally grounded forms of compliance for cadets in their own 
domination: ideological, ethnic and class distinctions create new forms of violence and 
                                                 
198
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the term original refers to the cadets who 
went both to Turkish Naval High School and to Turkish Naval Academy –without 
skipping a year. 
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domination in professional military education, and thus, disciplinary order within the 
school by individualizing, subjectifying and deforming “the selves” of cadets. 
Subjectification and individualization create a necessity of making sense “through the 
subjective reorganization of the conduct of self and of others.” (Hildebrand-Nilshon, 
Motzkau, and Papadopoulos 2001, 289) While unities, solidarities and former 
encompartments of selves melt, the authority of commanders empowers and reform new 
military masculinities much more easily by responding to this necessity of making 
sense.  
Therefore, I argue that these new distinctions either created by commanders or 
cadets, or both, serve to increase discipline and centralization of authority within the 
school as well. As a feeling of insecurity is created among cadets, new distinctions 
deform some crucial features of military masculinities, and contribute to the 
composition of new ones. These distinctions appear to be major outcomes of the macro 
shifts in civil military relations such as Ergenekon and Balyoz trials on how cadets 
experience the simultaneous transformations in professional military education. 
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CHAPTER 4:  AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEOLIBERALISM AND 
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
 
 
 One of my strongest tentative guesses while designing this research was that 
there is a strong impact of neoliberalism, especially after the JDP came to power, on the 
nationalist and militarist values attributed to military education and the professional 
military in Turkey. The first draft of this chapter was prejudiced by my empathy with 
the unsettling experiences of my friends, and thus was based mainly on the unfavorable 
repercussions of neoliberalism on my interviewees’ perceptions of military education 
and a military career. The reviews of my advisor and my friends, fortunately, led me to 
reconsider the impact of my personal relations particularly on this chapter. Hence, the 
challenge here is to balance the significance of some of the negative narratives of my 
research participants with the positive perceptions of others all while discussing a very 
important intersection: how have the perceptions of former cadets on military education 
and military careers been informed by rising neoliberalism in Turkey? What do these 
changing perceptions tell us about the future of the military professionals, and thus, of 
the military as an institution? 
In this chapter, after a brief summary of the emergence and consolidation of 
neoliberalism in Turkey, and of TAF’s position in this process, I interpret the narratives 
of my interviewees from the first and second groups, around the issues of military 
education, military professionalism, and neoliberalism in Turkey. Afterwards, in the 
section titled “Younger cohorts and new distinctions”, I proceed to the perceptions of 
younger cohorts in order to understand the differences and resemblances between the 
two groups whose experiences of military education show a great deal of dissimilitude. 
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However, I do not draw a sharp line between the narratives of elder and younger 
cohorts, as there is heterogeneity even among the narratives of former cadets of the 
same cohort. This heterogeneity in the perceptions on the intersection of neoliberalism, 
socio-economic context and military education is kept in the background throughout the 
chapter, attempting to challenge both the assumptions of homogeneity regarding 
military professionalism and my own initial prejudices. 
This chapter also draws attention to some other ways in which the narratives of 
my research participants from different cohorts combine to a great extent, either with 
predominantly negative or positive insights. Their diverse but interconnecting 
perceptions suggest a pattern leading to new subjectivities among military professionals 
as I argued in the previous chapter. An additional finding that I discuss in this chapter is 
the overwhelming expectation that the prospective cadets of TAF will increasingly 
come from low-income families with lower social and cultural capital
199
. Whilst new 
distinctions among cadets at the intersection of nationalism, militarism, Ergenekon and 
Balyoz operations, and neoliberalism remake military masculinities, former cadets 
expect increased access to the military profession by economically, ethnically 
disadvantaged groups, which they do not necessarily perceive as a positive 
development. Some former cadets, referred to the “threat” of “even Kurds” becoming 
military professionals. Needless to say, one cannot generalize from these narratives by 
mainly Turkish interviewees coming from middle class families. However, given the 
historical background of recruitment by TAF, my research findings might be interpreted 
as clues for a changing profile. . 
In the end, I discuss one of my strongest assumptions at the beginning of the 
fieldwork. The rise of neoliberalism under the rule of the JDP contributes to the 
discrepancy between the future expectations of a cadet during his education and the life 
style he attains after graduation. However, most of my research participants expressed 
the primary significance of the military’s loss of political and social prestige in creating 
this discrepancy. In shaping the changing perceptions of former cadets on military 
professionalism and professional military education, economic concerns are situated 
secondary for most of my interviewees.  
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For the terms “social capital” and “cultural capital” see Bourdieu 1986.  
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4.1. Neoliberalism in Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces 
 The process of neoliberalization was initiated by a military coup in Turkey in 
1980, as in several Latin American countries. This makes David Harveys 
comprehensive definition of the neoliberal state of the US only partly valid for Turkey: 
The assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the 
market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking, and it has 
long dominated the US stance towards the rest of the world. What the US is 
evidently sought to impose by main force on Iraq was a state apparatus 
whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profitable capital 
accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital. I call this 
kind of state apparatus a neoliberal state [his emphasis]. The freedoms it 
embodies reflect the interests of private property owners, businesses, 
multinational corporations, and financial capital. (Harvey 2005, 7) 
 
 The political, social and economic transformations following the 1980 military 
coup were imbued with a mixture of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and increasing 
freedom of the market economy. Yet individual freedoms were not in the equation since 
the 1982 Constitution is aimed at protecting the state “from the actions of its citizens 
rather than to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizen from the States 
encroachment” (Özbudun 2007, 179). A mention of this somehow extant constitution 
and constitutionally unprotected individual freedoms is essential while starting a brief 
summary of the emergence of neoliberal measures in Turkey and their impacts on civil-
military relations. 
The term “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” was originally formulated by the right-
wing nationalist Intellectual Hearts [Aydınlar Ocağı] in the 1970s (Zürcher 2000, 419). 
After the coup, this synthesis rose to become the hegemonic state ideology. Although 
the Kemalist military had long posed as secularisms last line of defense in Turkey, it 
incited, if not initiated, the rise of political Islam with the military-supported policies to 
“Islamify” the state (Eligür 2010). As Banu Eligür states the plan was to create  “an 
Islamic sense of national community and preventing a recurrence of ideological clashes 
and the political violence of the 1970s” (Eligür 2010, 95), mainly to circumvent 
socialist movement. 
Many analyses claim that the help of TAF to the rise of political Islam, and 
eventually to the rise of the JDP and its Islamist forerunners, was inadvertent. Yet, the 
creation of an Islamic sense of national community required more than just General 
Kenan Evren recounting Quranic verses during public speeches. After the coup, the 
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budget for the Religious Affairs Directorate was increased immensely. This led to the 
rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran courses. Mandatory religion 
classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam) were introduced. Religious bureaucrats 
were tolerated more than ever. The educational and professional opportunities for 
graduates of imam hatip [prayer leader and preacher] high schools were widened. “In 
this way, the military tactically opened up a social and political space for Islamist 
mobilization in Turkey.” (Eligür 2010, 24). Therefore, the aftermath of the 1980 
military coup was one of the moments in which the military has played paradoxical 
historical roles (Armstrong 2014). 
In this process, imprisonment and torture were widespread, targeting both the 
members of leftist/ socialist groups, and ultrapatriotic, right wing extremists: 
[…] 650,000 people were arrested; 1,683,000 prosecutions were prepared; 
517 people were sentenced to death (49 of these sentences were carried out); 
30,000 were fired from their jobs for holding political views incompatible 
with the state; 14,000 had their citizenship revoked; 667 associations and 
foundations were banned; torture was widespread (Armstrong 2014).  
 
The members of the ülkücü
200
 movement/ right wing extremists were imprisoned as 
well, although they were very close to the newly forming hegemonic state ideology. 
However, as Alparslan Türkeş, the founder and former president of the Nationalist 
Movement Party [Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi] once stated, they were in prison while their 
ideology was in power: “Biz içerideyiz ama fikrimiz iktidarda.”201 According to Tanıl 
Bora and Kemal Can, the military junta reinterpreted Kemalism with an an authoritarian 
and fascistic lens by utilizing its large wardrobe of “mottos”, “principles” and 
“excerpts” from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It was important to fill the gaps in Kemalisms 
eclectical structure since its “coldness” as an ideology almost completely identified with 
the state authority was not sufficient for the production of an ideological consensus on a 
totalistic sense of national community (Bora and Can 2004, 147-148). 
This Islamic sense of national community was in progress not only to prevent a 
recurrence of the political violence in 1970s but also to pave the way for free market 
economy, which was supposed to build up without the threat of political violence, 
strong unions, and socialist movement. Due to increasing political violence, two 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)–based economic stabilization programs failed to 
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Ülkücü is the adjective with which the members of NMP identify themselves. It can 
be literally translated as idealist. 
201“We are inside but our political view is in power.” 
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implement “several IMF resolutions to devalue the national currency and institute tight 
monetary policies” (Eligür 2010, 112) before the coup. A new IMF austerity package, 
also known as The January 24 Measures, was prepared by Turgut Özal, the 
undersecretary of the Prime Ministry at the time, with the order of PM Süleyman 
Demirel in 1979. The government was not able to adopt the program due to political 
violence and economic instability in the country. To rectify the economic situation, the 
January 24 Measures was declared to the public only in January 24
th
, 1980, right after 
the coup. Özgür Müftüoğlu, from the Labor Economics and Indusrial Relations 
Department of Marmara University, harshly criticizes the program: 
Looking at the period after the decisions, Turkeys black market activity rose 
sharply and public expenditures fell rapidly, for the sake of encouraging the 
private sector. We could also see that the January 24 decisions meant the 
end of social state, or welfare state, policies of subsequent Turkish 
governments.
202
 
 
 TAFs constitutive role in this neoliberal shift is quite noticeable but how the institution 
itself started to transform is not. However, I shall first briefly reflect back upon the 
period between the establishment of the Republic and the 1980 military coup.  
 In a 1970-dated publication of TAF, the joining of the military and the Peoples 
Republican Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP] in their identification with the state 
during the one-party regime is purpoted as follows:  
Republic of Turkey has continued to implement the program of 
modernization under the auspices of the Republican People's Party in the 
areas civil law, culture, economy and education. Many of the national 
leaders relied on military history.
203
 (Türkiyede Ordu 1970, 20-21) 
 
The proudly expressed collaboration between the state-PRP and the military in law 
making, culture, economy and education was aiming at modernization of the newly 
established Republic (Şen 2010, 45-49). The fundamentals of this modernization were 
all defined under the Six Arrows: Republicanism, populism, secularism, reformism, 
nationalism, and statism. Also known as the tenets of Kemalism, Six Arrows were 
                                                 
202“Economists discuss milestone of Turkey’s market economy. ”, Hürriyet Daily News, 
January 25, 2011, accessed May 5, 2014. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=economist-discuss-
mile-stone-of-turkeys-market-economy-2011-01-25. 
203
 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin sivil himayesi altında hukuk, 
kültür, ekonomi ve eğitim alanlarında çağdaşlaşma programını uygulamaya devam 
etmiştir. Milli liderlerden birçoğu askeri bir geçmişe dayanıyordu. (Türkiyede Ordu 
1970, 20-21) 
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identified later with the state-PRP as the one-party rule lasted for 27 years
204
. In Askerin 
Bilgi Kitabı [Soldiers Pocket Book], Necdet Uluboy describes this situation: 
People s Party’s unchanging principles found the basis of the Turkish 
revolution. Those principles of People's Party are described very well at the 
holidays with their flags carrying six arrows. These six arrows remind us of 
the following: 1
st
 we are republican, 2
nd
 we are nationalists, 3
rd
 we are 
populist, 4
th
 we are statist, 5
th
 we are secular, 6
th
 we are revolutionary. All 
Turks must know and understand these very well.
205
 (Uluboy 1945, 83) 
 
Reckoning my own experience of primary and elementary education, I remember the 
arrow of “statism” was told to connate the independence of the state economically as 
well as politically: for the rapid and independent development of the national economy, 
the state shall hold the responsibility of making large investments within the country. 
This economic initiative of the state, of course, would be supported by its initiatives and 
social engineering in cultural, social, political and military fields (Dinç 2004, 2). 
Therefore, until the Democrat Party, the state-PRP in collaboration with the military 
was the ruler of the economy as of the other fields.  
 The ten-year period of the DP in power was very important in terms of the 
relations between the economic condition of the country and the military, both 
domestically and internationally transformed. Ömer Laçiner draws attention to the 
catalytic function of the involvement of TAF in the Korean War, in shaping the 1950s 
national and international proceedings for economic “development”: 
When empowered middle class – DP – put itself forward through the way of 
economic recovery and growth with American aid and capital investments; 
the army started to pursue the modern equipment the “national economy” 
could not provide with American surplus of used weapons and equipment. 
That “developmentalist” truce which lasted until the end of the year 1950 
was catalyzed by Korean War. The condition of US-led "western alliance" 
to accept Turkey in was that. Both sides – DP government and the army – 
ran eagerly for this prerequisite for their own “development”. The blood of 
thousands of soldiers who died in the Korean territory, provided the DP 
                                                 
204
Although the first general elections were held in 1946 and the result was a victory for 
the PRP, the elections was considered to be shady since the openly given votes was 
counted behind closed doors. Only in 1950, after 27 years of one-party regime, the 
Democrat Party formed a government as a result of the 1950 general elections, which 
was the first time the method of secret ballot-open counting was in practice. 
205
 Türk inkılabının temelini; Halk Partisinin değişmez prensipleri kurar. Halk Partisinin 
bu esasları bayramlarda üzerinde altı ok bulunan bayraklar çok iyi anlatır. Bu altı ok 
bize şunları hatırlatır: 1. Cumhuriyetçiyiz, 2-Milliyetçiyiz, 3-Halkçıyız, 4-Devletçiyiz, 
5-Laikiz, 6-İnkılapçıyız. Bunları her Türk bilmeli ve çok iyi anlamalıdır. (Uluboy 1945, 
83) 
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government with the political rant of millions of dollars of US aid, and thus 
a 4-5 year period of economic prosperity and success.  
And the Turkish Army which suffered heavy casualties in Korea and so 
rescued American troops from giving heavy casualties, as a result obtained 
the payee of being the most loyal allies with the United States and won its 
generous military aid as well as secure U.S. support for the coups and 
interventions it will realize after "within the chain of command " in 27
th
 
March, 12
th
 March and 12
th
 September.
206
 (Laçiner 2009, 31) 
 
On the other hand, Serhat Güvenç writes this history by attempting to 
understand how the US military aid to Turkey challenged, if not transformed, the 
military’s internal affairs and understandings between 1942 and 1960. He put that, 
drawing from the history of the Ottoman army, TAF embraced the Prussian-German 
military system
207
 for a long while
208
. The Law of Loan and Rent [Ödünç Verme-
Kiralam Kanunu] was amended during the World War II, and it rendered the first US 
aid in 1942 possible. Since the content and quantity of this aid was determined by 
Britain as the mediator between the US and Turkey, and Turkish military officers were 
resistant towards the US military system, the British military effected TAF between 
1939-1945, for a short while. (Güvenç 2010, 259-260) Only the Truman Doctrine 
announced in 1947 paved the way for the possible challenges of the US military 
understanding towards TAFs internal organization. Though started with humble amonts 
of financial aid in quantity, and continued with the second hand ammunition shipped 
                                                 
206İktidara geçen orta sınıf -DP- iktidarı Amerikan yardımı ve sermaye yatırımları ile 
ekonomik canlanma ve büyüme yoluna koyulurken, ordu da Amerikan ihtiyaç fazlaları 
ve ikinci el sil h ve teçhizat ile, "millî ekonomi"nin ona sağlayamadığı modern 
donanımın peşine düşmüştür. 
1950lerin son yıllarına kadar süren bu "kalkınma"cı mütarekenin katalizörlüğünü yapan 
"Kore Savaşı"dır. ABD önderliğindeki "Batı ittifakı"nın Türkiyeyi kabul koşulu idi bu. 
Her iki taraf -DP hükümeti ve ordu- da kendi "kalkınma"larının bu ön şartı için hevesle 
koşturdular. Kore toprağında ölen binlerce askerin kanı, DP hükümetine milyonlarca 
dolarlık ABD yardımı ve bu sayede 4-5 yıl süren bir ekonomik bolluk ve başarı dönemi 
yaşatmanın siyasal rantını sağladı. Korede verdiği ağır zayiatla Amerikan birliklerini 
çok ağır bir zayiat vermekten kurtaran Türk ordusu da böylece ABDye en sadık mütte-
fik payesini edinip, hem onun cömert askerî yardımını hem de bundan böyle "emir 
komuta zinciri dahilinde" yapacağı -27 Mayıs, 12 Mart ve 12 Eylül gibi- darbe ve 
müdahalelerde ABD desteğini güvenceye almış oldu. (Laçiner 2009, 31) 
207
For more on the Prussian-German General Staff System see: Millotat, Christian O. E. 
(German Army). 1992. Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System. 
Strategic Studies Institute. Accessed online July 3, 2014. URL: 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a249255.pdf. 
208
Güvenç also put that while Land Forces and Air Forces took the Prussian-German 
General Staff System as a model, the British navy was the main source of inspiration 
fort the construction of the Turkish Navy. (See Güvenç 2010, 255; Barlas and Güvenç 
2010, 223-253)  
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from the US, this process created important changes in the internal affairs of the 
military as well as in the perceptions of its military officers. While the US Military Aid 
Agency was impressed by the human power of TAF, the members of the agency drew 
attention to several weaknesses of TAF. Some of them were the low rates of literacy 
among conscripts, the transportation infrastructure of the country that would prevent 
improvement even if TAF had advanced military technologies, low numbers of non-
commissioned officers in each force, education of military professionals that lacks 
training in political science and international relations (Güvenç 2010, 263-283). 
Although bodily training is prioritized over the intellectual sophistication of the military 
officers in the US model, the institutional neglectof educational deficiencies was 
deemed as a weakness of the professional military of Turkey.  
Güvenç puts that the economic aid and the advices of the US military officers 
about the internal structure and educational affairs of TAF did not turn the face of the 
military completely towards the US model but created a composition of the US with the 
Prussian-German military understanding (Güvenç 2010, 283-284). However, one of the 
most important consequences of the US military aid and assistance was the flourish of 
young and lowly enlisted military officers. They were educated in the US or by the US 
military officers to be able to take initiative and risk in order to succeed, unlike what the 
Prussian-German system imposes by valorizing hierarchical military values over end 
results. (Güvenç 2010, 280-282)  
In sum, the economic involvement of the US in Turkey through the channels 
opened by the DP government, and the military’s role in the DPs maneuvers for 
economic development were very transformative both for macroeconomics of the 
country and for the military. Whilst the military was challenged by the US military aid 
and allowed young officers to shine, the noun missing was laid open for the liquidation 
of high ranked officers, faithful to long-outdated military values of the early Republican 
period, by lowly enlisted officers with the 1960 military coup. 
The holding company of the military officers, The Armed Forces Trust and 
Pension Fund (OYAK) was the most important economic development after the 1960 
military coup, regarding the relations between the military, militarism, and free market 
economy. It was initiated by the National Unity Committee, which came immediately 
after the first military coup on May 27, 1960 (Official Gazette 1961). OYAK is a 
compulsory savings institution, a supplementary social security and welfare 
organization, and a holding company (Akça 2010a, 9). Thus the question “What is 
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OYAK?” raises many following ones about its legal status and about whether it is a 
civilian institution or a military one. İsmet Akça explains OYAKs legal status as 
follows: 
OYAK is bound by its special law and falls under the jurisdiction of either 
private or public law depending on the context. According to the first article 
of Law No. 205, OYAK is an administratively and financially independent 
legal entity attached to the Ministry of Defense and subject to special legal 
provisions. Article 37 states that all assets, revenues, and claims of the 
organization are eligible for the rights and privileges attached to state 
property and that violators/ offenders are subject to similar charges received 
by violators of state property. Apparently, special laws govern OYAKs 
relationship with third parties, and this arrangement facilitates its pursuit of 
revenue-generating activities. On the other hand, one can also deduce from 
the OYAK Law that this fund is also a public legal entity because it is 
endowed with public rights, authorities, and privileges. In other words, 
OYAK has a legal status that allows it to benefit from the privileges of both 
private and public law. For example, the relationship between OYAK and 
its beneficiaries is placed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Military 
Administrative Court (SMAC); on cases against OYAK for claims on “the 
distribution of benefits to former beneficiaries” and “the unconstitutional 
character of compulsory membership to OYAK,” SMAC ruled against the 
plaintiffs. Evidently, the double-headed nature of the judiciary in Turkey, 
due to the existence of a separate military judiciary, poses a significant 
problem in the case of OYAK as well. (Akça 2010a, 8) 
 
 Akça also answers the question of whether OYAK is a military institution or a 
civilian one. He states that a review of the membership and administrative structure of 
the institution reveals that the military is indeed in control. (Akça 2010a, 9) As to 
OYAK as the military holding company, it is a massive one that contained 60 
companies, 29 of which it totally owned, in July 2010. Additionally, these investments 
are never used on military spending and projects: “OYAK invests in industrial 
production and the financial and services sectors. OYAKs investments are concentrated 
in the automotive, cement, and iron-steel industries and are also distributed across the 
following sectors: finance, energy, mining, agricultural chemicals, food, construction, 
transportation-logistics, domestic-foreign trade, private security, technology-IT, and 
tourism.” (Akça 2010a, 10) As Akça argues in another article, even the Marxist 
explanations to the connections between the military and class relations, handle the 
military as a collateral phenomenon and disregard its constitutive role   in the 
mechanisms between militarism and class conflicts (Akça 2010b, 360-361). Yet one can 
easily deduce that the military does indeed play a very constitutive role in economy and 
class relations starting from the establishment of the Republic. This finding is based 
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firstly on the ongoing existence of OYAK, and the companies of Turkish Armed Forces 
Foundation [Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı]209. Secondly, it is based upon 
TAFs historical contributions in supporting the government plans to transform the 
economy. 
The works of Ayşe Buğra, Cihan Tuğal, and Yüksel Taşkın, and the articles 
published by the journal Birikim are important sources to understand the contemporary 
scene of politics in Turkey, the eleven years of JDP in power, its assertive policies and 
discourses shaped around neoconservatism and neoliberalism (See Buğra 2011[2008]; 
Taşkın 2013; Tuğal 2011[2010]; Birikim 283). Since 2003, there have been dramatic 
shifts in the civilian-military relations and in the relationship between the once strongly 
Kemalist military and Islamist movement(s). One of the most obvious power struggles 
between the government and the military took place around the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
operations. In 2009, Bayramoğlu argues that one can see the military’s area of power 
narrowing while the governments area of power expands (Bayramoğlu 2009, 15). 
Ergenekon and Balyoz operations are among the most important determinants of the 
changing macro-politics since 2003. On the other hand, the JDP government 
consolidates the hegemony of neoliberalism in macroeconomics, which was first 
cleared by the 1980 military coup. This economic consolidation process is another 
major source of change since the first victory of JDP. 
The repercussions of the JDP government’s ability to effect economy upon the 
military, and the military’s constitutive role in this ability are not exclusive to Turkey. 
Catherine Lutz draws attention to how the US military reorganized itself “in the manner 
of American business” by downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing during the 1990s, 
with the subsequent threat “ to make soldiering less masculine.” (Lutz 2001, 219). 
Similarly, TAF has participated in “outsourcing” in recent past, a trend that defines the 
contemporary economic system in Turkey and globally. Erman Güngör, who should be 
a squadron leader by now if still a military officer, reviews the international trends of 
outsourcing and privatizing the militaries especially through the examples of the New 
                                                 
209
 Established in 1987, Turkish Armed Forces Foundation have six associated partner-
companies: ASELSAN Electronics Industry and Trade Inc., Turkish Aerospace 
Industries Inc. (TAI), Hava Electronic Industry Inc., Rocket Insdustrial Trading Inc., 
İŞBİR Electric Industrial Inc., ASPILSAN Inc. The foundation is located in Ankara, 
and has regional representatives in İstanbul, İzmir and Mersin. It has publicity 
committees in 78 cities, and 715 towns of Turkey. For more see: 
http://www.tskgv.org.tr/tskgv/?lang=en. 
141 
 
Zeland and the US militaries in his MA thesis (Güngör 2007, 32-45). Then he explains 
the beginning of outsourcing trend in TAF as follows: 
The first implementations regarding outsource use at Turkish Armed Forces 
began via the adjudication of service channels to civilian sector in 1992 for 
GATA Commandership units and in 1994 for Naval Forces Commandership 
units. Expansion of service channels with this method was envisaged in 23th 
January 1998 with the project called Turkish Armed Forces Staff Shuttle 
Bus Service Reform. This way, it was aimed for Armed Forces to get rid of 
the burden of manpower, vehicle purchases and vehicle maintenances where 
it had to transfer sources. […] Second field where outsource use 
implementation began was kitchens. Board service overall, covers the stages 
like procurement, storage, distribution and cooking and extremely intense 
labor, equipment, and personnel allocations are used to serve. And for all 
these activities to be carried out, quite extensive time and resources are 
spent.
 210
 (Güngör 2007, 48) 
He suggests for downsizing and outsourcing other fields of the institution as well, such 
as tailoring workshops, local and private education centers, officers clubs and military 
messes, air supply maintenance centers, arsenals, and navy yards (Güngör 2007, 53-57). 
Some of these units and others were already privatized by the year 1998
211
. Especially 
since the Supreme Court of Public Accounts started to audit officers clubs, post 
exhanges and military barracks
212
, in accordance with the law amended in December 
2010 by the JDP governent, the incredibly cheap and fine services provided for military 
personel by TAFs previously unsupervised budget opened to be outsourced and became 
more expensive
213
.  
                                                 
210
 TSK da dış kaynak kullanımı ile ilgili ilk uygulamalar 1992 yılında GATA K.lığı ve 
1994 yılında Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığına bağlı birliklerde servis hizmetlerinin sivil 
sektöre ihale yolu ile verilmesi suretiyle başlamıştır. Servis hizmetlerinin bu yöntemle 
yapılmasının yaygınlaştırılması 23 Ocak 1998 tarihinde TSK Personel Servis Otobüs 
Hizmetlerinin İyileştirilmesi adlı proje kapsamında öngörülmüştür. Bu yolla Silahlı 
Kuvvetlerin kaynak aktarmak zorunda kaldığı; insan gücü, araç alımı ve araç bakımı 
yükünden kurtulmak hedeflenmiştir. […] Dış kaynak kullanımı uygulanmasına 
başlanan ikinci alan mutfaklar olmuştur. İaşe hizmeti genel olarak; tedarik, depolama, 
dağıtım ve pişirme safhalarını kapsamakta ve hizmet için son derece yoğun emek, araç 
gereç, ödenek ve personel kullanılmaktadır. Bütün bu faaliyetlerin gerçekleştirilebilmesi 
için de oldukça geniş zaman ve kaynak harcanmaktadır. (Güngör 2007, 48) 
211“Silahlı Kuvvetlerden özelleştirme bilançosu.”, Hürriyet, July 28, 1998, accessed 
April 5, 2014. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-31115. 
212“Orduevine Sayıştay denetimi geliyor.”, Milliyet, August 9, 2011, accessed April 5, 
2014.  
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/orduevine-sayistay-denetimi-
geliyor/gundem/gundemdetay/09.08.2011/1424392/default.htm. 
213“Orduevine Sayıştay denetimi geliyor”. Bugün, January 18, 2012, accessed April 5, 
2014. http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/yuzde-500-zam-yapildi-haberi/181446. 
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 On the other, or rather complementary, side of the coin, the JDP government 
amended a very important military law that provide the military with more autonomy in 
downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing in February 2014
214
. One of many striking 
parts of this law is the new regulation that allows the ministries of National Defense or 
Internal Affairs to sublet military fields and facilities to public or private, and national 
or foreign companies. According to Adnan Keskins review of the law no. 6596 in the 
newspaper Taraf, TAF obtained this wider autonomy also with exemption from tax. 
Keskin interprets the law as the hush payment of the government to the military
215
. In 
short, while the government and the Supreme Court of Public Accounts involve more 
and more into the internal affairs of TAF, in order to increase privatization of military 
properties and to reduce military expenses, TAFs autonomy is sustained although in a 
different character.  
My gatekeepers Selim and Rıdvan also addressed to these debates around 
outsourcing and privatizing the services and personel of the military. Their emphasis 
however was more on the recruitment of military personnel from outside military 
schools. Along with their reference, I have learned that Turkish Land Force
216
, Turkish 
Naval Force, Turkish Coast Guard Command, Turkish Air Force, and Gendarmerie 
General Command offer diverse employment opportunities to the graduates of civilian 
elementary schools, high schools or universities
217
, even for the position of military 
officers. Different forces started to outsource certain categories of personnel in different 
times
218
, and there are several categories of outsourced recruitment:  
                                                 
214
The Law No. 6596. “Askerlik Kanunu ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde 
Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun.”, date of amendment: February 2, 
2014, accessed April 5, 2014. 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/02/20140222-1.htm. 
215
Adnan Keskin, “Hükümetten TSKya sus payı.”, Taraf, February 23, 2014, accessed 
April 5, 2014.  http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-yazdir-149002.html. 
216
For an example application and recruitment guide, see the official website of Turkish 
Land Forces: 
http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/PerTem/PERSONEL%20TEM%C4%B0N%20FAAL%C4%B0Y
ETLER%C4%B0.htm. The guide is available also on: 
http://ilan.memurlar.net/common/documents/4580/kilavuz.pdf.  
217
For the links to the personnel recruitment announcements of all the forces, see: 
http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/PerTem/ana1.asp. 
218
There is a great deal of information pollution on the beginning dates of outsourcing 
of each force and for each position. Yet it is reported that TAF started to recruit 
contracted enlisted men very recently in November 2011, Air Forces participated in 
outsourcing trend only in 2014. See “İlk kez Hava Kuvvetleri Sözleşmeli Er Alıyor”, 
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1. Specialized trained enlisted men [uzman erbaş sınıfı] (formerly named as 
“specialized sergeants [sözleşmeli çavuş] –because “sergeancy is a rank of 
non-commissioned officers [astsubay], they opposed to the naming of this 
group of contracted personnel, and obviously their opposition caused this 
change): employed with periodic contracts since late 1990s, graduated at least 
from high school, bereft of several rights enjoyed by all the other military 
personnel. They constitute 22.47% (46.299 members) of the professional army 
(Asker Hakları 2014, 9). 
2. Gendarmerie specialized sergeants [jandarma uzman çavuş sınıfı]: regular staff 
of Gerdarmerie General Command, graduated from a specific type of two years 
long military school, designed only for this particular position, after a civilian 
high school. They have the right to use officers clubs [orduevleri] unlike the 
contracted specialized trained enlisted men of other forces. They are paid ¼ 
less than non-commissioned officers. They constitute 11.8% (24.084 members) 
of the professional army (Asker Hakları 2014, 9). 
3. Regular military officers [muvazzaf subay sınıfı]: employed after 6 months 
long basic military training as regular staff, graduated from a 4-years 
university. This means they attended neither a military high school nor a 
military academy, yet they work in the same status with those who did. As they 
work under contract, though not repealed unless a very extreme circumstance 
occurs, they are not allowed the promotion to the position of general staff 
officer [kurmay subay].   
4. Regular non-commissioned officers [muvazzaf astsubay sınıfı]: employed after 
6 months long basic military training as regular staff, graduated from a 2-years 
university. This means they did not attend 2-years military schools that raise 
non-commissioned, yet they work in the same status with those who did.  
5. Contracted enlisted men [sözleşmeli er]: graduated at least from elementary 
school, employed as periodically contracted personnel, bereft of several rights 
enjoyed by all the other military personnel just like specialized trained enlisted 
men [uzman çavuş sınıfı]. They constitute 0.63% (1.305 members) of the 
professional army (Asker Hakları 2014, 9). 
As I put in the second chapter, despite the high salary offered and low 
                                                                                                                                               
KPSS Haber, March 5, 2014. http://www.kpssrehber.com/kpsshaber-6107-ilk-kez-hava-
kuvvetleri-sozlesmeli-er-aliyor.html. 
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expectations on the educational background of the applicants, only 783 men applied to 
Turkish Land Forces while the quota was 5.103 for the position entitled contracted 
enlisted men. Turkish General Staff was surprised by the situation, according to the 
news in 2011.
219
 Moreover, 3.149 specialized trained enlisted men were appointed to 
civil service jobs upon their own request
220
. Examples as such might be interpreted as 
low demand for outsourced military positions. However, even the percentages of 
outsourced military personnel reflect the existence of a great deal of demand if not as 
much as TAF expects. The latest numbers released by the military show the high 
percentages of specialized (outsourced) staff and contracted enlisted men in the overall 
number of military personnel.
221
 
There is an association called Uzmanlar Derneği (UZDER) [Specialized Mens 
Association]
222
, targeting both gendarmerie specialized sergeants and specialized 
trained enlisted men. Yet I gather from the website of the association the educational 
difference between the two classes is a major source of discrimination against 
specialized trained enlisted men who do not attend military school for two years as 
gendarmerie specialized sergeants. The association however, describes its aim as 
fighting to end discrimination against both of the specialized classes. While the 
percentage of specialized personel is 35 in the grand total of 652.38, the number of 
contracted enlisted men is 2.412. The Turhish Coast Guard Command and the 
Gendermerie General Command opened applications for the position of contracted 
enlisted men in the last two years: thus, the number of their contracted enlistees is not 
reflected in this statement.   
In respect to the yearly military/ defense budget, there has not been any 
significant reduction from 2003 to 2013. Last year, there has even been an increase. 
Besides, OYAKs annual profit has been increasing since 2007, reaching 1.951.51 
                                                 
219“Sözleşmeli erde Genelkurmay şaşkın”, Radikal, December 1, 2011, accessed January 
5, 2014. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sozlesmeli_erde_genelkurmay_saskin-
1071175. 
220
 http://www.haberler.com/msb-3149-uzman-erbas-kendi-istegiyle-devlet-5056983-
haberi/ 
221 “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Personel Sayıları (Mevcutları) Mart 2014”, 
sozlesmelierler.net, March 3, 2014, accessed May 5, 2014. 
http://www.sozlesmelierler.net/?pnum=178&pt=T%C3%BCrk%20Silahl%C4%B1%20
Kuvvetleri%20Personel%20Say%C4%B1lar%C4%B1%20(Mevcutlar%C4%B1)%20%
20Mart%202014. 
222 Uzmanlar Derneği (UZDER) [Specialized Mens Association] Official Website, 
http://www.uzder.org.tr. 
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million in 2012 (OYAK 2012 Annual Report). OYAK has become one of the largest 
holdings of Turkey (Akça 2010a, 19). Somehow, the military holding continues 
strengthening itself in an increasingly neoliberal context (Akça 2010a, 18-23; Ünsaldı 
2008, 252-256). Thus, I think the military tries to make baby steps toward a privatized 
and less expensive way of recruiting military officers, sub-commissioned officers and 
soldiers. Certainly, there is an institutional and economic transformation in the military 
as there is in its political and economic relations with the government. However, as 
Akça argues specifically through the current situation of OYAK and the recently 
amended law no. 6596 show, it is quite impossible for now to claim that TAF is loosing 
power in terms of institutional autonomy over its economic revenues or its state-
sponsored budget.  
4.2. A military career for new generations 
 What to expect from the future in this socio-economic context then, if one is a 
cadet? Knowing the exact salary you will earn at each succeeding level of your career 
and the cities you might work in, how to create a sense of your future expectations? 
What does it mean not being able to choose where you will work? How many young 
graduates are able to choose their workplace anyway? Most of my elder research 
participants addressed the duality in their expectations from the future back when they 
were in military high school or academy. On the one hand, the military authorities quite 
transparently determine the future of a cadet: their salary, the cities they might work in 
depending on their specific force, and even the time they can quit or get retired. On top 
of this, cadets are raised with a discourse of approaching privileges with a very high 
social status in the society, and this discourse help them make sense of their suffering 
from the violence comprised by professional military education. On the other hand, the 
immobility and inflexibility of military careers gives a sense of unpredictability to 
cadets: they are raised for a career over which they will not have any authority in terms 
of time and place management. Such a career has been deemed to be dissatisfying in 
several respects by most of the former cadets, either they are military officers on duty or 
working in private sector. 
 Under this subtitle, I argue that there is a discrepancy between cadets future 
expectations shaped during professional military education, and the social and 
economic conditions awaiting them after graduation as military officers. However, the 
content of this discrepancy is not identical, although similar, for everyone. While 
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former cadets from eldest-first group highlight their dissatisfaction with socio-economic 
conditions of military professionals, my research participants from younger cohorts, 
who suffered from discrimination and mobbing of their commanders, emphasize their 
socio-political anxieties in making the decision of leaving naval academy. There are of 
course varying narratives among the members of elder or younger cohorts, yet a 
majority of each group is on the same page.  
4.2.1. Neither poor nor rich: Dissatisfactions and appreciations of elder former 
cadets 
 After the establishment of the Republic, a middle class of government 
employees forms gradually with the support of etatism, one of the Six Arrows. There is 
an adage in Turkish, describing the economic situation of the government employees 
who are not in high ranks: Eşek kuyruğu gibi ne uzar ne kısalır.223 The narratives of my 
elder research participants coincide with the message of this adage to a great extent. 
Most of them think that a military career is economically not as satisfactory as it used to 
be in the past.  
Oğuz thinks that many people who left the military school from his generation 
believed that they would do better outside, economically speaking: 
 
Oğuz: The simplest thing, sometimes you work on the ship and you don’t 
even have weekends. You are tied to a place. There may not be such 
liabilities in a private company. Well, of course it has some conditions. 
Regarding vacations, you might be at more ease but in terms of salary there 
is nothing satisfactory I think. At most you can win 4000 or 5000 TL. I 
mean, the man outside wins it at his thirties, why should I wait till I am 45? 
[…] Now we live in such a society that you are as man as the money you 
make, unfortunately the society is in such a condition now.
224
  
 
Berk: The only thing I rely on, I believe that: I am valuable. That is not self 
confidence or impertinence. I am a different person. I rely on my feelings 
and I said “outside, I will be a happier person than I am now and I will make 
more money” and left.225 
                                                 
223“A donkeys tail neither grows nor shrinks.” 
224Oğuz: En basitinden gemide çalışıyorsan bazen haftasonun bile olmuyor. Bir yere 
bağlı kalıyorsun. Özel şirkette bu kadar şeyin olmayabilir. Ya tabii ki bazı şartları var. 
İzin olarak daha rahat alabiliyorsun ama aldığın maaşın tatmin eder bir tarafı yok bence. 
En fazla dört bin lira, beş bin lira para kazanırsın. Yani dışarıdaki adam bunu otuz 
yaşında kazanıyor, niye ben kırk beş yaşına kadar bekleyeyim? […] Artık öyle bir 
topluma geldik ki ne kadar paran varsa o kadar adamsın, toplum maalesef öyle bir hale 
geldi.  
225Berk: Tek güvendiğim şey, şuna inanıyordum: Değerli biriyim. Bu özgüven ya da 
şımarıklık değil yani. Değişik bir insanım. Hislerime çok güveniyorum ve dışarıda 
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What Oğuz and Berk explain as their personal stories of leaving military school was one 
of my tentative guesses before the fieldwork. Although I was relying upon my 
observations among my former cadet-friends, I was aware that this is a very strong 
opinion and it could made me direct my research participants, albeit unconsciously. Yet, 
it did. While transcribing, I realized I put my opinion on the table before my research 
participant, fortunately only in my first couple of interviews. Afterwards, my 
interpretations of their answers to my question on their opinions about economic well 
being of military officers slightly changed.  
Burak: For most people, the salary military officers get is really high. […] I 
talk like that because I see myself in a different place, in a place I can gain a 
different financial success. […] Well, I guess they tried to change the 
student profile, because when they took me and students like me, we were 
dissatisfied. We were just dissatisfied. Then I thought; do I endure this 
entire ordeal for 3500 TL?
226
 
 
When Burak addresses his “different expectations from the future, he does not only 
refer to becoming wealthy but also to having a “different social environment than a 
military officer might ever have. Leaving aside the importance of making decisions 
about ones own life, Burak gained back the possibility of imagining future when he left 
the school.  
Needless to prove, the youth who comes mostly from middle or upper middle 
class families learn to dream about a bright future during their educational life. 
Especially if graduated from one of the top universities of Turkey, people believe that 
they can do better than her parents and most people around them. Especially after the 
1980 military coup, education has been the most valued investment for middle class 
families in order to give their children the chance to move up the social ladder (Rutz 
and Balkan 2013). Concerning the educational background of my interviewees, I argue 
that their dissatisfaction stems from both economic and social reasons.  
                                                                                                                                               
olduğum zaman şu anki halimden hem daha mutlu olacağım hem de daha fazla para 
kazanacağım, dedim ve çıktım. 
226Burak: Çoğu insan için subayların aldığı ücretler gerçekten yüksektir. […] Sadece 
ben kendimi farklı bir yerde gördüğüm için, farklı ekonomik başarıları elde edebilecek 
bir yerde gördüğüm için böyle konuşuyorum. […] Ya hani diyorum ya öğrenci profilini 
değiştirmek istediler, çünkü ben ve benim gibi öğrenciler aldıkları zaman biz 
memnuniyetsizdik. Memnuniyetsiziz yani. Düşünüyorum şimdi ben, bu kadar çileyi üç 
buçuk milyar için mi çekiyorum? 
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Burak, for instance, was ranked within the first 100 students among over a 
million students who took the high school entrance examination [Temel Eğitimden Orta 
Öğretime Geçiş Sınavı, TEOG] at the time. Most of my research participants come from 
middle class families and do not perceive the salary of a military officer as insignificant. 
However, as they had very good results in the high school entrance examination, they 
developed higher expectations from the future than Turkish Armed Forces can provide, 
both economically and socially. There is a duly widespread illusion among the 
graduates of top universities that they will be able to find the best jobs with best 
salaries. Accordingly, Burak holds on to the possibility of earning more than a military 
officer one day, although he makes much lower than 3.500
227
 in his current job. 
 Secondly, there is another and sometimes more significant layer to this issue for 
the cadets of military academies. If they went to a military high school as well, they are 
taught to perceive themselves as “superior to everyone and everything as Birand quotes 
from a commander of a military school: “Always bear in mind that you are superior to 
everyone and everything and that you are trained here to have superior knowledge and 
superior qualities.” (Birand 1986, 44) When I asked Selim whether this discourse still 
maintains by reading this quotation, he said no. The emphasis was more on the equal 
intelligence and success of cadets with the students of top civilian universities rather 
than on superiority. He remembered one of the regiment commanders of naval academy 
saying “You could have enrolled in the top universities of this country, the only 
difference between you and those students who are in Bogazici University is that you 
chose to serve to your country.” Though seemingly softened, the same understanding 
survives with a different discourse: patriotism to sacrifice the social life that would 
come during and after the education of a top university is put forward to distinguish 
cadets positively from the students of top universities. If not assertively trained to 
perceive themselves as “the protectors of the nation and as “superior to everyone and 
everything, cadets are obviously taught to expect more than they would actually acquire 
after graduation. 
 As almost always valid, their expectations, and dissatisfaction if became a 
military officer, are shaped not only by the hegemonic discourse and institutional 
                                                 
227
A second lieutenant of Turkish Naval Forces or Turkish Coast Guard Command 
makes approximately 3.500 Turkish liras starting right after the oath-taking ceremony in 
the summer of his/ her graduation. The amount changes depending on his particular 
duty, which may also change at times, though not radically.  
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atmosphere of military schools but also by the past lives and experiences of cadets. To 
reflect this diversity while arguing that all of my research participants expressed this 
discrepancy and dissatisfaction albeit with different perceptions and arguments, I will 
proceed firstly by focusing on the narratives of Kaan, Berk, and Mahmut. Afterwards I 
will move on with my four research participants from younger cohorts, and their 
expectation that the prospective cadets of TAF will increasingly come from low-income 
families with lower social and cultural capital. 
4.2.1.1. Kaan and the repercussions of immobility, inflexibility, and hierarchy 
 Mobility and flexibility are raising values of our global society. Needless to say, 
when I use the expression “global society, I mean a certain segment of the society that 
actually has access to information technologies and global employment opportunities. I 
think this immobility and inflexibility is a great source of anxiety for those who work as 
military officers, while it is one of many socially grounded reasons why most of my 
interviewees left naval academy. 
Approximately every two years, military officers are appointed to their new 
work places in a different city. Last May, three military officers I know were inducted 
to their new places. Among them, I was unable to secure an interview with Ali. After 
his recent reappointment, he is quite worried about moving to a smaller city than the 
one he was working in. Not only his social environment will change, he thinks he will 
get very bored in a small city and he is afraid that his tedium will lead him to drink 
more alcohol than he already does. Ali says he will quit when he finds an opportunity.  
One of my interviewees, Kaan, was working in a very small city before he was 
inducted to a big city almost a year ago. When I visited him last year, he brought me to 
a restaurant where he and his commander eat and drink alcohol almost everyday. 
During that day, I was trying to find a break to interview him. We entered the restaurant 
at 2 pm. I met his commander, the owner of the restaurant who is friends with almost all 
military personnel in the city, and other civilian people who hang out with them. Then, 
we found a break and made a short interview, which was interrupted by the owners 
shouting “lunch is ready. We started by having lunch at 3-4 pm and ended up leaving 
the place at 2 am. I was quite uncomfortable as the only woman at the table. Sexist and 
homophobic jokes and stories were all over the place together with with rakı, fish and 
mezes. His commander was a very assertive man whose wife was living in a different 
city because of her work.  
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Kaan: That was its contribution to me, well, I got old earlier. I could live a 
more comfortable life and I wanted that, too. I could also want to have an 
egg war on the report card day like my peers at the age 14. I could want 
having a long vacation instead of a short one in summers. I could want to be 
with my mom and dad in the evenings. Especially between ages 14 and 18, 
and even university can be included. Especially, between the ages 14 and 
18, well, I should be with my parents. I think it would have been healthier, I 
wanted that. […] And besides that, you are a young guy, after all. There is 
also that side, I mean, if you were outside… Do you understand? Well… 
(Taking a deep breath) I don’t know… 
[…] 
Well, do you know what that means? You do not arrange your job according 
to yourself, your life; you arrange yourself, your life according to your 
job.
228
 
 
According to Kaan, a lonely and inflexible working life follows a childhood in a highly 
disciplinary institution, away from the family and joys of being a schoolboy. Kaan and 
many other research participants think that immobility and inflexibility bring 
unhappiness and boredom.  
 One of the military officers on the table who was working in a nearby city and 
drove to where we are to hang out with Kaan’s commander was a very talkative man. 
He narrated how he drove fast after getting drunk, why he works as a military officer 
although his family is rich, and why he cannot get married and settle down. In the mean 
time, my drunken friend Kaan was shouting me to take notes and use these observations 
in my thesis. At the end of the night, when I was quite drunk too, I think the 12 hours I 
spent with several military officers and military-friendly local men was full of boredom 
and sadness. Of course the circumstances of Triqui farmworkers in the U.S.A. and 
military officers in Turkey cannot be compared but I cannot resist thinking how similar 
the vicious circles in the lives of these two groups are. 
 Seth Holmes, in his book Fresh Fruit Broken Bodies, narrates Crescencios 
headaches as the anguish of insult. Crescencio is one of the Triqui farmworkers with 
                                                 
228Kaan: Bana onu kattı yani, erken yaşlandırdı beni. Daha rahat yaşayabilirdim ve bunu 
isterdim de. On dört yaşındaki yaşıtlarım gibi ben de okulun karne gününde yumurta 
savaşı yapmayı isteyebilirdim. Yazın çok kısa tatil değil de uzun tatiller yapmayı 
isteyebilirdim. Akşamları annemin babamın yanında olmayı isteyebilirdim. On dört-on 
sekiz yaş arası özellikle ya da üniversite de dahil buna. Özellikle on dört-on sekiz arası 
ben annemle babamla olmalıyım yani. Bence daha sağlıklı olurdu, bence, ben onu 
isterdim. […] Bunun yanında bir de sonuçta genç adamsın. Bir de işin o kısmı var yani, 
dışarıda olsan… Anladın mı? Yani… (Derin bir nefes) Bilmiyorum ya… […] Yani ne 
demek bu biliyor musun? Sen kendine göre, hayatına göre işini kurmuyorsun, sen işine 
göre hayatını kendini ayarlıyorsun.  
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whom Holmes works in strawberry fields in the US. When Crescencio asks Holmes for 
medicine for his headaches, Holmes learns about his pain. Crescencio explains that 
“everytime a farm supervisor called him names on the job, made fun of him, or 
reprimanded him unfairly, he developed one of these severe headaches. (Holmes 2013, 
97) He also explains that he feels more prone to anger with his wife and children during 
his headaches. After seeing several doctors and Triqui healers who cannot find any 
solution, Crescencio finds his own remedy: drinking 20-24 beers. Holmes states that: 
These socially constructed headaches lead him to get angry with his family 
and get drunk, thus involuntarily embodying the stereotype of Mexican 
migrants as misogynists and alcoholics. This stereotype serves to legitimate 
the ethnic-citizenship hierarchy on the farm as well as the racist treatment 
the migrant workers receive. This symbolic violence, embodied so precisely 
by Crescencio, works to make invisible the racism and xenophobia 
underlying the disrespect that he and other Mexican migrants are seen to 
deserve. Finally, this disrespect is added to the forces positioning migrant 
berry pickers at the bottom of the farm hierarchy. (Holmes 2013, 98) 
 
Holmes draws attention to a violence continuum from racist insults to violence against 
women and children. It may sound very disturbing to many, even to compare the 
conditions of Triqui farmworkers in the US with the conditions of military officers in 
Turkey. However, as Bourdieu argues in Masculine Domination, both the dominated 
and the dominant can be victims of symbolic violence, although quite differently under 
different circumstances.  
The effect of symbolic domination (whether ethnic, gender, cultural or 
linguistic, etc.) is exerted not in the pure logic of knowing consciousness but 
through the schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are 
constitutive of habitus and which, below the level of decisions of 
consciousness and the controls of the will, set up a cognitive relationship 
that is profoundly obscure to itself. (Bourdieu 2001, 37) 
 
 In line with Holmes and Bourdieu, I argue that the repercussions of immobile, 
inflexible, and hierarchical working conditions are reflected in Kaan’s consumption of 
alcohol. I cannot elaborate further on the perceptions of his commander or other co-
workers as I had very little contact with them and I do not have any observation on their 
relationships with their wife, children or other family and friends. Yet Kaan thinks they 
have been treated unfairly as cadets and he deserves better than his existing working 
conditions. He also expressed feeling very aggressive and prone to violence in his 
personal relationships. I interpret Kaan’s inclination to aggression and alcohol 
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consumption as a manifestation of the impacts of his educational past and current 
working conditions as well as of the problems he has with his family.  
“I wish the best of luck to the person who will marry me! 
 The feeling of disappointment and being treated unfairly stems mostly from the 
future anxieties of former cadets about their personal lives. Reminding me the motto of 
radical feminism, “the personal is political, Kaan was very worried about his future 
romantic relationships. He had a relationship at the time of our interview, yet he and his 
girlfriend were living in different cities: 
Kaan: Now, I am arranging myself all over in a new city. I will leave this 
place and go somewhere else, rearrange my life again there. And now I am 
alone, single. What will happen if I decide to get married in the future? God 
help the person I am going to marry! I will call in the morning and say, 
“gather our stuff, I am appointed.” She has to be someone who will collect 
the boxes in the evening when I am home and won’t be unhappy about it. 
Apart from that, how will she work? Now, people are not packages, should 
we marry teachers only just because there are schools everywhere? Do you 
understand? Let’s say her work is about finance and she gets into a bank and 
gets promoted; for that she needs to be in Istanbul or Ankara. I will say 
“come to that city with me.” Or she is a chemist. Where will she work? 
Constantly drifting from some place to another… I have friends, for 
instance, woman says “I won’t leave this place” and so won’t the kid. What 
will they do? At best he could work for five years and try turning back but 
one day he will go again. A guy at civilian high school, for instance, 
wouldn’t think of that at my age. Well, do you know what that means? You 
do not arrange your job according to yourself, your life; you arrange 
yourself, your life according to your job.
229
 
 
Many military officers, among whom I have been doing participant-observation, carry 
the same anxieties about their future. The immobility and inflexibility brought by the 
                                                 
229Kaan: Ben şimdi bir şehirde yeni baştan hayat kuruyorum. Ben şimdi buradan 
çıkacağım, başka bir yere gideceğim, yeni baştan orada hayat kuracağım. Artı şu an ben 
tek başımayım, bekarım. Yarın bir gün evlenmeye kalksam nasıl olacak? Benim 
evleneceğim insana Allah kolaylık versin! Ben sabah arayacağım diyeceğim ki “kolileri 
topla, benim tayinim çıktı”. Akşam geldiğimde kolileri toplayıp bundan da mutsuz 
olmayacak bir insan olması lazım. Onu da geç, ne iş yapacak? Şimdi insanlar paket 
değil, öğretmen mi alacağız her yerde okul var diye, anladın mı? Diyelim ki ekonomiyle 
ilgili bir yerde çalışıyor, atıyorum bankaya girdi, yükseldi, yükselebilmesi için İstanbul 
ya da Ankara. Ben diyeceğim ki gel şu şehre. Ya da kimyager. Nerede çalışacak? 
Sürekli oradan oraya, oradan oraya. Arkadaşlarım var işte, kız diyor ki “ben buradan 
ayrılmam”, e çocuk da gidemez. Ne yapacak? Taş çatlasın beş sene çalışıp dönmeye 
çalışsın, yine bir gün gidecek. Bunu mesela sivil lisede okuyan bir adam benim 
yaşımdayken düşünmez. Yani ne demek bu biliyor musun? Sen kendine göre, hayatına 
göre işini kurmuyorsun, sen işine göre hayatını kendini ayarlıyorsun.  
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current conditions of a military career, even for the military officers of Turkish Coast 
Guard Command who work only in seaside cities, creates a perception that they deserve 
better. As most of the military officers among my research participants share this 
perception, those who left or were expelled from the military school feel free to reveal 
their complacency about being outside the military, especially in regard to their 
personal lives: 
Oğuz: Before, these cases were more flexible. There weren’t many troubles. 
Well, for me… These are, of course relative troubles. I mean, I might find it 
difficult while another one does not. Something that bothers another one 
may not bother me at all. I mean, in conclusion, it depends on how you look 
at it or what kind of a person you are. I didn’t find these difficult. I might 
have but I thought like this… I could do this job better than most people, I 
mean, perhaps better than most people who work at this profession right 
now, because I had this thing in me… I might have stronger sense of 
patriotism than others. But I… To be honest, under these circumstances I 
see some kind of people. I said “I can’t do this job” in the end. Frankly 
speaking, I had trouble. I thought, if I had trouble, that would also affect my 
private life and so, well, I quitted. 
[…] 
Now, where you would go is unclear, on which ship you would be is 
unclear, most probably you won’t be in Istanbul, you will be out of Istanbul; 
and as a result you won’t be able to have a family life in the future, well, it 
is distressing, I mean, because you won’t step on to land in that five or six 
years. Well, I mean, I didn’t think that I could do it; to be honest, it is 
because I didn’t think that I could work under those circumstances. 
Otherwise, it is not because of psychological pressure or something like 
that.
230
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 Oğuz: Öncesinde biraz daha esnekti bu durumlar. Çok sıkıntılı durumlar yoktu. Ya 
benim... Bunlar tabii kişiden kşiye değişen zorluklar. Yani bu bana göre zor gelir, 
başkasına zor gelmeyebilir. Yani başkasını zorlayan şey bana zor gelmeyebilir. Yani 
sonuç olarak nereden baktığın, nasıl bir karakter olduğuna bağlı. Bana bunlar zor 
gelmedi. Gelecekti açıkçası, şöyle düşündüm ben. Ben açıkçası çoğu insandan belki 
şuanda mesleği yapan çoğu insandan daha iyi bu işi yapabilirdim çünkü benim içimdeki 
hani şey... Vatan sevgisi belki diğerlerinden daha güçlü olabilir. Ama benim... Ben 
açıkçası bu şartlar altında bir takım gördüğüm insanlar oluyor. “Bu işi yapamam” dedim 
ben yani. Sıkıntı yaşadım açıkçası yani. Sıkıntı yaşarsan bu benim özel hayatımı da 
etkiler diye düşündüm ondan dolayı bıraktım ben yani. […] 
Şimdi nereye gideceğin belli değil, hangi gemide olacağım belli değil, İstanbulda 
olmayacağım büyük ihtimal İstanbul dışında olacaksın; sonuç olarak bir aile hayatın 
olmayacak ilerde yani sıkıntı o hani beş sene boyunca, altı sene boyunca ayağın karaya 
basmayacağı için. Yani ben yapabileceğimi düşünmedim açıkçası yani ben bu şartlar 
atında çalışabileceğimi düşünmediğim için. Yoksa öyle büyük psikolojik baskı ya da 
öyle bir şeyden dolayı değil.  
154 
 
 The anxieties of military officers and contentment of the former cadets who left 
the school hold for many issues besides personal/ romantic relationships, which I will 
further elaborate on under following subtitles. 
4.2.1.2. Berk: The soul of a military officer, the money of an advertiser 
 “Experience is nothing, creativity is everything said Berk while I was trying to 
follow his fast and passionate narrative my eyes open. His utter reliance on what he 
considers the values of the “capitalist order whilst explaining the reasons behind his 
detachment from the military logic ignited the idea for this chapter. His narrative 
impressed the pre-fieldwork outline of this chapter more than it should have as I thought 
of his perceptions on the contradictions between the military and neoliberal economic 
orders not as “perceptions but as proofs. After my fieldwork, I comprehended that 
Berk’s narrative on the differences between military and neoliberal work ethics is based 
also on his particular perceptions of professional military education and advertisement 
business. 
Berk: And I said, instead of selling my life and my freedom in return of 
such an amount of money as a lieutenant, I could make more money and 
achieve a very different status in life outside by being only me [Berk] and 
using only my personal abilities.
231
 
 
He put forward a strong opinion that selling ones freedom is worse than selling ones 
talents and capabilities. It is worse not only because of the possibility of earning more 
money but also because of the promise of “freedom and social statue outside the 
military zones. Therefore, there are three apparent sides to this contradiction according 
to Berk: Freedom, social statue, and money/ economic well being.   
What constitutes this “freedom? The discourse of neoliberal global mobility 
promises freedom and mobility to white-collar workers, even if one goes abroad once a 
year and only for a couple of days. Although many white-collar workers suffer from 
flexible working hours and absent overtime payments both economically and 
psychologically, there is a widely shared sense of “mobility/ freedom among former 
cadets, at least discursively. In that sense, Ümit’s way of explaining why he left naval 
academy supports Berk’s narrative, although more moderately: 
                                                 
231
 Berk: Ve ben dedim ki bir teğmen olarak böyle bir miktar paranın karşılığında 
hayatımı ve özgürlüğümü satmak yerine, ben [Berk] olarak dışarıda sadece bende olan 
özelliklerimi kullanarak hem daha fazla para kazanırım, hem de çok daha farklı bir statü 
elde ederim hayatta.  
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Ümit: Since there would be a better life outside… I mean, frankly, I don’t 
have that many reasons. I was at ease in school, didn’t get punished much, 
didn’t, well, itch for trouble; I was comfortable, in that sense didn’t have 
much… Only, well, I saw some officers and think “Man, how that guy 
became an officer?” Or saw some friends and “Man, how will that guy 
become an officer?”… There were that kind of people; he would only use 
his rank. Since, most probably, everything would depend on me outside… 
That’s why I quitted.232 
 
Predictably, military hierarchy and normative military masculinity requires 
respect and absolute submission to the experience of the elders/ higher ranked military 
officers. However, Berk disagrees with this principle and advocates the work ethics of, 
what he calls, “the capitalist order:  
Berk: The thing I feared most was that. You will say something to someone, 
and that someone will patronize you although he has no authority. Or people 
who you wouldn’t even look at on the street will see themselves authorized 
to tell you things just because he got into the school before you, he will 
graduate before you. This is also something offensive. I believe that this 
world, yes, it has an order, should be ruled with intelligence. I mean, I 
support that smart people should rule the stupid ones. A fool cannot rule a 
smart person. Then there is only one way left: the smart will rule the fool. 
And for the smart one to rule the fools, you have to infuse that responsibility 
and consciousness into that person. Not, “My friend, you are very 
intelligent, very smart but stay where you are.” “You are intelligent, very 
smart: You will fuck them all.” You will give that thing, that authority to 
him and so after that those people who are ten years older than him won’t be 
able patronize, get smart with him just because they are older. The order of 
the world, the present, capitalist order is founded on that. The smarter one 
wins. And it is poles apart with the whole system of the army, Turkish 
Armed Forces.
233
 
                                                 
232Ümit: Dışarıda daha güzel bir hayat vardır diye. Yani aslında öyle çok da bir nedenim 
yok. Okulda rahattım, çok fazla ceza almıyordum, çok fazla böyle kaşınmıyordum; 
rahattım o konuda bir şeyim yoktu. Bir tek hani bazı subayları görüyorum, “ulan bu 
adam nasıl subay oldu” diye... Ya da bazı arkadaşlarımı görüyordum “ulan bu nasıl 
subay olacak”... O tarz kişiler vardı; adam sadece rütbesini kullanacaktı. Dışarıdayken 
her şey benim elimde olur büyük ihtimalle diye... O yüzden ayrıldım.  
233Berk: En çok korktuğum şey buydu yani. Birine bir şey söyleyeceğim, biri sana 
kalkıp hiçbir yetkisi olmamasına rağmen üstlük taslayacak. Veya yolda yürürken 
suratına bakmayacağın insanlar sırf senden önce o okula girdiği için, daha önce mezun 
olduğu için sana bir şeyler söylemekte kendini yetkili görecek. Bu da çok ağır bir şey. 
Ben bu dünyada, evet dünyanın bir düzeni var, zekayla yönetilmesinden yanayım. Yani 
zeki olan insanların aptal olan insanları yönetmesi taraftarıyım. Aptal olan insan zekiyi 
yönetemez. O zaman tek bir şey kalıyor: Zeki olan aptalı yönetecek. Zeki olanın aptalı 
yönetmesi için de bu adama bu sorumluluğu, bilinci aşılaman lazım. Kardeşim çok 
akıllısın, çok zekisin ama olduğun yerde kal, değil. Çok akıllısın, çok zekisin: Hepsinin 
anasını sikeceksin. Buna o yetkiyi ve o şeyi vereceksin ki ondan sonra senden on yaş 
büyük olan adamlar, sadece yaşça büyük olduğu için sana gelip bilmişlik 
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As to Berk’s perception, neoliberal work ethic does not respect hierarchy based on 
experience, and thus, it contradicts with the logic of the military hierarchy. 
Unsurprisingly, he thinks the individual is responsible for whatever happens to her/him 
and whatever s/he succeeds in. Not only experience but also owning more money does 
not make one special: 
Berk: If this is the order for this work, I support it. If stupid people will lose, 
fuck them, they can lose. Because everything is in their own hands. I could 
have been an idle person. Life dragged me to this way and this kind of a 
person I became. It was my luck, yes, I am this kind of a person and I am 
standing up for it. But you, my friend, live in beer and skittles, don’t give a 
fuck about the world, if you will come and show off just because you have 
extra 30.000 TL money in your pocket, I will roll that 30.000 TL and stick it 
to your ass. Money, experience, they are nothing. The only thing which 
matters is whether you can create a new thing and whether you can be 
different than other people. I think most people catch this in a period of their 
lives and say “Man, nobody around ma can do that but me. Then here we 
go!” And this is the point I support. With smart, I don’t mean people with 
higher IQ rates. I mean people who want to create something new, make an 
effort and use their mind for just themselves. Otherwise there are lots of 
smart people, who can handle math very well, who are physic professors; I 
don’t put those in that circle. There are people who see and realize that 
system and, call it a pyramid or call it a ring, try to climb at the highest 
point of that. I am talking about them.
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taslayamayacak, bilginlik taslayamayacak. Dünyadaki düzen, şu anki halihazırdaki 
kapitalist düzen, bunun üzerine kurulmuştur. Zeki olan kazanır. Ve ordunun, şu an Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin bütün sistemiyle taban tabana çelişir.  
234 Berk: Bu işin düzeni buysa ben o düzeni destekliyorum abi. Aptal insanlar 
kaybedecekse siktirsin kaybetsin. Her şey herkesin kendi elinde çünkü.  Ben avare bir 
insan da olabilirdim. Hayat beni buraya sürükledi ve böyle bir insan oldum. Benim 
şansımdı, evet ben böyle bir insanım ve bunu savunuyorum. Ama sen kardeşim 
laylaylom bir hayat yaşamışsın, dünya sikinde değil, kalkacaksın sadece cebinde benden 
30 bin lira fazla paran var diye bana şekil yapacaksan, o 30 bin lirayı kıvırıp senin 
götüne sokarım. Para, tecrübe, bunların hiçbiri önemli değil abi. Tek önemli şey, ortaya 
çıkardığın yeni şey ve diğer insanlardan farklılaşabildiğin bir nokta var. Bunu bence 
herkes hayatının bir evresinde yakalıyor ve diyor ki ulan bunu benim etrafımda hiç 
kimse yapamıyor, bir tek ben yapıyorum. O zaman hadi! Dediği yer var ya, hep onu 
savunurum. O zekadan kastım IQsu yüksek insanlar değil. Ortaya yeni bir şeyler 
çıkarmak isteyen, çabalayan ve aklını sadece kendine yoran insanlardan bahsediyorum. 
Yoksa çok zeki insanlar da var abi, matematiği çok iyi becerne, çok iyi fizik bile 
profesörler de var, onları bu dairenin içine sokmuyorum. Bu sistemin ve bu sürecin 
farkında olup bir şekilde o piramitse piramit, halkaysa halka, onun en yükseğine 
çıkmaya çalışan insanlar var, onlardan bahsediyorum.  
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Berk does not hold intelligence or intellect over money and experience. He rather values 
awareness and nimbleness: awareness of surrounding economic and social hierarchies, 
and willingness to climb the social ladder with whichever means available. The 
valorization of experience per se in military hierarchy, and respecting someone just for 
his/ her age, is not acceptable for Berk’s understanding of freedom and human dignity, 
which he put into words as the “rule of this system. 
 The social statue that is promised by the neoliberal economy is already imbued 
with the idea of freedom and human dignity according to him. Outside the military 
zones, one can choose where to live, how much to pay for a dinner, and how to respond 
to a senior as opposed to the conditions of military officers: 
Berk: But when I look from the professional dimension, not spiritual but 
professional and physical dimension, military officership is more than a job, 
a lifestyle, a way of living. You cannot be both a military officer and a 
citizen of the Republic of Turkey. They cannot come together. You cannot 
want to have a normal life like an ordinary person and serve this country as 
a military officer at the same time. You have to choose one. Whatever you 
become you are tied to somewhere, there are some people above you, there 
is a government upon them; I mean there is a nation. For instance someone 
will… Someone, a son a bitch will come and say “you motherfucker, we 
give your salary.” You cannot say “the fuck you give” because they really 
are the ones paying you but perhaps the work you do has nothing to do with 
them. The thing I feared most was that. You will say something to someone, 
and that someone will patronize you although he has no authority. Or people 
who you wouldn’t even look at on the street will see themselves authorized 
to tell you things just because he got into the school before you, he will 
graduate before you. This is also something offensive. I believe that this 
world, yes, it has an order, should be ruled with intelligence.
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235Berk: Ama işin mesleki boyutuna bakarsam, manevi boyutuna değil de, mesleki ve 
maddi boyutuna bakarsam, subaylık bence bir meslekten öte bir hayat şekli, yaşam 
biçimi. Hem subay olup hem Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde yaşayan bir birey olamazsın. 
İkisi aynı anda yürüyemez. Hem normal bir insan gibi bir hayata sahip olmak isteyim  
hem de subay olarak bu ülkede görev yapamazsın. Ikisinden birini tercih edeceksin. Ne 
olursan ol bir yere bağlısın, senin üstünde birileri var, onların üstünde devlet var. bir 
millet var yani. birinin kalkıp mesela… Biri, bir orospu çocuğu kalkacak ve bana şunu 
diyecek, “ulan amına kodumunun çocuğu senin maaşını biz veriyoruz Ananın amını 
veriyorsun diyemezsin çünkü hakikaten o veriyor maaşını ama belki senin yaptığın işin 
belki onunla hiçbir alakası yok. En çok korktuğum şey buydu yani. Birine bir şey 
söyleyeceğim, biri sana kalkıp hiçbir yetkisi olmamasına rağmen üstlük taslayacak. 
Veya yolda yürürken suratına bakmayacağın insanlar sırf senden önce o okula girdiği 
için, daha önce mezun olduğu için sana bir şeyler söylemekte kendini yetkili görecek. 
Bu da çok ağır bir şey. Ben bu dünyada, evet dünyanın bir düzeni var, zekayla 
yönetilmesinden yanayım.  
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Ironically, he thinks it is the military as a working environment in which one cannot 
easily oppose his seniors because of money related concerns. TAF pays the salaries of 
military officers in the name of the nation and high ranked military officers embody the 
will of the nation. What TAF and its professional members do constitutes a life style 
rather than a job, both professionally and economically. Therefore, a military officer 
cannot stake out a claim on his labor and his salary as an individual, and cannot oppose 
his commanders. On the other hand, in accordance with this perception on the 
differences between military and civilian jobs, he said that in private sector, he never 
did and never will submit to his seniors if he is right: 
Berk: I do not respect any people who are 60 years old, for instance, I don’t 
respect a 100-year-old, either. Let them go and fucking die, they have no 
use to me. Who cares, really, who cares?! What is it to me if you get 200 
years old, go fuck yourself. Or I don’t respect the people who are 5 years 
older than me just because they are 5 years older. This, for instance, may be 
the only reason I won’t do that job. I do not respect. Because the work they 
do… Though they came to school just a year before me and… Think it, he 
is coming to school a year before me, we are getting the same education, he 
idles for a year. Then he lords it over! What the fuck! Now outside, nobody 
can do that to me. Now, I am a copywriter in one of the best ad agencies of 
Turkey. No writer who is 5 years older than me or who worked 5 years 
more than me can give a revision to a text, filming, radio broadcast I write. 
[After that he talks while hitting the table in a rhythm.] He can’t, I would 
get the shit out of him! He has no such authority. Experience is nothing. 
Anything put forward is created from zero. Both for him and for me. It is 
that simple. That is why I am doing this job, perhaps.
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I argue that Berk’s passionate emphasis on freedom and human dignity (not being 
subjected) in work place is in line with David Harveys claim for “the central values of 
civilization. Harvey argues that “the founding figures of neoliberal thought took 
                                                 
236Berk: 60 yaşındaki hiçbir insana saygı duymam mesela, 100 yaşındaki hiçbir insana 
saygı duymam. Siktirsin gitsin ölsün, bana hiçbir faydası yok. Bana ne abi, bana ne 
yani?! 200 yaşına gelsen nolur, siktir git. Ya da benden 5 yaş büyük insanlara sadece 
benden 5 yaş büyük olduğu için saygı duymam. Bu benim mesela o mesleği 
yapamamamın yegane sebebi olabilir. Saygı duymuyorum. Çünkü  yaptıkları işi… 
Sadece benden bir sene önce o okula grmelerine rağmen ve… Düşünsene benden bir 
sene önce giriyorsun, aynı eğitimi alıyoruz, bir seneyi öyle avare gibi geçiriyorsun. 
Bana artistlik taslıyorsun! Hassiktir! Şu an dışarıda bunu bana hiç kimse yapamıyor. 
Ben şu an Türkiyenin en iyi reklam ajanslarından birinin yazarıyım. Benden 5 yaş fazla, 
5 sene fazla çalışmış bir yazar kalkıp benim yazdığım hiçbir metne, ne metne ne filme 
ne radyoya kalkıp bir tane revizyon veremiyor. [Bundan sonrasını ritmik bir şekilde 
masaya vurarak anlatıyor] Veremez, ağzına sıçarım. Öyle bir yetkisi yok. Tecrübe 
hiçbir şeydir. Ortaya çıkarılan her şey sıfırdan çıkarılmıştır. Onun için de benim için de. 
Bu kadar basit bir şey. O yüzden belki de bu mesleği yapıyorum.  
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political ideals of human dignity and freedom as fundamental (Harvey 2005, 5). From 
individual to society, Berk agrees with these values sincerely. Through his personal 
success story, he pointed out the differences between the military order and neoliberal 
order, and the lack of freedom and human dignity in the former. However, his 
nationalist and militaristic feelings are not diminished because of his disagreement with 
the logic of military hierarchy. Right after his claims on the contradictions between 
military and capitalist logics, he continued with how the experience of military school 
provides him with a great advantage in advertisement. Thus, I interpret his attempt to 
dignify professional military education right after his criticisms towards military 
hierarchy as a way to make sense of his detachment from the military without 
demeaning nationalism and Turkish Armed Forces. 
 Berk narrated his struggle of leaving the school despite his fathers fierce 
opposition, and of climbing the ladder very quickly in advertisement by periodically 
reminding me that he is a nationalist but he just did not get along with the military’s 
understanding of work. His recallings of nationalism and good parts of professional 
military education throughout our interview were expressed through the key role of the 
experience of military education in his success.  
Berk: It is a big advantage. But not for everyone, of course… The man who 
is an officer now… It is no use to him, I mean. Since I behave like a 
sociologist and I do a job like a sociologist, a job which is directed to attract 
people, change their shopping habits, I see the benefit of it. Because I know 
that a man from Istanbul will perceive it that way… I divide them into 
socio-economical classes. Like A, B, C, D, E: according to their salary, their 
income. When I look, I have friends from all socio-economical classes! 
Presently I have. Then that A, B, C, D, E seems like this to me: A Ahmet, B 
Burak, C Cumhur, D Deniz, E Engin. I divide them all according to their 
socio-economical classes and I think “What would Ahmet do if he heard of 
that campaign?” Well, he would show such a reaction, then we should 
change that. If the campaign is something that will involve E, Engin, I say 
“Man, Engin wouldn’t get any of that, we are too, well, sophisticated. We 
should simplify that and reinforce it with more amateurish visuals and 
ideas.” And I organize the campaign accordingly. This is an advantage for 
me, an advantage nobody else has.
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237 Berk: Bu büyük bir avantaj. Ama herkes için değil tabii. Şu an subay olmuş 
adamın… Onun için bir faydası yoktur yani. Bir toplumbilimci gibi davranıp bir 
toplumbilimci gibi bir meslek icra ettiğim için, insanları etkilemeye yönelik, onların 
alışveriş alışkanlıklarını değiştirmeye yönelik bir iş yaptığım için ister istemez bunun 
bana faydasını görüyorum. Çünkü biliyorum ki İstanbullu bir adam bunu böyle 
karşılayacak… Onları sosyo-ekonomik sınıflara ayırıyorum. A, B, C, D, E gibi: 
Aldıkları maaşlara, kazançlarına göre. Bakıyorum, bütün sosyo-ekonomik sınıflardan 
arkadaşlarım var! Halihazırda da var. Sonra o A, B, C, D, E bende şöyle oluyor: A 
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The notions of “class unity and “mens friendship, mentioned in previous chapter, turn 
out to have an exchange value, as defined by Karl Marx. Friendships of cadets, 
established without discriminating anyone from the same cohort, already are products of 
human labor. As put by many interviewees, cadets of a particular cohort make a big 
effort to protect class unity by solving the conflicts between classmates. They have a 
great deal of use value since they provide protection from violence of any kind, which 
may be directed by commanders, officer-teachers, or elder cohorts. However, Berk 
added a certain kind of exchange value on this. His friendships with other cadets were 
deemed to be “commodities by reason of the fact that they had been produced for other 
(Marx 1887[1867], 29). Not only Berk’s friendships with other cadets but also the 
whole experience of such a disciplinary institution have an exchange value in Berk’s 
current life: 
Berk: Not just exams, there are also some rules they make you obliged to, or 
you have to obey. When you submit, you can get out at the weekend, it is a 
reward. Think of it like being trained with food. They tell me “Be a good 
boy in the weekdays and you can go out at the weekend then.” They feed 
me. And with that feeding, I behave and do those. This becomes a habit. I 
do not link it to a condition then. I say “Man, from now on I should always 
try for better, try for much better and get rewarded for that.” When I do it 
systematically, the work becomes all about this.
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As he situated the source of his malleable creativity in his friendships with cadets 
coming from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, the roots of his efficiency was based 
on carrot and stick approach of professional military education.  
                                                                                                                                               
Ahmet, B Burak, C Cumhur, D Deniz, E Engin. Hepsini sosyoekonomik sınıfına göre 
ayırıyorum ve diyorum ki Ahmet bu kampanyayı duysa ne yapardı? Haa şöyle bir tepki 
verirdi, o zaman şöyle değiştirelim. Eğer kampanya Eyi, Engini kapsayacak bir 
kampanyaysa “Ulan Engin bundan hiçbir şey anlamazdı, çok şey kaldık, sofistike 
kaldık. O zaman bunu daha basite indirgemeli ve daha amatör görsel ve amatör 
fikirlerle desteklemeliyiz deyip kampanyayı ona göre organize ediyorum. Bu benim için 
bir avantaj, hiç kimsede olmayan bir avantaj.  
238Berk: Sırf sınavlar değil, seni mecbur tuttukları belli kurallar da var ya uymak 
zorunda olduğun. Onlara uyduğun zaman haftasonu dışarı çıkıyorsun, bu bir mükafat 
ya. Yemekle eğitmek gibi düşün bunu. Bana diyorlar ki haftaiçi yaramazlık yapma 
haftasonu izne çık. Beni yemliyorlar. Ben de o yemle beraber yaramazlık yapmıyorum 
ve şey yapıyorum. Bu da bir alışkanlığa dönüşüyor. Bunu bir şarta bağlamıyorum. 
Diyorum ki kardeşim benim artık sürekli iyiyi çabalamam lazım, daha iyiyi çabalamam 
lazım ve bunun karşılığında mükafat almam lazım. Bu sisteme bağladığım zaman da iş 
buna dönüşmüş oluyor. 
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A use value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human 
labour in the abstract has been embodied or materialised in it. How, then, is 
the magnitude of this value to be measured? Plainly, by the quantity of the 
value-creating substance, the labour, contained in the article. The quantity 
of labour, however, is measured by its duration, and labour time in its turn 
finds its standard in weeks, days, and hours. (Marx 1887 [1867], 28) 
 
As Berk, many other research participants who currently work in a civilian job 
stated similar opinions about the affects of the military education on their lives: 
Ümit: Outside, the number of people who haven’t improved themselves is 
very high, I mean the number of people you cannot even have a talk with is 
very high. For that reason, I see that those 8 years gave a magnificent 
education to us, no matter what people say, I don’t know. […] There are 
people who are 22 years old and still their mamma’s boys; we got ahead of 
that, we got our feet on the ground, we maintain our own lives. I mean, we 
learned living with 200 people, living in a community. Outside, people – 
and especially at these times – are unable to get involved in the society, are 
afraid of that. We, as 200 people, learned how to talk there, when TV was at 
minimum; I mean, we talked, made jokes. Now outside, people are with 
computers… They are hanging out ridiculously, I mean neat and nice times 
we spent there is not common outside… More precisely, it is boarding 
school culture, I think; because people I talk with about boarding schools 
say that it is a common thing in boarding schools. […] 
“What do you mean with improving yourself? Like warm human 
relations and…” 
All kinds: Time management, work discipline – as you see I don’t care 
much about appearance management. There is time management, work 
discipline, ability to look from different angles to a case, managing some 
situations easily; because another thing we are taught on was the ability to 
lie quickly in the military. Because sometimes you have to, like “why did 
you do that?”… I mean, your mind begins… You cannot say “I didn’t care 
and did that”, there is no such answer. “Sir I did it because of that, these 
happened and then that… For that reason I did it”… There is also that thing, 
stress management; I mean, people are whining, weeping about things and 
they say “Man, how can you be so relaxed?” I say “It will clear up” relaxed, 
I mean… “We went through many worse things, never mind that one…”239 
                                                 
239Ümit: Dışarıda kendini geliştirememiş insan sayısı çok falza, yani dışarıda muhabbet 
edemeyeceğin bile insan sayısı çok fazla. O yüzden o 8 yıl hani muhteşem bir eğitim 
olmuş, kim ne derse desin, bilmiyorum... […] 22 yaşında hala böyle anne kuzusu olan 
kişiler var dışarıda; biz onları falan aşmışız, biz daha yere sağlam basıyoruz, kendi 
hayatımızda kendimizi idame ettiriyoruz. İşte 200 kişiyle yaşamayı, toplulukla 
yaşamayı öğrendik. Dışarıda insanlar -hele şu dönemde- toplumun içine giremiyor, yani 
korkuyor beceremiyor. Biz orada 200 kişi televizyon minimumken cidden konuşmayı 
monuşmayı görmüşüz; yani konuşmuşuz, geyik yapmışız. Şimdi millet dışarıda 
bilgisayar... Saçma sapan takılıyor, yani bizim ordaki gibi temiz güzel takılma 
dışarıda... Daha doğrusu bu yatılı okul kültürü bence; çünkü yatılı okul konusunda 
görüştüğüm kişiler yatılı okulların genel şeyi olduğunu söylüyor. […] “Kendini 
geliştirmek” derken neyi kastediyosun? Böyle çok sıcak insan ilişkileri ve... Her türlü: 
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How, then, is the magnitude of the value of the experience of professional military 
education to be measured? How to measure the labor he put in military education if he 
embodies and utilizes it in a very different environment? These questions are obviously 
rhetorical ones. However, I think Berk challenged his own claim of “experience is 
nothing, creativity is everything by explaining how he utilizes his embodiment of the 
experience of military education within neoliberal market economy. Although it is quite 
impossible to measure the labor he put in professional military education as a cadet, the 
impacts of his educational labor on his current labor are obvious.   
At this point, I shall bring Akças macro level analysis of the constitutive role of 
the military and militarism in shaping and reproducing class relations to a very micro 
level. According to some former cadets who left the military schools willingly or 
unwillingly, professional military education has a use value, and thus a constitutive role 
for them, in free market economy. They think that many people coming from middle or 
upper class families who work in private sector are raised as “sisies (loved and taken 
care of by their parents and attended regular civilian schools) when compared to the 
highly hierarchical and disciplinary structure of professional military education. That is 
why they are less of “crusaders than former cadets in the wild market conditions. In a 
sense, Berk and Kaan’s perceptions of professional military education served in their 
narratives to relocate themselves in social and class relations. However, these 
perceptions and appreciations of some former cadets do not prove any generalizations 
about the relations between the military values and neoliberal work ethic right.  
These constructions are not effected in a social vacuum, as some 
ethnomethodologists seem to believe: the position occupied in social space, 
that is, in the structure of the distribution of the different species of capital, 
which are also weapons, governs the representations of this space and the 
stances adopted in the struggles to conserve or transform it. (Bourdieu, 
1994, 28) 
                                                                                                                                               
Zaman yönetimi, iş disiplini -şekil yönetimini ben pek sallamıyorum gördüğün gibi. 
Zaman yönetimi, iş disiplini var, olaylara farklı konulardan bakıyor olma olayı var, bazı 
olayları iyi kıvırma olayı var; çünkü askeriyede bize öğretilen bir şey de çok hızlı yalan 
söyleme olayıdır. Çünkü ona mecbur kalıyorsun bazı konuda “niye böyle yaptın”... Ona 
artık kafan hani... “Ulan sallamadım o yüzden yaptım” diyemiyorsun; öyle bir cevap 
yok. “Efendim biz onu şimdi şu yüzden, şuradan şu olmuştu ya da ondan... O yüzden 
öyle yaptım”... Yani o var bir de, şey, stres yönetimi yani; şimdi bu millet ağlıyor 
sızlıyor, ediyor, şu bu. “Oğlum” diyor “sen ne rahatsın”. Ya diyorum “Halloluyor”, yani 
rahat... “Biz neleri gördük boşver salla ya!”  
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Although I never openly asked about the economic conditions and ethnic 
backgrounds of their families, I know from our social meetings that Berk and Kaan 
come from middle class Turkish families who might have sent their children to some of 
the top high schools of the country both becase they could afford it and because their 
children were successful enough. Their class, ethnicity, gender, and other categories that 
intersect with their past lives and experiences construct their perceptions, appreciations 
and actions “in the structure of the distribution of the different species of capital”  
(Bourdieu, 1994, 28).  Their perceptions and appreciations govern the stances they 
adopt in the struggles to conserve or transform their conditions, which is also valid for 
different positions of other former cadets in this structure.  
4.2.1.3. Privilege of silence, Mahmut, and voicing privilege  
 
 Silence is privilege in some cases. To requote Lutz, “Silence is also a strategy of 
confinement” (Lutz 2001, 132). The predominantly negative perceptions of Kaan, Berk 
and others who think similarly occupy a position in social space, and this position also 
contains particular silences. The privileges of a military professional, especially a 
military officer, are silenced in their narratives. When I asked my elder research 
participants about the significance of Kemalism in their education, they had to stop to 
remember it. Similarly, the privileges of military officers are taken for granted by most 
of my interviewees to the extent that they are outside of the perception and appreciation. 
First, privilege is a special advantage: it is neither common nor universal. 
Second, it is granted, not earned or brought into being by ones individual 
effort or talent. Third, privilege is a right or entitlement that is related to 
preferred status or rank. Fourth, privilege is exercised for the benefit of the 
recipient and to the exclusion or detriment of others. Finally, a privileged 
status is often outside the awareness of the person possessing it. (Black and 
Stone 2005, 244) 
 
 The sense of inclusion, belonging, well being and even the categories of social 
hierarchies such as gender, race or ethnicity are imperceptible to the privileged. Yet 
structural privilege is not an entirely passive phenomenon (Borell et al. 2009, 41). 
Privilege is performed as well, probably as much as it is structured. I do not claim that 
voicing dissatisfaction about professional military education and military 
professionalism is a performance of privilege. However, silencing privilege certainly is, 
either consciously or unconsciously performed.  
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 Not only the high salary of a military officer bu also the services and facilities 
maintained by the military and the state create the privileged status. İnsel calls military 
officers as the power holders of the pretorian regime in Turkey
240
, and as a privileged 
“coterie (İnsel 2009, 45), in the historical context before the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
trials. After I started to ponder more on the privileges of my research participants who 
work in the military, I asked Selim what he recalls as the advantages of a military 
officer. He said because they were acquired before the military’s recent falling from 
grace, officers clubs are in very good locations. Although many services given in clubs 
are privatized and outsourced
241
, they are still very cheap and fine. Military lodgings 
leased for moderate prices are available mostly for married officers in many cities. 
Military housing is a great advantage in big cities, Selim stated, since they are usually 
located in very expensive neighbourhouds such as 4. Levent or Balmumcu. While non-
military people pay extremely high rents in such districts, military officers pay 
approximately around 600 Turkish liras. However, because the rents of military 
lodgings are standard in all the cities, they are not necessarily beneficial in small cities 
and towns where rents are already very cheap in comparison to Istanbul, Ankara or 
Izmir. What he did not mention was the material fact that life is much more cheaper in 
small cities than in big ones, which probably compensates the relatively “high rents of 
military officers. Selim also noted that while almost all military personnel lives in 
military lodgings in eastern and southeastern Turkey since “the outside is considered 
dangerous in cities where the presence of PKK is palpable
242
, single officers can benefit 
from military housing only if the military families left any in other regions. Military 
vacation camps are the sites of cheap and very fine holidays only for high ranked 
officers, Selim put, lowly enlisted officers almost never seize this chance
243
. 
Additionally, Selim stated that an ever-guaranteed salary is a very important privilege, 
although not high in comparison to the standards of private sector for graduates of top 
                                                 
240Ahmet İnsel, “Devletin Sahipleri”, Radikal İki, May 13, 2007, accessed January 1, 
2014. http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/devletin_sahipleri-874968. 
241
Prior to this process, conscripted soldiers were working in service positions in 
officers clubs. 
242
For an elucidative discussion of how the PKK is the most notable actor that marks the 
ruptures between inside and outside military lodgings, and between the times of peace 
and conflict in perceptions and ordinary experiences of the children of military officers, 
see Şen 2014, 78-103. 
243
 Only as of 2012, the spatial segregation of general officer (general), high officer (üst 
subay) and officer (subay) in officers clubs and military vacation facilities was 
abolished. 
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universities. This guarantee is valid also for almost all government employees, he 
added. 
 As the granddaughter of a colonel, I reminded him the advantages acquired by 
first-degree relatives of military officers with the military identification card. Depending 
on the degree of kinship, the family of an officer can take advantage of the 
abovementioned services and facilities with or without the company of him/her. 
Moreover, the regulation that was “awarding the children of military officers in military 
schools entrance examinations with a standard number of extra points was abolished 
only in 2005
244
. 
“History is always produced in a specific historical context.” (Trouillot 1995, 22) 
A military officer has many advantages and privileges in contemporary Turkey, albeit 
not as much as s/he would before the military’s recent falling from grace. Among social 
privileges of military officers that are considered to be threatened after the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz trials, Selim recollected the general respect and courtesy shown to them by 
almost everyone who did military service, especially in small cities and towns. He said 
even first lieutenants [üsteğmen] who get to be a part of the protocol with the district 
governer and other high ranked state officials in state ceremonies and official 
gatherings. 
When I asked about the travel allowance paid to military personnel if reassigned 
to another city or transferred on duty for a short period of time, he said white-collar 
workers of private companies are in better conditions in those terms, mentioning the 
high amounts they are paid for business travels. He also added that when a white-collar 
worker is transferred to a bigger city permanently, her/his salary increases automatically 
in most of the companies, which is not the case for military officer who move from city 
to city in short intervals. Although he is very critical of the military as an institution 
“filled with unreasonable pursuits and people, he felt a need to make comparisons 
between the privileges of the military personnel and of white-collar workers with 
relativelt well-paid jobs. He also ponderingly figured out the “eliteness of the officers of 
Naval Forces as they work only in seaside cities, hardly facing conflict situations. After 
this conversation, I regretted my choice of a rather general interview question about my 
interviewees’ opinions on being a military officer. I wonder how they would react and 
what they would recall if asked “the privileges of military officers.  
                                                 
244“Babam subaya ek puan yok.”, Yeni Şafak, November 5, 2005, accessed on June 15, 
2014. http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/kasim/05/g06.html. 
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Mahmut and Kerem were coming from economically and socially less 
advantaged families than the others, if not from low class. Our interview with Kerem 
was rather strange since we were in a room without a door, and he did not answer my 
questions openly as I gathered from his careful and slow selection of words. Therefore, 
he did not share enough for me to elaborate on his narrative in respect to how he 
perceives and makes sense of his privileges as an officer. Yet we had a very 
communicative interview with Mahmut.  
While his father works in an underpaid freelance job, his mother is a stay-at-
home mother, whom I would call a fulltime mother with more than two children. As he 
did not made any mention of his ethnic background, I did not ask whether he has a 
Kurdish or other ethnic identification. I only know he is from eastern Turkey and grown 
up there unlike the rest of my elder research participants. On the particularity of his 
hometown in naval academy, he only mentioned how his classmates were making fun 
of his accent although not with bad intentions or to bully him: 
 
Was it important or a question subject whether someone was more 
religious, Alevi, Cherkess, Kurd or whether their mother tongue is 
Kurdish or Laz?  
Mahmut: I will call it race discrimination, race discrimination like that… 
Well, no… You do not recognize that in all that turmoil. (Laughing) I mean 
it. Which… you don’ recognize at all. It somehow streams. I, for example, 
couldn’t do, like this and that to anyone. Couldn’t say this has to be so. 
Maybe you can tell it from tongue, from accent. Mine was so, for instance, 
back then.  
How? 
My accent was stronger. The accent of [the city he was born and grew up] is 
strong. (He imitates his throat use) Do you understand? [He says which 
consonant is especially emphasized.] I, for instance, used that a lot when I 
talked. That happened, for instance, my friends used to say “man, talk 
decently, this is not … any more” or so. Do you understand? Like that. But, 
well, in that level, like insulting, no, such a thing never happened. And I 
never saw anyone being insulted. Yes. Not in an insulting level. At most, it 
was making fun of it. But not a mocking that would hurt. That I can say. I 
didn’t observe that, I mean, I never came across.245  
                                                 
245Atıyorum mesela, örnek veriyorum, birinin daha dindar olması, Alevi, Çerkez, 
Kürt olması ya da anadilinin Kürtçe, Lazca olması… Bunlar bilinir ya da 
mevzubahis olur muydu? 
Mahmut: Mesela ırk ayrımı diyeyim ona, o şekilde bir ırk ayrımı… Yok ya… O 
hengamede fark etmiyorsun. (Gülüyor) Harbiden. Hangi … hiç fark etmiyorsun. Akıyor 
gidiyor bir şekilde. Ben mesela hiçbirine böyle şöyle diye hiç şey yapamadım. Böyle 
olsa gerek diye diyemedim. Belki dilden, ağızdan diyebilirsin. Benim de öyleydi hatta o 
zamanlar. 
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Mahmut is also the only one who explained his entrance to naval academy with material 
motives: 
Mahmut: The real purpose to it was not a special one like “I was born to be 
a soldier” or so, not like this. It was the worries about the future, the 
attraction of officialism, a guaranteed job, etc. Yes.
246
 
 
Knowing him also as a friend, Mahmut is one of the less complaining military officers I 
know. He stated that professional military education is imbued with unreasonable 
physical and psychological challeges, and violence: 
Mahmut: I don’t think that any person can be happy about going to the 
military school. Because there is an unnecessarily intense program, I mean, 
an intensified program. Well, though there is nothing needed to be done, 
there is a constant effort to fill the gaps. 
247
 
 
However, he was the only one expressing his hard work as a second lieutenant after 
stating he finds his salary satisfying like a few other interviewees: 
Mahmut: I, well, much before, thought the salary is good compared to the 
other salaries of present day. I thought it was average. It is an officer’s 
salary, in the end; I won’t leave you starving but it won’t make you rich, 
either. I thought it was good. But because of brand obsessions, etc, of course 
you have more difficulty. But as an income, frankly it is pretty well, enough 
to get by. […] 
If it is not going well, I am the responsible for it; but if it is going well, it is 
the success of the commander. That is the case. If something is wrong it is 
my mistake but if something is good, it is the commander’s goodness. That 
                                                                                                                                               
Nasıl? 
Ağzım biraz daha sertti. [Doğup büyüdüğü şehir]in ağzı biraz daha serttir. (Gırtlak 
kullanımını taklit ediyor) Anladın mı? [Hangi harfin özellikle sert kullanıldığını 
söylüyor] Ben mesela konuşurken çok kullanırdım. Mesela bu şey olurdu, “oğlum şey 
konuş falan derlerdi bizim arkadaşlar, “oğlum dur lan düzgün konuş derlerdi, “burası … 
değil artık falan. Anladın mı? Onun gibi. Ama hani öyle aşağılayacak derecede, hiçbir 
zaman öyle bir şey olmadı. Ben kimsenin aşağılandığını da görmedim. Evet. 
Aşağılanacak derecede olmadı. En fazla dalga geçme oldu. Ama o incitecek dalga 
geçme bile değil. Öyle söyleyeyim sana. Ben gözlemleyemedim yani, bana hiç denk 
gelmedi.  
246
Mahmut: İşin aslı çok öyle özel bir maksat değildi yani, “ben asker olmak için 
doğdum” vs., bu değil. Gelecek kaygısı, memuriyet peşinde koşma, garanti iş vs… 
Evet. 
247
 Mahmut: Harp okulunda okumaktan memnun olabilecek bir insan olabileceğini 
düşünmüyorum. Çünkü çok gereksiz bir şekilde yoğun bir program var, yani 
yoğunlaştırılan bir program var. Yani ortada hiçbir şey olmadığı halde sürekli bir boşluk 
doldurmaca. 
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is the case, I mean, I try not to make any mistakes. Try to direct people. Try 
not to leave a lacking part, a hole.
248
 
 
Though this may appear like overinterpretation, I think his silence about (or actual 
absence of) the moments he considered leaving while in military school, despite his 
frankly expressed unhappiness in the military as an officer, stems from his socio-
economic background, partially if not completely. 
Mahmut: I got over the school process somehow but after starting to work, I 
saw it wasn’t what I was hoping for. I had many sad moments. I saw that 
you cannot be that happy. Then I said what makes me so unhappy was… It 
is time really, I mean, I am really upset. For some work that makes you so 
unhappy… I mean, it is a job in the end, though it affects your whole life, it 
is just a job. Just for bread and butter. After seeing that you can make that 
money much more easily, yes, I was sad. [He hits the table with his knife or 
something, while saying the last sentence, the hits get stronger] I would like 
being a registrar, enjoy being a registrar. I was in municipality recently. I 
just went to the guy for a signature, though. He signed. He took a receipt, 
said “here you are”. His task is composed of just this. (Laughing) He is a 
clerk. (Laughing) It is great! I think it is a very sad thing for a person to 
envy such a stupid job. Do you understand? There is no excitement, do you 
see? There is nothing in that job, really nothing. You go in the morning, 
open your office and sit there. You sit till 5. Tea and coffee… Someone 
comes, sign the receipt, do something alike and “here you are”. In a day, 10 
people might come, or even less. After that “I did my job, earned my money 
and now I can go home.” After he is home, no one would call or ask 
something; there is weekend, etc. I mean, I ogle that. [The hit sound gets 
faster and stronger in these last sentences] I get called incredibly much, 
don’t take it light! They call me for everything [from work]. (We laugh) 249 
                                                 
248Mahmut: Ben hani çok önceden, günümüz maaşlarına oranla yine aynı oranda iyi 
olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ortalama olduğunu düşünüyorum. Memur maaşı sonuçta, aç 
bırakmaz, zengin etmez. Iyi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ama biraz marka takıntıları 
vesaire olduğu için tabii ki biraz daha zorlanıyoruz. Ama maaş olarak hakikaten gayet 
güzel geçinilebilecek bir maaş. […] 
Düzgün işlemiyorsa sorumlu benim, düzgün gidiyorsa başarılı komutan. Olay bu. Bir 
şey yanlışsa benim hatamdır, bir şey iyiyse o komutanın iyiliğidir. Olay bu yani. hata 
yapmamaya çalışıyorum. İnsanları yönlendirmeye çalışıyorum. Bir eksik bir gedik 
bırakmamaya çalışıyorum. 
249Mahmut: Okul sürecini bir şekilde atlattım ben de işe başladıktan sonra hayal ettiğim 
gibi olmadığını gördüm. Çok üzüntüler oldu. O kadar da mutlu olunamayacağını 
gördüm. Ondan sonra dedim yani beni bu kadar mutsuz eden… Zaman hakikaten, 
acayip mutsuz oluyorum yani. bu kadar mutsuz eden iş için… Yani iş sonuçta ya, tüm 
hayatını etkilese de bir iş sonuçta. Ekmek parası yani. Çok daha rahat bir şekilde bu 
ekmek parasının kazanılabileceğini gördükten sonra evet üzüldüm yani. [Bıçağı ya da 
bir şeyi masaya vuruyor, bu son cümleyi söylerken sertleşiyor vuruşları] Bir nüfus 
memuru olmayı sevdim yani, hoşuma gitti nüfus memuru olmak. Geçen 
belediyedeydim. Adama sadece bir imza götürdüm. İmzaladı. Makbuz çıktısı aldı, 
buyurun dedi. Adamın işi sadece bundan ibaret. (Gülüyor) Adam memur. (Gülüyor) 
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He compared his job with the conditions of a registrar, who works in a more peaceful 
environment with more time to spend with her/his loved ones as Mahmut appreciates it, 
but not with a well-paid white-collar worker. When asked his opinions about being a 
military officer in general, he replied: 
Mahmut: Believe me I am getting old, sea makes a person old. Honestly. 
Sea, ship, stress… A constant stress. I couldn’t have lunch since this 
morning, just from running for everything. From answering a sudden phone 
call... Stress… It makes you get old. Being an officer is a good job for the 
person who wants it. (Laughing) But I am not that much now, that 
[Mahmut] in the first class is not here anymore. I am also looking for a way 
out, no need to lie.
250
 
 
Though while transcribing our interview, I realized we spoke very much about his 
girlfriend and their future plans, which actually depend on Mahmut’s salary, while he 
never mentioned the alternatives he considers for leaving the military in short run. 
Although Mahmut did not articulate the privileges of military officers loudly 
and clearly, quite like his mates, the privileges of a military career were not profoundly 
obscure to him as Bourdieu argues for dominant classes. His awareness found voice in 
his narrative through his silence about how he looks for a way to outside the military, 
through his talkativeness about his future plans with his girlfriend, or through the 
missing expression of the times he considered leaving during military education –either 
he ever thought about this or not. I interpret this awareness as a consequence/ impact of 
his relatively lower socio-economic background and dispositions “in the structure of the 
distribution of the different species of capital”  (Bourdieu, 1994, 28). 
                                                                                                                                               
Çok iyi ya! İnsanın bu salak işe böyle iştahla bakması çok üzücü bir şeydir bence. 
Tamam mı? Heyecan yok, tamam mı? O işte hiçbir şey yok, gerçekten hiçbir şey yok. 
Gidiyorsun sabahtan dükkanı açıyorsun oturuyorsun oraya. 5e kadar oturuyorsun. Çay 
kahve. Şu geldi, makbuz imzala bir şey yap, tamam buyurun. Günde 10 kişi belki gelir 
belki gelmez. Ondan sonra ben iş yaptım, paramı hak ettim, hadi evime gidiyorum. 
Evine gittikten sonra da arayan olmaz, soran olmaz, haftasonu var, vesaire vesaire 
vesaire. Ona iştahla bakıyorum işte. [Vurma sesi bu son iki-üç cümlede de sertleşti ve 
hızlandı] Acayip aranan biriyimdir ha, bakma sen! He rşeye beni ararlar. [İşten] 
(Gülüyoruz)  
250Mahmut: Vallahi yaşlanıyorum ya, deniz insanı yaşlandırıyor ya. Vallahi. Deniz, 
gemi, stres. Sürekli bir stres. Sabahtan beri öğlen yemeği yiyemedim ben, sağa sola 
koşturmaktan. Bir anda gelmiş bir telefona cevap vermekten. Stress… Yaşlandırıyor 
insanı. Subaylık yapmak isteyene güzel iş. (Gülüyor) Da ben öyle acayip şey değilim 
artık ya, o birinci sınıftaki [Mahmut] yok yani. Ben de çıkış yolları arıyorum, yalan yok.  
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4.2.2. Younger cohorts and new distinctions: at the intersection of Kemalism, class, 
and ethnicity 
 As argued in previous chapter, some former cadets from the second group went 
through painful processes of investigations in naval academy. A few of them fought to 
prove their innocence in court, as my interviewees Hakan, Eren and Arda put. Eren and 
Arda were among those who faced allegations about their personal lives because of the 
anonymous letters received by the administration. Eren addressed the commonalities 
among those who had been investigated as follows: 
Eren: I think that’s it, then I also said that they are Kemalist people, with a 
fired up point of view, I don’t know… When I think about it now, look at 
the friends outside, they are always flashy types, free thinkers… I don’t 
know, what can be their common traits? Their being Kemalist can be 
counted. Their taking alcohol… Because in that investigation, even this was 
a subject to be mentioned. You hang around all the weekends, or so. I can 
give that example for that change. While they told us that at first years, I 
mean alcohol was not like something forbidden, and even someone from 
higher rank, a vice admiral said “Of course you will get familiar with all 
kinds of environments, a marine officer knows everything, you will sit and 
drink at weekends, but won’t exaggerate” or so; at last years, a person could 
get detention for seven or fourteen weeks for just tasting alcohol.
251
 
 
 Eren, Arda and Hakan pointed out that Kemalism and expressing ideological 
closeness to secular nationalism were definitely commonalities of beleaguered cadets. 
Yet they were not as passionate as the four youngest former cadets I have interviewed, 
about this observation. These youngest former cadets were Rıdvan, Ali, Mert, and 
Furkan. To repeat myself, Rıdvan, Ali and Mert defined their detachment from the 
naval academy as “being pushed out rather than a self-decided leave. They said the 
unjust treatment they received from the commanders and officer-teachers of naval 
academy forced them to leave the school because they were worried about their futures. 
                                                 
251Eren: Bence bu o zamanlar şey diyordum ben de daha böyle gaz bir düşünce tarzıyla 
Atatürkçü kişiler diyordum da bilmiyorum ya… Şimdi de düşününce dışarıdaki 
arkadaşlara falan bakınca hep şeyler daha böyle parlak tipte, özgür düşünceli, ne 
bileyim ortak özellikleri ne olabilir? Atatürkçü olmaları denebilir. Alkol almaları 
denebilir. Çünkü o soruşturmalarda bunun bile konusu geçiyordu yani. Siz böyle işte 
sürekli haftasonları geziyorsunuz falan. Onu da şöyle aslında örnek verebilirim, o 
değişimi. İlk sınıflarda bize şey denirken, yani alkol yasak değil gibiydi, hatta üst 
seviyedeki, koramiral rütbesindeki biri diyorken “Tabii ki siz her ortama gireceksiniz, 
deniz subayı her şeyi bilir, oturup haftasonu içeceksiniz, ama abartmayacaksınız 
bilmem ne falan gibi konuşmalar yapılıyorken en son senelerde alkolün asını alana, yedi 
haftasonu mu on dört haftasonu mu, ceza veriyorlardı yani.  
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Rıdvan put that the commanders accused ten to fifteen cadets from his cohort by being 
undisciplined and forced them to extra military training after the bedtime. Although 
they were decided not to leave, after witnessing what happened to a very successful 
senior cadet they thought their futures are very shadowy too:  
Rıdvan: There is that thing: “You showed indiscipline” statement. But as the 
justification, they said I was unable to stand the gaff, was a little more a 
social person and could be more comfortable outside. Because were 
seriously resisting, we weren’t going to leave. We, as those 10 or 15 people 
would go till the end, wherever it went. They saw that we wouldn’t go, I 
guess, then they took me aside and said “You can be more successful 
outside; your grades are good anyway, you are a social person, we saw that 
you are at dance club, you dance, play basketball, you care about social 
activities…” They tried that way. I mean, that my life would be miserable in 
those four years, worse things would wait for me in the navy, I would not be 
able to handle that life, they said. We, as I said, was not going to leave, 
would continue, but later I heard, at the end of the year, that a friend was 
expelled, after studying […] years together with high school; he always had 
good grades, he was very successful at […] field but couldn’t rank higher 
degree because of his discipline grade; after I found that out, it was over for 
me. […] When there was just a month left, he was expelled, his diploma 
was given. […] They dismissed him. After hearing of that I thought my 
future could be like that, after studying for four years, I didn’t know when 
they would send me out… I mean that I might not have a good ending, what 
I would do if I was expelled at last stage; that I had to study for high school 
placement tests again… And there is that thing, being labeled as getting 
expelled from military school for discipline notes; I recognized that a little 
earlier and decided to quit. My friends were already leaving one by one. 
Usually at […] year people decided to quit. I have many friends who are 
thinking about quitting now. The thought that this place’s goose was 
cooked, however passionate we were, it wasn’t more important than our 
future was beginning to get in people’s heads.252 
                                                 
252Rıdvan: Şey var: “Disiplinsizlik yaptın söylemi. Ama bunun gerekçesini benim sıkıya 
gelemediğim, birazcık daha sosyal bir insan olmam, dışarıda daha rahat edebileceğimi 
söylüyorlardı. Çünkü ciddi bir direnç gösteriyorduk, ayrılmayacaktık. Biz o 10-15 kişi 
ayrılmayacaktık, sonuna kadar gidecektik, nereye giderse artık. Ayrılmayacağımızı 
gördüler mi artık ne, beni çekip öyle konuşuyorlardı: Sen dışarıda daha başarılı olursun, 
senin ders durumun da iyi zaten, sosyal bir insansın, bakıyoruz dans kolundaymışsın, 
dans ediyormuşsun, basketbol oynuyorsun, sosyal aktivitelere katılmayı çok şey 
yapıyorsun… Böyle bir noktadan girdiler. İşte dört senenin senin hayatın için zehir 
olacağını, donanmada da seni daha kötü şeylerin bekleyeceğini, sen bu hayata şey 
yapamazsın dediler. Biz dediğim gibi ayrılmayacaktık, devam edecektik ama ben daha 
sonra sene sonunda liseyle birlikte […] sene okuyup, her zaman ders durumu iyi olup, 
[…] bölümünde ortalaması yüksek olup ama disiplin puanı yüzünden dereceye 
giremiyordu, o arkadaşın atıldığını duyduktan sonra benim için bitmişti. […] Son bir ay 
kala okuldan atıldı, diploması verildi. […] İlişiğini kestiler. Ben bunu duyduktan sonra 
benim de sonumun böyle olabileceğini ve hani dört sene okuyup ya da kaçıncı senede 
atılacaksam bilmiyorum… Yani sonumun pek parlak olmadığını, son aşamada atılırsam 
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Therefore, according to them, accomplishment in courses is another commonality 
among the badly treated. The third one is having a high-ranked military officer in the 
family as mentioned in the introduction. These three commonalities of former cadets 
who were “pushed out are closely connected the new distinctions created within naval 
academy, mentioned in the third chapter.  
Moreover, Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert kept referring to the economic well being of 
their families throughout our interviews. This was something I never heard from my 
other research participants. 
Rıdvan: Yes, in the end, also my family’s condition is… in a level to afford 
university expenses. I wasn’t that in to graduating from there and having 
2500 TL salary, 4000 for colonels I think. My other friends were keeping 
the track of salaries or so. But the life in sea… We took short courses and it 
is not a life you can endure for that salary. Only people who like it can do it. 
I was having pleasure, to be honest. […] to develop our commandership 
skills, they gave commandership duties at small boats. I was having 
pleasure doing that, frankly. Money was not a big deal for me, as I said the 
condition of my family is good. My father earns more than most military 
officers; it is God’s honest truth.253 
 
If one is in need of a guaranteed job, his/her nationalism is not a sincere one according 
to Rıdvan. As such, the willingness of a person to become a military officer is 
questionable if s/he is seeking for a guaranteed salary. Hence, nationalism and the 
“quality of a military officer are linked to ones socio-economic background. Rıdvan’s 
evaluation of the situation of his classmates who need a guaranteed job is strikingly in 
line with the historical self-understanding of the military officers as a privileged, 
“preatorian coterie (İnsel 2009, 56). 
                                                                                                                                               
dışarıda ne yapacağımı, tekrar LYS sınavına hazırlanıp sınava girmem gerektiğini… Ve 
disiplin yüzünden askeri okuldan atılmış damgası yemek var yani, o yüzden bunu biraz 
erken sezip ayrılma kararı aldım. Zaten teker teker ayrılıyor o arkadaşlar. Genelde […] 
sınıfta ayrılmaya karar veriyor insanlar. Şu anda ayrılmayı düşünen bir çok arkadaşım 
var. Artık bu işin suyunun çıktığını, ne kadar bir tutku olsa da geleceğimizden ya da 
hayatımızdan önemli olmadığı düşüncesi artık kafalarda yer etmeye başladı.  
253 Rıdvan: Evet, sonuçta benim ailevi durumum da … Üniversitesinin şeyini 
karşılayabilecek bir seviyede. Ben oradan mezun olup 2.5 maaşa, albay olanlar 4 alıyor 
galiba, şeyim değildi. Diğer arkadaşlar takip ediyorlardı maaşlar şöyle falan. Ama 
denizdeki hayat… Kısa seyirlere çıktık ve o hayat o maaşa çekilebilecek bir hayat değil. 
Sadece seven insan yapabiliyor. Ben haz alıyordum açıkçası. […] bizim de komutanlık 
şeyimizi geliştirmeye yönelik, küçük gemilerde komutanlık görevi veriyorlardı. Ben 
bunları yaparken haz alıyordum açıkçası. Para benim için bir şey değildi yani. dediğim 
gibi ailevi durumum da iyi benim. Benim babam çoğu subaydan çok daha fazla para 
kazanıyor açıkçası, doğruya doğru yani. 
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 Then the issue of ethnicity rises to the surface, albeit indistinctly, in the 
perceptions of my youngest research participants. Burak, from an elder cohort, also 
made a mention of ethnicity. Nonetheless, he only told that he heard the trips of their 
commanders and officer-teachers to the eastern cities of the country to publicize 
military high schools. Although uncertain about this information, he was sure that his 
generation of cadets was mostly ill-pleased [memnuniyetsiz] about professional military 
education and its promises: 
Burak: Well, I guess they tried to change the student profile, because when 
they took me and students like me, we were dissatisfied. We were just 
dissatisfied. Then I think; do I endure this entire ordeal for 3500 TL?
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Rıdvan, however, was certain about the ethnic and lingual difference of particular 
cadets and he was very much annoyed by their “abnormal existence in naval academy: 
Rıdvan: Nobody has problems. Even if there is, student union detects it and 
tries to reconcile them. Or, there were two friends who fought, our 
commanders put them in the same double room, saying “you two will stay 
here now, talk to each other and compromise.” But there was this thing, 
look, in military academy, there was a large group speaking in Kurdish 
among themselves. 10 people or so would close themselves in a room and 
speak loudly in Kurdish. Interesting. They called us things like Turkey 
soldiers. 
How so? 
I don’t know, weird… 
Is it like joking?  
It is like joking but there can’t be such a joke, how?... Even as a joke it is 
horrible, they call us Turkey soldiers. When I hear this, the first thing 
coming into my mind is PKK, to be honest. […] 
Did you have friends from high school among them? 
No, there weren’t. […] One of my friends slapped one’s neck, as a joke. He 
said “Turkey soldier has hit me”. He said that laughing but even if it is a 
joke there is a grain of truth, I think. There is something lying under that 
statement. In high school there weren’t such things. You are rich, you are 
poor, you are Alevi, you are Kurd… I heard nothing like that. Perhaps it 
was because I wasn’t interested in, I don’t know. It didn’t catch my eyes. In 
military academy, I also wasn’t interested but I saw. There were people who 
didn’t know National Anthem. I know it certainly. When they asked about 
National Anthem… They asked some questions, as I said. “Can you say the 
first quatrain of the National Anthem?” they asked. He said something odd 
like “korkma sönmez bu şafaklarda yüzen al sancak, ne bu şiddet bu celal 
                                                 
254Burak: Ya hani diyorum ya öğrenci profilini değiştirmek istediler, çünkü ben ve 
benim gibi öğrenciler aldıkları zaman biz memnuniyetsizdik. Memnuniyetsiziz yani. 
Düşünüyorum şimdi ben, bu kadar çileyi üç buçuk milyar için mi çekiyorum?  
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(Fear not, for the crimson flag that proudly ripples in this glorious twilight, 
shall not fade; why the anger, why the rage). He couldn’t continue, of 
course. In the end, coming for being an officer to Turkish Armed Forces and 
not knowing the National Anthem is not something very normal for me. I 
mean who didn’t know was some, sorry one of those friends who spoke in 
Kurdish. Well, I don’t think the others did… When I told this to my family, 
they said “Why do you discriminate against people for their ethnical 
background?” I don’t discriminate them, they have Turkish id after all; they 
live in Turkey. Even if they are so, they are Kurds, they have to fulfill some 
tasks I think, if they are living on this territory. If they are getting in Turkish 
Armed Forces, they have to know these things, I don’t know. If they don’t 
feel themselves as Turks… After all, the nationalism description of Ataturk 
is also like that: Anyone who feels like a Turk, defines himself as a Turk, 
calls himself as a Turk is Turk. Our ethnical background does not matter. 
But it seems they do not feel as Turks and so they don’t know our National 
Anthem.
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255Rıdvan: Kimsenin arasında bozukluk yok. Olsa da öğrenci birliği tespit edip onları 
kaynaştırmaya çalışıyor. Ya da kavga eden iki arkadaş olmuştu, komutanlarımız onları 
aynı iki kişilik odaya koymuşlardı: “Siz artık burada kalacaksınız, birbirinize şey yapın, 
anlaşın konuşun falan diye. Kavga olmayacak falan diye. Ama şey vardı bak, Harp 
Okulunda aralarında Kürtçe konuşan büyük bir kesim vardı açıkçası. 10 kişi falan bir 
odada kapanıp Kürtçe bağıra bağıra konuşuyorlardı. İlginç. Şey diyorlardı bize T.C. 
askeri falan diyorlardı yani.  
Nasıl yani? 
Bilmiyorum, garip… 
Dalga geçer gibi mi? 
Dalga geçer gibi ama böyle dalga geçemezsin ki, nasıl..? Şakası bile bunun korkunç. 
T.C. askeri diyor bize. Benim bunu duyduğumda ilk aklıma gelen şey PKK açıkçası. 
[…] Onlar arasında liseden olan arkadaşlarınız var mıydı? 
Hayır yok. […] Benim arkadaşım bir tanesinin şaka babında ensesine vurmuştu galiba. 
Demişti ki “T.C. askeri bana vurdu demişti yani. Gülerek demişti ama sonuçta şaka bile 
olsa bence bir gerçeklik payı var yani. bir şey yatıyor o söylemin altında. Lisede 
herhangi bir şey yoktu yani. sen zenginsin, sen fakirsin, sen Alevisin, sen Kürtsün… 
Ben hiçbir şey duymadım. Belki de ilgilenmediğim için duymamışımdır bilmiyorum 
ama. Gözüme çarpmadı. Harp okulunda da ilgilenmiyordum ama gördüm. İstiklal 
Marşını bilmeyen insanlar vardı. Çok bir net bir şekilde biliyorum bunu. İstiklal Marşını 
sorduklarında… Demiştim ya sorular soruyorlardı bize. “İstiklal Marşının ilk kıtasını 
okur musun? demişti, “korkma sönmez bu şafaklarda yüzen al sancak, ne bu şiddet bu 
celal gibi öyle değişik bir şey demişti. Sonra da devamı gelmemişti tabii ki. Sonuçta 
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine subay olmaya girip de İstiklal Marşından bihaber olmak çok 
normal bir şey değil bence. Yani bu Kürtçe konuşan arkadaşlar bazıları, bir tanesiydi 
pardon, bilmeyen. Diğerlerinin de şey yaptığını sanmıyorum da… Ben bunu aileme 
anlattığımda “niye insanlara şey yapıyorsun, etnik köken ayrımcılığı yapıyorsun? 
demişlerdi. Ben öyle bir ayrımcılık yapmıyorum, sonuçta Türk kimlikleri var, 
Türkiyede yaşıyorlar. Şey olsa bile Kürt olsa bile bazı şeyleri yerine getirmeleri 
gerekiyor diye düşünüyorum, yani bu topraklarda yaşıyorlarsa. Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetlerine gireceklerse bunları bilmeleri gerekiyor bence, bilmiyorum. Kendini Türk 
olarak hissetmiyorsa… Sonuçta Atatürkün milliyetçilik tanımı da öyle: Kendini Türk 
hisseden, Türk olarak tanımlayan, Türküm diyen herkes Türktür sonuçta. Etnik kökenin 
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Rıdvan put that there are cadets whose mother tongue is Kurdish, and who do not know 
the Turkish National Anthem by heart.  
Most of my research participants from different cohorts agree on Rıdvan, Ali 
and Mert’s expectations about the ideological, ethnic and economic backgrounds of the 
prospective cadets, and thus, military officers: they think the military officers will 
gradually become people coming from low class families with lower social and cultural 
capital. Some like Rıdvan, Ali and Mert also assert that prospective cadets will be from 
diverse ethnicities unlike the current situation, in which the majority is from Turkish 
families. Moreover, regarding the long-lasted war between armed Kurdish movement 
and the governments, Kurdish cadets are deemed to be the most important threats 
towards the historically approved identity of Kemalist, Turkish and middle class 
military officer. Turkish Alevi community that has a widespread sympathy for 
Kemalism due to its secular envisgement of the state is not a threat to the military. Non-
Muslim communities have always been considered as less of citizens than Muslim 
majority. While there are no legal obstacles before a Catholic, Protestan, Greek 
Orthodox, or Jewish citizen if s/he wants to become a military professional, it is still 
unimaginable in Turkey
256
. Ethnic minorities such as Georgian, Gypsy, Circassian or 
Laz are not even a matter of mention in hegemonic discouses of the military and the 
state as well as in the narratives of my youngest interviewees. 
All in all, the threats felt and implied by my research participants are centered 
on the intersection of Kemalism, class and ethnicity. These perceived threats are 
directed towards the historical priviledges of the “preatorian coterie (İnsel 2009[2004], 
56) according to many, and thus, towards the ideal (middle class, Turkish and Kemalist) 
military masculinity. Therefore, in the narratives of younger cohorts, the discrepancy 
between their expectations while in military school and current circumstances of 
military professionals find voice through these new disctinctions, which started to 
emerge among cadets after the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, as argued in the third 
chapter. 
                                                                                                                                               
bir önemi yok. Ama demek ki bir kendilerini Türk olarak hissetmiyorlar ki İstiklal 
Marşımızı bilmiyorlar.  
256Ayça Örer’s interview with author and researcher Rıfat Bali on his book Gayrimüslim 
Mehmetçikler: Hatıralar – Tanıklıklar, “Subay olmak hiçbir gayrimüslimin aklına 
gelmez.”, Radikal, September 19, 2011, accessed January 5, 2014. 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/kultur/subay_olmak_hicbir_gayrimuslimin_aklina_gelmez-
1063738. For more see Bali 2011. 
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4.3. Diverse justifications of the discrepancy between expectations and 
circumstances 
 Whether they currently are military officers or not, almost all of my research 
participants stated their frustration about the life style required by a military career. As 
some left military school because of social and economic concerns, some others –
especially those from younger cohorts– left because they were forced to leave. Not only 
the material working conditions but also the social and emotional burdens of military 
professionalism are sources of the perceived discrepancy between the expectations 
cadets develop during professional military education and the existing socio-economic 
conditions of military officers. In the same vein, those who left or were expelled from 
Turkish Naval High School or Turkish Naval Academy are content with their current 
situation when they compare it with the working conditions of a military officer.  
 Former cadets who left military school with social and economic anxieties or 
merely because they could not stand the disciplinary rules are content with their state of 
affairs. Yet I shall mention some of the differences between the contentment expressed 
by elder and younger cohorts. Rıdvan, Ali, Mert and Furkan expressed only their 
disturbance by the financial burden that is taken on by their parents with their 
detachment from the academy. On the other hand, as a person who made the hard 
decision of leaving in the face of his fathers disapproval and the financial burden he will 
take on his own, Berk pointed out the struggle of being inside or outside while wishing 
to be the opposite in either case:  
Berk: You should either not get in at all or not let the idea get into your 
head. When you get in, getting out is a problem; when you don’t, thinking 
like why I didn’t get in, I would have been like this is another problem. You 
will never get in [or] never think about it. When you do either of them it is a 
swamp. […] For example, I could have been an idle university graduate 
now who couldn’t earn money and couldn’t manage himself. Then I would 
have said “I wish I had gone to naval high school. Now, I could have been 
an officer, could had that much salary, could do that…” Because I would 
have known nothing about that place and this would be a thorn in my flesh. 
I went in and now I still swear it saying “man, my life is fucked”. This is 
also a weight. Therefore, there are two conditions: you won’t get in and 
won’t ever think about it. You will do neither of them. This is a must. 257 
                                                 
257 Berk: Ya hiç girmeyeceksin ya hiç aklından geçirmeyeceksin. Girdiğin zaman 
çıkmak problem, aklından geçirdiğin zaman ulan niye girmedim, girseydim böyle 
olacaktım diye aklından geçirmek başka bir problem. Hiç girmeyeceksin, [ya da] hiç 
aklından geçirmeyeceksin. İkisinden birini yaptığın zaman bataklık. […] Atıyorum ben 
şu an üniversite mezunu aylak bir herif olabilir ve para kazanamıyor olabilir ve kendi 
kendimi çeviremiyor olabilirdim. O zaman şöyle derdim: Ulan deniz lisesine girseydim, 
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 Becoming a military officer was not “the dream of most of my research 
participants except for Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert who were “pushed out from the school 
and angry at the institution. The immobility and inflexibility of a military career cannot 
provide the “freedom that is deemed to exist in neoliberal market as asserted by the 
eldest-first group of interviewees. Since they were raised as “the future protectors of the 
nation to be the priviledged coterie of the society, those who became officers find 
themselves feeling disappointed after graduation. Not only their professional lives but 
also their personal lives and emotional states continue to be under the effect of their 
career, as is the case during military education. There is thus a widely perceived 
discrepancy between the future expectations they have developed while in military 
schools, and the life style that awaits them after graduation. Those who left or were 
expelled from the school observe and articulate the disappointment of their classmates, 
and express their contentment about being outside the military in one way or another. 
Although most of them still value military professionalism with nationalist drives, they 
are glad to be outside, again, except Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert.  
Mahmut is the one interviewee, among those from elder cohorts, who 
distinguishes from the others with his socio-economic background  “within the structure 
of the distribution of the different species of capital” (Bourdieu, 1994, 28). Although he 
did not mention the advantages of military personnel explicitly, several reasons lead me 
different species to the conclusion that his awareness of the privileges of a military 
career is a structural impact of his relatively lower socio-economic background and 
dispositions. 
Militarism and the military itself act an essential role in the neoliberal state, and 
in class relations. As Akça argues, militarism is a constitutive part of the neoliberal 
market and ever changing class relations (Akça 2010b, 360-361). This chapter was 
meant to illustrate that the military holds its constitutive role not only through macro 
structures but also within and through micro processes. While the majority of my elder 
interviewes state experiencing dissatisfaction because of the abovementioned 
discrepancy for mainly socio-economic reasons; Rıdvan, Ali, and Mert indicated the 
                                                                                                                                               
subay olsaydım şu an şu kadar maaşım vardı, şunu yapıyordum. Çünkü oradaki hiçbir 
şeyi bilmeyecektim, o benim hayat boyu içime dert olacaktı. Girdim, ulan hayatım 
sikildi diye hala beddua ediyorsun, o da bir dert. O yüzden iki ayağı var: girmeyeceksin, 
aklından bile geçirmeyeceksin. İkisini de yapmayacaksın. Şart bu.  
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social and political background of the discrepancy they experience, namely the 
military’s recent falling from grace. That is why the narratives of my research 
participants overlap to a great extent on the existence of such a discrepancy although 
with diverse justifications. As the elder cohorts addressed a loss of power on the side of 
the military in the neoliberal market and state, youngest-first group of interviewees 
expressed their expectation of the rising significance of political, ethnic, and class 
distinctinctions in shaping the future of military professionalism in Turkey. Whilst the 
military reorganizes itself by downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing, mainly with the 
incentives of the JDP government, it also holds on to its historical autonomy in “internal 
affairs. In the mean time, the transformations of perceptions on professional military 
education and military professionalism in respect to the rising neoliberalism and the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz trials signal major changes in the ideal identity and background 
of military officers. 
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
 
 “All knowledge is a condensed node in an agonistic power field”, says Donna 
Haraway (Haraway 1988, 577). Powerfully challenging the ideological doctrines of 
disembodied scientific objectivity, she states that feminist objectivity means simply 
situated knowledges. It is “about limited location and situated knowledge, not about 
transcendence and splitting of subject and object” (Haraway 1988, 583). This thesis is 
aimed at presenting an objective vision, as redefined by Haraway, with a partial 
perspective on the military institution, and civil-military relations in Turkey, in this 
specific historical context.  
 In Chapter 2, I attempted to historicize the links between the military’s falling 
from grace and the structure and subjects of professional military education.I tried to 
cover the large literature on civil–military relations in Turkey, and the past and present 
of military education, especially of Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval 
Academy,from the late 18
th
 century of the Ottoman Empire to the latest developments in 
Ergenekon and Balyoz [Sledgehammer] trials. The military’s anti-democratically 
powerful ideological and physical existence in politics, if not in our social world, 
gradually recedes approximately since 2007. The ‘scientifically objective’ accounts on 
civil-military relations neglect the micro level ramifications of this macro 
transformation process. However, the military’s changing roles in domestic and 
international arena have historically shaped and been shaped by the subjects who 
comprise the military and their education. Not only the narratives of my research 
participants but also quantitative data show that there has been serious repercussions of 
TAF’s declining reputation and changing position in the public sphere on professional 
military education. While the dramatic decrease in number of applications to and 
graduations from military academies reflect a paradigmatic shift in popularity of 
military schools in our historical context, this does not necessarily mean that military 
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professionalism might loose its power and socially constructed ‘absolute importance’ in 
the long run.  
 I met a young man who left Turkish Military Academy while I was approaching 
the end of this thesis. He asserted that the current cadets of the Naval Forces did not 
face even half of the mobbing, and psychological and physical violence that they had 
been exposed to. However, according to my research participants and many public 
figures and journalists, Turkish Naval Academy receives a significant share from these 
‘changes’ in professional military education. In Chapter 3, I traced the impacts of this 
process on the Turkish Naval High School and Turkish Naval Academy along different 
axes by focusing particularly on the disciplines through which military subjectivities 
and masculinities are made up.  
Suffering from perpetual fear of violence, hierarchies of suffering, and the daily 
routine of bodily disciplines deform the understanding of the ‘self’, as a means of 
producing both productive and subjected bodies through military education. However, I 
argued that this allegedly homogenous entity is made up of diverse subjectivities, 
bodies, and ideologies in despite of this routine, standard, and disciplinary training that 
military education continue to have. There are thus different modes of subjection and 
subjectivation, and these different modes create different military masculinities. On the 
other hand, the kinds of disciplines military education involves and the making of 
subjectivities are in a process of transformation. I suggest that the historical shift in the 
military’s positioning in Turkish context ranges from its declining reputation in the 
public sphere to internal restructuring of power,and of the forms of making military 
masculinities in military schools. That is why, the authority has been gradually 
centralizing and concentrating in the hands of the governing military officers since 2008 
and 2009, as perceived by my interviewees. In order to achieve this, the administrative 
commanders eliminate solidarity, comfort, and power zones of the cadets.  
Finally in Chapter 4, I argue that there is a significant economic side of the 
impacts of the military’s falling from grace on professional military education. First, 
militarism and the military play constitutive roles in neoliberal market through its 
concrete bodies such as the companies of Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and 
OYAK. As this is a two-sided story, the market shapes the military institution as well. 
TAF has been participating in global and domestic trends of downsizing, outsourcing 
and privatizing, especially since the 1990s. Thisalso challenges the ways in which 
military subjectivities are constructed. Together with the declining political and social 
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‘prestige’ of the military, the emerging values of neoliberalism such as flexibility, 
uncertainty, and freedom challenge the perceptions on military education and military 
professionalism, according to most of my research participants. If the first reason of 
increasingly negative perceptions of former cadets on military professionalism is the 
military’s loss of power and ‘prestige’, the second is the perceived conflicts between the 
burgeoning values of neoliberal market, and the military values and rules such as 
hierarchy of experience, inability to choose one’s work place, or dependence of all the 
members on the institutional decisions taken by a few high ranking military officers. 
For a long time throughout the fieldwork, and even the writing process, I was 
quite prejudiced by the abovementioned negative perceptions of some interviewees, 
some of whom are also my friends, and by my memories about the impacts of my 
Colonel grandfather’s on my father’s life and decisions.  However, I gradually realized 
the privileges of a military career silenced in the accounts of the middle or upper middle 
class former cadets. While only a few interviewees voiced these privileges, I hope that I 
was able to reflect upon them in Chapter 4.  
Three groups of research participants perceive and make sense of these changes 
quite differently, which is in itself a part of my argument on the unprecedented 
historical shift in the military and military education. The elder former cadets consider 
the process as deformation of the values that construct military masculinities. Yet the 
interviewees who suffered either administrative investigations or mobbing and 
extracurricular violence channel their anger towards the unfair treatment they received 
into macro actors, such as the Gülen movement or the JDP. With regard to the inside of 
the naval academy, they do not connect this Foucauldian story of centralization of  
authority and intensifying discipline to macro level processes since they did not witness 
the earlier state. However, they point out new distinctions emerging among the cadets, 
which did not exist before according to my elder interviewees who appreciate class 
unity and close friendships as integral parts of professional military education. These 
distinctions appear along the lines of Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, class, and 
ethnicity. They put that the economic background of future cadets will gradually 
deteriorate because a military career becomes less and less attractive, for several 
reasons, for children or adolescents who come from similar backgrounds with them. 
The youngest group referred to the ‘threat’ of Kurdish men’s existence in the military 
since they know cadets from their cohort speaking Kurdish in naval academy. 
Regarding the examples such as the US military which is completely based upon 
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professional soldiers who mostly come from lower class and migrant families, their 
overwhelming expectationsabout the future of the professional military give hints of the 
possible consequences of the military’s falling from grace, and fitting in the neoliberal 
market by downsizing, outsourcing and privatizing. In short, beyond what I have 
observed along the differences between three groups of my research participants, the 
younger group calls attention more than the rest to changingmodes of making military 
masculinities in military schools.The prototypical subjectivity and masculinity of a 
military officer have historically been Kemalist, Turkish and mostly middle class, since 
the establishment of the Republic. As my research participants claim, this image might 
be in a transformation process in this specific historical context.  
All in all, the unprecedented historical shift in the military extends to internal 
restructuring of power to serious changes in ideological, ethnic, and class composition 
in military education. Neither the military nor the military schools are composed of 
homogenous subjectivities and a standard military masculinity. Thus, this heterogeneity 
continues to take new forms in our historical context. 
There are of course several shortcomings and further prospects offered by this 
thesis. First of all, my interviewees were born between 1987 and 1994, a generation, 
which did not witness even the February 28 military intervention in 1997 as adults. The 
JDP government had been in power throughout their adolescence. This fact prompts 
many questions: What would be their reactions to anonymous letters about them 
received by the academy if they had been cadets before the JDP rule? Would they leave 
the academy with increasing concerns about their future in the military, or would they 
act differently? Would there be such letters in the first place? Secondly, while the 
fathers of many of them were military officers of NCOs, they were also military 
children whose lives were, and probably still are ‘encompassed’ by the military’s 
material assets, incentives, prestige, security and care (Şen 2014, 8). Almost all of those 
who were not military children were raised by Kemalist families who knew the military 
institution as a powerful and prestigious actor in politics and social life of Turkey. The 
military’s falling grace started after all of my participants were already in naval high 
school or academy. Moreover, all of the interviewees have grown up in a neoliberal 
context in which everything turns into commodities, and material assets gradually erase 
the value of historically and socially prestigious occupations. One wonders whether or 
how these two specific historical conditions factor in the silence in their narratives 
regarding the privileges provided by the military. What would be, for instance, the 
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repercussions of a similar process of transformation if one of these conditions had not 
been valid? 
Some further prospects offered by this research are intentionally not discussed 
throughout the thesis in order not to be speculative about such a tender issue. The first 
one is the question of whether the ongoing changes in military schools are a part of kind 
of a planned shift in the profile of the future professional military. Are these changes 
only efforts of commanders who want their students to stay out of the chaos the high 
ranking officers were facing? Or is there a decision-making on the higher levels of the 
military institution about the internal restructuring of military schools and military 
masculinities? Although further research is required to be able to answer these 
questions, there are a few points marked in this thesis that hint at the latter: the decrease 
of compensation penalty in the past years, in cases of voluntary detachment or 
dismissals, and the serious investigations that some of my interviewees and many other 
cadets went through despite the fact that the accusation letters were anonymous and 
might not have been taken this seriously.  
Secondly, the content of these changes ‘strangely’ includes the punishment or at 
least questioning of alcohol consumption outside the school or having heterosexual sex. 
This research also raises a question about whether there is a nontransparent power in the 
cadre of TAF. Most of my research participants stated their belief that there is. While 
most avoided identifying this power, many research participants such as Hakan, who 
has been a cadet of Turkish Naval High School as a part of the Gülen community, 
claimed that Gülen movement is organized within the military since the middle of the 
2000s. Their claims bring forth an outburst of questions about the future of the 
professional military: writing on the history of the impacts of German-Prussian and the 
US military models on the Turkish Armed Forces, I wonder whether one can speculate 
about a new model in the military in the near future. The ongoing changes in the 
structure and the bureaucracy of military schoolsmight as well have corollaries in the 
high ranks of the military. What kind of a professional military awaits us?An 
increasingly Islamist one with the alleged impacts or internal organization of the Gülen 
movement, a military with lower class, ideologically more diverse (differing from the 
old Kemalist tradition of the military) and non-Turkish professionals, a totally 
professional military as in the case of the US or the UK, or a combination of all these 
changes? These are only some of the new questions that emanate from this research, 
although the scope of the research is not adequate to answer them.What this research 
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does show is that there is a major transformation taking place, not only in civil-military 
relations in general, but at all levels of the military institution itself. I hope that this 
partialaccount on professional military education and civil-military relations will lend 
support to the growing field of studies on the military institution and military members.  
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